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.Introduction
What determines human behavior? This seemingly simple question is at the core of
economics and the social sciences more generally. Yet, it is one of the most difficult
questions to answer for at least two reasons: First, the presence and choices of others
influence our own behavior and requires a systematic study of social aspects. Second,
every decision relies on our subjective beliefs about unobserved states of the world,
and these beliefs may reflect heterogeneous expectations about the consequences
of different choices. By investigating the role of peers for behavior and by studying
the systematic variation in beliefs, this thesis contributes to our understanding of
human behavior and decision-making.
It is widely accepted that peers influence consumption behavior, general well-
being, and performance. Yet, we do not know much about how individuals choose
these peers in the first place and about the consequences of peer self-selection. The
first two chapters, Chapters 1 and 2, which are joint work with Jonas Radbruch and
Sebastian Schaube, therefore aim at filling this gap. We first examine how allowing
individuals to choose with whom to interact affects their performance relatively to
exogenously assigned peers (Chapter 1), and second, whom they actually choose as
peers (Chapter 2). In order to study this self-selection of peers, we conduct a field
experiment in secondary schools and allow students in two treatment arms to select
their peers themselves, while in another they are randomly assigned to a peer.
Chapter 1: “Self-selection of Peers and Performance” analyzes the conse-
quences of peer self-selection on performance. It documents that individuals, who
can self-select their peers, improve their performance more than those with ran-
domly assigned peers. In principle, these differences in performance may stem from
two sources: First, individuals interact with different peers, who influence perfor-
mance. Thus, accounting for differences in the peer composition may explain our
findings. Second, the results could stem from a psychological effect of being able to
self-select peers rather than having them assigned. Although a peer’s characteristics
such as his or her performance explain part of the variation in one’s own perfor-
mance, these peer effects cannot explain the treatment effects. Rather, our data indi-
cate a positive effect on performance when having autonomy over peer assignments.
Furthermore, the presence of peer effects in multiple dimensions has implications
for the design of reassignment policies such as tracking regimes, which are based
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on, e.g., measures of students’ ability. If policy-makers want to reassign students
into classrooms or workers into teams based on peer effects in a single dimension
only, they neglect the fact that reassigning rules simultaneously change other peer
characteristics, giving rise to peer effects apart from the targeted dimension. These
effects can counterbalance each other leading to ambiguous net effects.
Chapter 2: “Determinants of Peer Selection” studies whom individuals choose
as peers and links these choices to three potential determinants. Particularly, the
chapter assesses the extent to which the selection of peers depends on (i) the rel-
ative performance of peers, (ii) personality differences, and (iii) the presence of
friendship ties. By quantifying the relative contributions of performance and social
aspects for peer choices, we find that friendship is the most important determinant,
but individuals exhibit sizable homophily both in past performance and personality.
These results help to explain why previous studies often find that different groups ex-
ert peer effects of different sizes. In particular, we suggest that selective peer choices
may give rise to individual-specific peer groups that result in differential peer effects.
Chapters 1 and 2 document peer effects in performance and that individuals
prefer peers who are similar to themselves. Although such peer choices and peer
effects yield a correlated outcomes among peers, decisions often remain highly het-
erogeneous in general. One potential explanation for such heterogeneities are dif-
ferences in beliefs that individuals hold. The aim of Chapters 3 and 4 is to systemat-
ically study the heterogeneity of subjective beliefs and expectations in two specific
contexts. First, I investigate parents’ beliefs about the returns to different parent-
ing styles and neighborhoods (Chapter 3). Second, in joint work with Pia Pinger,
Philipp Seegers, and Jan Bergerhoff, I characterize gender differences in students’
wage expectations and discuss potential drivers thereof (Chapter 4).
Parents are crucial for the development and success of children as they grow up.
However, not much is known about how parents decide how to raise their children,
and how parenting decisions depend on the environment in which a family lives. In
order to answer these questions, Chapter 3: “Understanding Parental Decision-
making: Beliefs about Returns to Parenting Styles and Neighborhoods” studies
parents’ beliefs about the returns to two factors affecting the development and long-
term outcomes of children: (i) parenting styles defined by the extent of warmth
and control parents employ in raising their children, and (ii) neighborhood quality.
Based on a representative sample of over 2,000 parents in the United States, I show
that parents hold well-formed beliefs: they expect large returns to the warmth di-
mension of parenting as well as to living in a good neighborhood. Regarding the
relation of both factors, I find that parents perceive parenting as being able to com-
pensate partly for adverse environments. Moreover, mothers expect larger returns
than fathers, but there is no socioeconomic gradient in perceived returns. Parents’
perceived returns are relevant for their actual decision-making in so far that they are
predictive for actual parenting behavior. Hence, my results highlight that parental
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beliefs are an important determinant of parental decision-making, but cannot ex-
plain socioeconomic differences in parenting.
Chapter 4: “Gender Differences in Wage Expectations: Sorting, Children,
and Negotiation Styles” presents evidence from a large-scale study on gender dif-
ferences in wage expectations based on a sample of over 15,000 students in Germany.
Studying such wage expectations before labor market entry is important as they may
determine further educational or labor market choices, affect within-household bar-
gaining or negotiations with prospective employers, and may have consequences
for financial decision-making, e.g., in terms of an optimal choice of retirement and
savings plans. We document a large gender gap in expected wages that amounts
to approximately 500,000 EUR over the life-cycle and resembles actual wage differ-
ences. In order to understand the underlying causes and determinants, we relate
these expected wages to (i) differential sorting into majors, industries, and occupa-
tions, (ii) differences in child-rearing plans, and (iii) male-female differences in ne-
gotiation styles. We show that males and females sort themselves into different ma-
jors, industries, and occupations, and follow different negotiation strategies. While
child-rearing plans are comparable across genders, females expect child-penalties
for giving birth to children before the age of 30.
In summary, this thesis focuses on human behavior and decision-making by in-
vestigating the role of peer influences and subjective expectations. Using data from
field experiments and large-scale surveys, the four chapters provide a starting point
for further analyses of social aspects and heterogeneous beliefs.
.
.Chapter 1
Self-selection of Peers and
Performance
Joint with Jonas Radbruch and Sebastian Schaube
1.1 Introduction
“The first thing I would do every morning was look at the box
scores to see what Magic did. I didn’t care about anything else.”
– Larry Bird
Basketball hall of famer Larry Bird motivated himself to train harder not by focusing
on any player but rather by looking at his rival Magic Johnson’s performance dur-
ing the previous night’s game. Similarly, seeing a specific classmate study long and
continuously might also help to concentrate on one’s own work. In various dimen-
sions of life – ranging from students in educational settings (Sacerdote, 2001) over
cashiers in supermarkets (Mas and Moretti, 2009) and fruit pickers on strawberry
fields (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2009; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2010)
to fighter pilots during World War II (Ager, Bursztyn, and Voth, 2016) – people
affect each other through their presence, performance and choices. Yet, these so-
cial influences often stem from specific persons – roommates, frequently interacting
coworkers, friends, or former colleagues – that individuals select themselves. This is
in stark contrast with settings in which peers are randomly or exogenously assigned.
But what actually changes once we allow peers to be self-selected? In general, these
settings differ in two aspects: first, self-selection changes with whom one interacts;
and, second, having the opportunity to self-select peers fundamentally changes the
mode of peer assignment from exogenous (or random) assignment to self-selection.
Both of these channels potentially alter an individual’s motivation and behavior.
In this paper, we study how different peer assignment rules – self-selection ver-
sus random assignment – affect individual performance. In doing so, we examine a
key feature of many peer effect studies, namely the absence of self-selection. In a
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first step, we document differences in performance between treatments which allow
for self-selection or random assignment of peers. Subsequently, we analyze the un-
derlying mechanisms. For this purpose, we decompose performance improvements
into their two possible sources: an indirect effect stemming from changes in the
peer composition and a direct effect from being able to self-select rather than being
assigned to a specific peer.
In order to study the effects of self-selection, we conducted a framed field exper-
iment (Harrison and List, 2004) with over 600 students (aged 12 to 16) in physical
education classes of German secondary schools. Students took part in two running
tasks (suicide runs) – first alone, then with a peer – and filled out a survey in be-
tween that elicited preferences for peers, personal characteristics, and the social
network within each class. Our treatments exogenously varied the peer assignment
in the second run using three different peer assignment rules. We implemented
a random matching of pairs (Random) as well as two matching rules that used
elicited preferences to implement two notions of self-selection: first, the classroom
environment enabled students to state preferences for known peers (name-based
preferences); and second, using a running task yielded direct measures of perfor-
mance and thus could be used to select peers based on their relative performance
in the first run (performance-based preferences). Using these two sets of preferences,
we implemented two treatments with self-selection of peers by matching students
based on either their name-based preferences (Name) or preferences over relative
performance (Performance).
We find that self-selection of peers leads to an average performance improve-
ment of 14–15 percent of a standard deviation relative to randomly assigned peers.
While students in Random also improve their performance from the first to the sec-
ond run, the improvements with self-selected peers almost double. Self-selection
changes the peer composition, e.g., students predominantly interact with friends in
Name, but tend to choose others with a similar past performance in Performance.
Based on this finding, we decompose the overall treatment effect into an indirect
effect that is due to the peer’s altered characteristics and a direct effect of being able
to self-select a peer. Although we observe substantial peer effects in multiple dimen-
sions (e.g., in relative performance in the first run), a peer’s characteristics do not
explain treatment differences resulting in an indirect effect close to zero. Instead,
our estimates provide evidence that there is a direct effect of peer self-selection
on performance. Therefore, the process of self-selection itself increases the perfor-
mance of students. Borrowing from self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985;
Deci and Ryan, 2000), we interpret this direct effect as a positive effect of having
autonomy: being able to self-select peers has a psychological effect that enhances in-
trinsic motivation and improves subsequent performance. Finally, we simulate other
exogenous peer assignment rules that seek to maximize or minimize the produc-
tivity differences between students. We document that these alternative rules yield
performance improvements close to those observed with randomly assigned peers
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and therefore lower than those with peer self-selection. These findings thus sup-
port our interpretation that self-selection of peers carries a intrinsic value beyond
changes in the peer composition.
Our results have three main contributions to the literature on peer effects, social
interactions, and autonomy. First, we show that self-selection changes with whom
people interact and thereby affects the overall composition of the reference or peer
group. Second, we present evidence that self-selection of peers affects behavioral
outcomes and has a direct effect on productivity. This highlights a novel channel
through which peers and their selection affect behavior and provides the first clean
evidence on autonomy in a field setting. Third, we document that peer effects may be
present in multiple dimensions and discuss how this limits the effects of exogenous
reassignment rules.
We document a strong causal difference in performance between widely-used
randomly assigned peer groups and self-selected peers.1 This focus on random peer
assignment is understandable given that researchers aim to identify a clean causal
effect of being exposed to peers. However, similar to what has been found in previ-
ous studies exploring the selection of students into peer groups (e.g., Cicala, Fryer,
and Spenkuch, 2018; Tincani, 2017), our results indicate that the relevant and self-
selected peer within a group does not equal to a random peer. This systematic selec-
tion helps to understand why the impact of certain peer groups differs compared to
others: friends and non-friends may have differential effects (Chan and Lam, 2015;
Lavy and Sand, forthcoming) and only persons with specific characteristics may
affect performance (Aral and Nicolaides, 2017).2 In light of our results, such differ-
ential peer effects can be due to self-selection of relevant peers. Related to our paper,
Chen and Gong (2018) study self-selection of team members and document, con-
sistent with our findings, that teams form endogenously along the social network
outperform randomly assigned ones. We move beyond their work in at least three
dimensions. First, we focus on a setup with a single peer and individual incentives.
Thus, we restrict the possible sources of peer effects to that single peer. Second, we
lever a rich dataset of individual characteristics and provide evidence that several at-
tributes of randomly assigned peers matter. Third, by eliciting preferences for peers,
we observe a normally unobserved dimension – the fit of a peer. Taken together, these
features allow us to document that peer self-selection constitutes a novel behavioral
channel through which peers can influence our behavior.
1. The literature on peer effects builds on (conditional) random assignment to identify peer
effects and circumvent statistical issues outlined in Manski (1993). See also Sacerdote (2011) and
Herbst and Mas (2015) for literature reviews on peer effects in education and a comparison of peer
effects from field and lab settings, respectively.
2. In a companion paper, Kiessling, Radbruch, and Schaube (2019), we study the peer selection
process in more depth and relate the selection of peers to individual-level determinants.
8 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
Moreover, our findings help to reconcile mixed evidence on the effectiveness
of interventions changing class or work-group compositions to exploit peer effects
(e.g., Booij, Leuven, and Oosterbeek, 2017; Carrell, Sacerdote, and West, 2013; Du-
flo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2011; Garlick, 2018). In our setup, the combination of two
effects – the change in the peer composition and the multidimensionality of peer
effects – has only a small impact on aggregate performance. More specifically, we
move beyond peer effects in a single dimension and allow several characteristics
such as productivity, friendship ties, and personality measures to exert peer effects.3
Our results show that there are sizable peer effects apart from productivity. Conse-
quently, if policy-makers reassign peers based on peer effects in a single dimension
only, they neglect the fact that reassigning rules simultaneously change other peer
characteristics giving rise to peer effects apart from the targeted dimension. These
effects can counterbalance each other and lead to a net effect that is in our case
close to zero and in general ambiguous. Hence, studies analyzing peer interactions
and reassignment policies need to take into account not only a potential direct effect
of self-selection, but also the multidimensionality of peer effects.
Our findings also contribute to the literature studying the effects of autonomy
and decision rights on behavioral outcomes. In particular, we provide field evidence
that self-selection (of peers) has a direct effect that can increase performance be-
yond its instrumental value of changing peer characteristics. Therefore, we comple-
ment laboratory studies by Bartling, Fehr, and Herz (2014) and Owens, Grossman,
and Fackler (2014), who demonstrate that people are willing to pay for autonomy,
i.e., the opportunity to actively select relevant aspects of their decision environment
(Deci and Ryan, 1985). Similarly, autonomy in the workplace is associated with
higher wages and employee happiness (Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt, 2013) and
leads to increased labor supply (Chevalier, Chen, Rossi, and Oehlsen, forthcoming),
while removing autonomy has been found to have negative consequences on em-
ployee effort (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).⁴ Our results highlight an additional channel
through which autonomy might provide value to employers or policy-makers: the
freedom to choose one’s own peers or teammates can boost performance similar
to other non-monetary incentives such as recognitions and awards (Bradler, Dur,
Neckermann, and Non, 2016; Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011), framing of rewards
(Levitt, List, Neckermann, and Sadoff, 2016) or personal goals (Corgnet, Gómez-
Miñambres, and Hernán-González, 2015; Koch and Nafziger, 2011).
3. Thereby we also join a small set of studies explicitly considering the impact of personality
traits on educational outcomes or performance (e.g., Chan and Lam, 2015; Golsteyn, Non, and Zölitz,
2017). Yet, these other studies do not consider the implications of multidimensional peer effects.
4. These studies focus on individual decisions. However, autonomy can also help improve out-
comes under collective decision-making. Having the right to vote has been can affect the quality of
leadership positively (e.g., Brandts, Cooper, and Weber, 2014) as well as increase the effectiveness of
institutions in the presence of social dilemmas (e.g., Bó, Foster, and Putterman, 2010; Sutter, Haigner,
and Kocher, 2010).
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While the quantitative impact of different assignment mechanisms and the re-
sulting peer composition might be specific to our setting and sample, students are
a highly relevant subject group. They have not only been analyzed to study phe-
nomena such as favoritism (Belot and Ven, 2011, and references therein), but peers
during high school also have long-lasting effects on an individual’s skill formation
(Agostinelli, 2018) and hence on subsequent educational attainment. Moreover, the
process of self-selecting peers is potentially equally important for settings in which
peer effects do not arise due to social comparisons or peer pressure, but from ef-
fort or skill complementarities (e.g., Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2010; Mas and
Moretti, 2009), or setting in which learning from peers is important (e.g., Bursztyn,
Ederer, Ferman, and Yuchtman, 2014; Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009). The settings
across these studies differ enormously, as does the underlying mechanism. Nonethe-
less, all of these share the notion that the behavior or action of peers imposes an
externality on the action or behavior of others. In addition, peers can in principal
also be self-selected affecting subsequent peer interactions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents our
experimental design as well as procedural details. Section 1.3 presents the data and
describes our sample of students. We outline our empirical framework in Section 1.4.
In Section 1.5, we analyze how self-selected peers affect performance relative to ran-
domly assigned peers and decompose this effect in a direct effect of self-selection
and an indirect effect as a result of changes in the peer composition. We then inter-
pret the direct effect and highlight potential policy implications. Finally, section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Experimental Design
Studying the self-selection of peers and their subsequent impact on performance
requires an environment in which subjects can choose peers themselves and where
exogenous assignment can be implemented. Subjects must be able to compare their
own performance with that of a peer in a task that lends itself to natural up- and
downward comparisons. One complication in many settings is that it is difficult to
isolate the person who serves as the relevant point of comparison. This is especially
true if several potential peers are present at all times, among which only some con-
stitute the set of an individual’s relevant peers. As subjects might select those peers
for many reasons besides their performance, it is essential not only to observe addi-
tional characteristics of all subjects, but also to collect data from an existing social
group. In these groups, subjects have a clear impression of other group members
and are able to select peers based on additional characteristics such as their social
ties.
In this study, we used the controlled environment of a framed field experiment
to overcome these challenges. We embedded our experiment in physical education
classes of German secondary schools. Students from grades 7 to 10 participated in
10 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
a running task, first alone and then simultaneously with a peer. Running allowed
students to compare their performance with either faster or slower students, while
it excluded complementaries in production between the students. Moreover, we fo-
cused on pairs as the unit of observation. This reduced the number of peers in the
experimental task to a single individual and allows us to cleanly identify his or her
impact. Subjects singled out specific peers by either naming them directly (in the
treatmentName) or selecting performance intervals (in Performance). The respec-
tive treatments used these preferences to form pairs with self-selected peers or pairs
were formed at random. Hence, we can compare the effect of self-selected peers
with exogenously assigned ones, and can evaluate the effects of each assignment
mechanism.
In the following, we present the design of our field experiment in detail and
describe the implemented procedures.
1.2.1 Experimental Design
Figure 1.1 illustrates the experimental design. Students participated in a running
task commonly known as “suicide runs”, a series of short sprints to different lines of a
volleyball court.⁵,⁶ The first run – in which students ran alone – served two purposes:
first, recorded times can be used as a measure of productivity and to evaluate the
time improvement between the two runs; and second, we used (relative) times from
the first run in combination with students’ preferences to create pairs for the second
run in one of the treatments described below. The second run mirrored the first
one aside from the fact that students did not run alone, but rather in pairs. This
means that two students performed the task simultaneously, while their times were
recorded individually. Feedback about performance in both runs was only provided
at the end of the experiment.
Between the two runs, students filled out a survey comprising three parts, elic-
iting preferences for peers, non-cognitive skills and information about the social
network within each class. We elicited two kinds of preferences: first, we asked sub-
5. The exact task is to sprint and turn at every line of the volleyball court. Subjects had to line
up at the baseline. From there, they started running to the first attack line of the court (6 meters).
After touching this line, they returned to the baseline again, touching the line on arrival. The next
sprint took the students to the middle of the court (9 meters), the third to the second attack line (12
meters) and the last to the opposite baseline (18 meters), each time returning back to the baseline.
They finished by returning to the starting point. The total distance of this task was 90 meters.
6. The task was chosen for several reasons: (1) the task is not a typical part of the German
physical education curriculum, yet it is easily understandable for the students; (2) in contrast to a
pure and very familiar sprint exercise as in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) or Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler
(2015), students should only have a vague idea of their classmates’ performance and cannot precisely
target specific individuals in Performance; and (3) due to the different aspects of the task (general
speed, quickness in turning as well as some level of endurance or perseverance), the performance
across age groups was not expected to (and did not) change dramatically.
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jects to state the names of those classmates with whom they would like to perform
the second run; and second, we asked them to state the relative performance level
of their most-preferred peers. Note that we elicited all preferences irrespective of
the assigned treatment and used these preferences to match students for the second
run in two of the three treatments.
In addition to these preferences, the survey included sociodemographic ques-
tions and measures of personality and economic preferences: the Big Five inventory
as used in the youth questionnaire of the German socioeconomic panel (Weinhardt
and Schupp, 2011), a measure of locus of control (Rotter, 1966), competitiveness⁷,
general risk attitude (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, et al., 2011), and a
short version of the INCOM scale for social comparison (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999;
Schneider and Schupp, 2011). The survey concluded by eliciting the social network
within every class. Subjects were asked to state up to six of their closest friends
within the class.
Before and after the second run, we asked students a short set of questions about
their peer and their experience during the task. Before the run, we elicited their
belief about the relative performance of their peer in the first run, namely who they
thought was faster. Following the second run, we asked them whether they would
rather run alone or in pairs the next time, how much fun they had as well as how
pressured they felt in the second run due to their peer on a five-point Likert scale.
1.2.2 Preference Elicitation
We used the strategy method to elicit two sets of peer preferences, independent of
the treatment to which a subject is assigned. The first set elicited preferences for situ-
ations in which social information is available (name-based preferences). Accordingly,
we asked each student to state his or her six most-preferred peers from the same
gender within their class, i.e., those people with whom they would like to be paired
in the second run. They could select any person of the same gender, irrespective of
this person’s actual participation in the study or their attendance in class.⁸ These
classmates had to be ranked, creating a partial ranking of their potential peers.
Second, we elicited preferences solely based on the relative performance in the
first run, ignoring the identities of the potential running partners (performance-based
preferences). For this purpose, we presented subjects with ten categories comprising
7. We implemented a continuous survey measure of competitiveness using a four-item scale. For
this, we asked subjects about their agreement to the following four statements on a seven-point Likert
scale: (i) “I am a person that likes to compete with others”, (ii) “I am a person that gets motivated
through competition”, (iii) “I am a person who performs better when competing with somebody”, and
(iv) “I am a person that feels uncomfortable in competitive situations” and extracted a single principal
component factor from those four items, of which the fourth item was scaled reversely.
8. All subjects were informed that peers in the second run would always have the same gender
as themselves and would also need to participate in the study.
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one-second intervals starting from (4, 5] seconds slower than their own performance
in the first run, to (0, 1] seconds slower and (0, 1] seconds faster up to (4, 5] sec-
onds faster. Appendix Figure 1.I.1 presents a screenshot of the elicitation. We chose
the range of intervals such that subjects could choose peers from a range of approxi-
mately ±2 SD from their own performance in the first run. Subjects had to indicate
from which time interval they would prefer a peer for the second run, irrespective
of the potential peer’s identity. Similar to the name-based preferences, we elicited a
partial ranking for those performance-based preferences. Accordingly, subjects had
to indicate their most-preferred relative time interval, second most-preferred rela-
tive time interval and so on.⁹
1.2.3 Treatments
We exogenously varied how pairs in the second run are formed by implementing
one of three matching rules at the class level, where pairs are only formed within
genders. The first rule matched students randomly – i.e., we employed a random
matching (Random) – and serves as a natural baseline treatment.
The second matching rule used the elicited name-based preferences (Name) and
the third rule formed pairs based on the elicited performance-based preferences
(Performance). Note that the problem of matching pairs constitutes a typical room-
mate problem. We thus implemented a “stable roommate” algorithm proposed by
Irving (1985) to form stable pairs using the elicited preferences.1⁰
Subjects did not know the specific matching algorithm, but were only told that
their preferences would be taken into account when forming pairs. Furthermore, we
highlighted that the mechanism is incentive-compatible by telling students that it is
in their best interest to reveal their true preferences. We informed subjects about the
existence of all three matching rules in the survey to elicit both sets of preferences
irrespective of the implemented treatment. Just before the second run took place,
they were informed about the specific matching rule employed in their class and the
resulting pairs.
In addition, we conducted an additional control treatment (NoPeer) in which
students ran alone twice and which featured a shortened survey but was otherwise
9. Naturally, each time interval could only be chosen once in the preference elicitation, although
each interval could potentially include several peers if several subjects had similar times and thus
belonged to the same interval. Similarly, some intervals may not contain any peers if no subject in the
class had a corresponding time.
10. Given the mechanism proposed by Irving (1985), it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for all
participants to reveal their true preferences. The matching algorithm requires a full ranking of all
potential peers to implement a matching. Since we only elicited a partial ranking, we randomly filled
the preferences for each student to generate a full ranking. However, in most cases subjects were
assigned a peer according to one of their first three preferences. Nonetheless, if groups were small, it
could be the case that subjects were not assigned one of their most-preferred peers. This is especially
the case for performance-based preferences. See also the discussion in Section 1.3.1 below.
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identical to the other treatments.11 As the focus of this paper is the differential size
of peer effects and not their existence per se, this only serves the purpose of exclud-
ing learning as a source of time improvements between the two runs. Hence, we
exclude it from the main analysis and focus only on the evaluation of different peer
assignment rules.
1.2.4 Procedures
We conducted the experiment in physical education lessons at three secondary
schools in Germany.12 All students from grades 7 to 10 (corresponding to age 12 to
16) of those schools were invited to participate in the experiment. Approximately
two weeks prior to the experiment, teachers distributed parental consent forms.
These forms contained a brief, very general description of the experiment. Only
those students who handed in the parental consent before the study took place par-
ticipated in the study.
The experiment started with a short explanation of the following lesson and a
demonstration of the experimental task. A translation of this explanation as well as
screenshots detailing the preference elicitation are presented in Appendix 1.I.
We informed students that their teacher would receive each student’s times from
both runs, but no information about the pairings during the second run.13 The stu-
dents themselves did not receive any information on their performance until the
completion of the experiment.
Additionally, we stressed that both of their performances would be graded by
their teacher – thus incentivizing both runs – and that the objective was to run as fast
as possible in both runs.1⁴ Moreover, most students themselves were very interested
in their own times. The introduction concluded with a short warm-up period. After
this, the subjects were led to a location outside of the gym.
Students entered the gym individually, which ruled out any potential audience
effects from classmates being present by design. Students completed the first suicide
run and subsequently were handed a laptop to answer the survey. Answering the
11. The survey asked students for their preferences for peers, sociodemographics and their social
network. Moreover, in order to avoid deception, we told students in advance that they would run alone
both times.
12. Physical education lessons in most German secondary schools last for two regular lessons of
45 minutes each, thus about 90 minutes in total. At the third school, lessons only lasted 60 minutes for
most classes. In order to conduct the experiment in the same manner as at the other schools, we were
allowed to extend the lessons by 10 to 15 minutes, which was sufficient to complete the experiment.
13. Of course, some teachers were present in the gym. In principle, they could observe the pair-
ings and therefore reconstruct the resulting pairs. However, none of the teachers made notes about
the pairings or asked for them.
14. In order for the teacher to grade the entire set of students, the students who did not partici-
pate in the study also had to run twice. Their times were recorded for the teacher only and were never
stored by us.
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survey took place in a separate room.1⁵ After the completion of the survey, subjects
returned the laptop to the experimenter and waited with the other students outside
the gym. Upon completion of the survey by all students, they returned to the gym to
receive further instructions for the second run. In particular, we reminded the stu-
dents of the existence of the three matching rules, and announced which randomly
assigned rule was implemented in their class as well as the resulting pairs from the
matching process. Following these instructions, the entire group waited outside the
gym again. Pairs were called into the gym and both students participated in the
second run simultaneously on neighboring tracks.
After all pairs had finished their second suicide run, the experiment concluded
with a short statement by the experimenters thanking the students for their par-
ticipation. The teacher received a list of students’ times in both runs and students
were informed about their performance. We then asked the teacher to evaluate the
general atmosphere within the class.1⁶
1.3 Data Description and Manipulation Check
We present summary statistics of the students in our sample in Table 1.1.1⁷ In total,
39 classes with an average class size of about 25 students participated in the ex-
periment. On average, 73% of students within each class subsequently took part in
the experiment.1⁸ This amounts to 627 students who participated in the treatments,
with 66% being female.1⁹ Due to odd numbers of students within some matching
groups, we randomly dropped one student in those groups tomatch students in pairs.
Therefore, some students participated in the experiment but were only recorded
once and are dropped for estimating the treatment effects in the next section. This
procedure yields an estimation sample of 588 observations.
15. At least one experimenter was present at all stages of the experiment to answer questions
and limit communication between subjects to a minimum.
16. Teachers indicated their agreement with three statements on a seven-point Likert scale: (1)
“The class atmosphere is very good”, (2) “Some students get excluded from the group”, and (3) “Stu-
dents stick together when it really matters”.
17. We focus on the students in the three main treatments, namely Random, Name and Per-
formance and do not include the students from the NoPeer treatment, which is discussed in Ap-
pendix 1.D.
18. We aimed to recruit all students from a class. However, due to numerous reasons this was not
possible in every class. Normally, some students are missing on a given day due to sickness or other
reasons, are injured and cannot participate in the lesson, are not allowed to take part in the study by
their parents or do not want to participate. Additionally, some students simply forgot to hand in the
parental consent. We do not have concerns of non-random selection into the study since students did
not know in advance the exact day when the experiment was scheduled and most reasons for non-
participation were rather exogenous (like injuries or sickness). Moreover, treatment randomization
was at the class level within schools and therefore selection into treatments is not possible.
19. We have more females in our sample since one school in our sample – the smallest one – was
a female-only school.
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Table 1.1. Summary statistics
7th
grade
8th
grade
9th
grade
10th
grade
Total
Sociodemographic Variables
Age 12.77 13.80 14.77 15.83 14.52
(0.48) (0.45) (0.39) (0.53) (1.22)
Female 0.60 0.60 0.66 0.72 0.66
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45) (0.48)
Times (in sec)
Time 1 (Females) 28.03 27.06 27.31 27.83 27.57
(2.75) (2.06) (2.28) (2.71) (2.50)
Time 2 (Females) 26.98 26.46 26.47 26.94 26.72
(1.97) (1.74) (2.43) (2.37) (2.23)
Time 1 (Males) 25.33 24.23 23.71 23.27 24.09
(1.93) (1.99) (2.03) (2.18) (2.16)
Time 2 (Males) 24.62 23.58 22.85 22.35 23.31
(2.01) (1.99) (1.70) (1.50) (1.98)
Class-level Variables
# Students in class 25.54 26.00 26.25 25.03 25.68
(2.71) (1.96) (2.56) (3.17) (2.74)
Share of participating students 0.75 0.69 0.77 0.71 0.73
(0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
Share of Students in Treatments
Random 0.32 0.46 0.34 0.32 0.35
(0.47) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
Name 0.37 0.25 0.37 0.35 0.34
(0.48) (0.43) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47)
Performance 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.31
(0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46)
Observations 123 124 182 198 627
Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Note that some students only participated
in the survey in cases in which they were allowed to participate in the study but were unable to take
part in the regular physical education lesson, while some others only took part in the first run if there
was an odd number of students in the matching group. See the text for details.
On average, female students took 27.57 seconds (SD of 2.50 seconds) in the first
run. Their performance is quite stable across grades, with students from the seventh
grade being somewhat slower. Male students’ times improved with age: while male
students in grade 7 took on average 25.33 seconds in the first run, their performance
improved by about two seconds on average in grade 10. In the following, we there-
fore control for these effects by including gender-specific grade fixed effects in all
of our regressions. Independent of their treatment assignment, males and females
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improved their performance in the second run by .78 seconds and .85 seconds on
average, respectively.
We randomized classes into treatment and check whether observable charac-
teristics differ between our treatments in Appendix Table 1.A.1. There are no ob-
servable differences across treatments for most variables, except for a difference
in the pre-treatment times in the first run. However, this gap results from the ran-
domization of classes into treatments and can be explained entirely by variation in
observables. Conditional on gender-specific grade fixed effects, school fixed effects
and age, these differences disappear.
1.3.1 Preferences for Peers and Manipulation Check
Before turning to the results of the experiment, we briefly present the preferences
for peers elicited in the survey. Furthermore, we show that our peer assignment
based on those preferences indeed changed the actual match quality, which we
define as the rank of the assigned peer in the elicited preference rankings. This
means that students in the self-selected treatments had a higher probability of be-
ing matched with someone who they preferred more, i.e., who ranked higher in
their name- or performance-based preferences. Hence, our experimental variation
of taking the preferences into account should have an effect on the rank of the as-
signed peers within a subject’s preferences (i.e., the quality of that match) in the
respective treatment with self-selection.
Table 1.2. Share of name-based preferences being friends
Name-based preference 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Average
Share of peers being friends 0.89 0.79 0.73 0.60 0.49 0.41 0.65
Notes: This table presents the share of friends for each name-based preference (most-preferred peer
to sixth most-preferred peer as well as pooled over all six preferences) as elicited in the survey.
We summarize the preferences for peers according to name- and performance-
based preferences in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2, respectively. Two findings emerge:
first, most students nominated friends as their most-preferred peer; and second,
while students on average preferred to run with a slightly faster peer, there is a
strong heterogeneity in this preference. We analyze these preferences in further
detail in Kiessling, Radbruch, and Schaube (2019).
Figure 1.3 shows the realized match quality for all three treatments with re-
spect to the ranking of peers in the two sets of elicited preferences. The upper panel
shows the realized match quality according to name-based preferences. We observe
that some people were randomly matched to someone with whom they would liked
to be paired in Random and Performance. As expected, this share is rather low.
While the median peer in Name corresponds to the most-preferred peer according
to the elicited name-based preferences, the median peer is not part of the elicited
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Notes: The figure presents a histogram of the peer preferences over relative performance as elicited
in the survey. Vertical lines indicate own time (black line; equals zero by definition) and the mean
preference of all individuals (red line; 0.56 sec faster on average, where we used the midpoint of each
interval to calculate the mean).
preferences (i.e., not among the six most-preferred peers) for Random and Perfor-
mance. A similar, albeit less pronounced picture arises when analyzing the match
quality according to the preferences over relative performance as presented in the
lower panel of Figure 1.3. We observe that students in Performance were paired
with more preferred peers according to their preferences relative to the other two
treatments. However, subjects might have preferred other students or relative times
that were not available to them, which mechanically affects the match quality. In
Appendix 1.A, we check that once we take the mechanical effect into account, the
median match quality in Performance corresponds to the second most-preferred
peer, i.e., we obtain a similarly pronounced pattern as in Name.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
This section outlines our empirical framework. For this purpose, we first analyze
the effect of being assigned to a particular peer assignment mechanism. In a second
step, we decompose this change in performance into two effects: an indirect effect
stemming from a change in the peer composition and a direct effect due to self-
selection. Appendix 1.B derives these estimation equations from an economic model
similar to a mediation analysis described in Heckman and Pinto (2015).
The random assignment of classes into treatments allows us to estimate the av-
erage effect of peer selection on performance. Let Dd = 1 with d ∈ {N, P} denote
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Figure 1.3. Match quality across treatments
Notes: The figure presents a histogram of match qualities for each treatment measured by the rank
of the realized peer in an individual’s name- (upper panel) or performance-based preferences (lower
panels). Vertical red lines denote median ranks.
treatment assignment to Name and Performance, respectively, and zero otherwise.
We focus on percentage point improvements from the first to the second run, yigs,
of individual i in gender-specific grade g of school s as an outcome. Our baseline
specification is then given by:
yigs = τ + τNDNi + τPDPi + γXi + ρs + λg + uigs (1.1)
The main parameters of interest are τN and τP, the effect of being assigned to one
of our treatments relative to Random. School fixed effects, ρs, and gender-specific
grade fixed effects, λg, control for variation due to different schools (i.e., as a result
of different locations and timing of the experiment) and variation specific to gender
and grades.2⁰ Finally, Xi is a vector of predetermined characteristics such as age as
well as personality characteristics and – in some specifications – class-level control
variables, and uigs is a mean zero error term clustered at the class level.
Any change in outcomes can be attributed to one of two main sources: first,
different peer-assignment mechanisms may affect peer interactions directly; and
20. See Section 1.3 for a discussion concerning why we include gender-specific grade fixed effects
rather than gender and grade fixed effects separately.
20 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
second, self-selection may change the peer composition and therefore the difference
between the student’s and his or her peer’s characteristics. To understand the source
of the average treatment effect, we decompose it into a direct effect of self-selection
as well as a pure peer composition effect.21 This takes into account the change in
relative peer characteristics across treatments. We implement this decomposition
using the following specification:
yigs = τ¯ + τ¯NDNi + τ¯PDPi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Treatments
(direct effects)
+ βθi
(
DN,DP
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Peer characteristics
+ γXi + ρs + λg︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ind. characteristics and FE
+uigs (1.2)
We are interested in τ¯N and τ¯P, the direct effects of our treatments relative to
Random. β denotes the influence of peer characteristics θi on the outcome. Changes
in peer characteristics through our treatments are captured by changes in θi
(
DN,DP
)
.
In particular, we allow our effects to be mediated through several channels: a first
set of channels capture the quality of the match measured by the rank of the peer in
an individual’s preferences22, productivity differences measured by absolute differ-
ences of times in the first run, and (directed) friendship ties. We allow the effect of
these to differ between the faster and slower student in a pair, given that previous
research has shown that ranks affect peer interactions.23
While the existing literature to date has mainly concentrated on the influence
of peers with respect to productivity differences and friendship ties on performance,
our data allows us to go beyond this.2⁴ In particular, we allow for a second set of
mediators based on the peer’s personality and preference measures (i.e., Big Five,
locus of control, competitiveness, risk attitudes, social comparison). Additionally,
21. The direct effect mainly captures changes in performance due to being able to self-select a
peer, which we interpret as an increase in autonomy (see Section 1.5.5 for a discussion of the psycho-
logical underpinnings). We acknowledge that our definition of a direct effect also captures inputs that
(i) differ across treatments, and (ii) are not measured in our rich set of potential mediators (match
quality, friendship ties, productivity differences, ranks and personality differences). However, we show
in robustness checks that in our setting this is of minor concern only.
22. We define two indicators to measure whether the assigned peer is nominated among the
first three peers for name-based preferences or falls into the three highest ranked categories for
performance-based preferences. Alternative specifications are shown in Appendix 1.E.
23. For example, beginning with Murphy and Weinhardt (2018), several studies document the
importance of ranks for subsequent outcomes when peers interact with each other (Elsner and Is-
phording, 2017; Gill, Kissová, Lee, and Prowse, 2019). In a related manner, based on theoretical
considerations, Cicala, Fryer, and Spenkuch (2018) show that individuals may select themselves into
specific peer groups based on their rank within a prospective group, while Tincani (2017) sets up a
model in which individuals have preferences over ranks and discusses how this can give rise to hetero-
geneous peer effects. Common across these studies is their emphasis on the importance of individual
rank within groups for peer interactions.
24. Two exceptions include Chan and Lam (2015) and Golsteyn, Non, and Zölitz (2017), who
study how peer personality traits affect one’s own performance.
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we also include the absolute difference in these personality measures to capture
potential non-linear effects.
1.5 Results
Our experimental design allows to study the causal effect of different peer as-
signment mechanisms on individual performance. More specifically, we compare
three treatments corresponding to randommatching (Random), matching with self-
selected peers based on name-based peer preferences (Name) and preferences over
relative performance (Performance). As outlined in section 1.2, the random as-
signment of peers constitutes a natural starting point for at least two reasons: first,
the pure presence of any peer might already improve performance; and second, ran-
domly assigned peers are used to document peer effects in a wide range of settings.
We contrast this baseline condition with two treatments that assign peers based on
elicited preferences, i.e., in which each subject endogenously chooses her peer.
Our empirical results start by documenting average treatment effects. As in-
troduced in Section 1.4, the average treatment effect can stem from two possible
sources: if the (relative) characteristics of the peer affect performance and the treat-
ments additionally induce a change in these characteristics, the altered peer compo-
sition might explain performance differences across treatments. Moreover, the abil-
ity to self-select a peer may directly influence the students’ willingness to perform.
Before we decompose each treatment effect into a direct effect of self-selection and
an indirect effect due to changes in the peer composition, we establish two necessary
conditions for the indirect effect to matter. First, we show that relative peer charac-
teristics matter for individual outcomes. Second, we document that our treatments
– which allow for self-selection – indeed change the relative characteristics of peers
in the second run. We then decompose the average treatment effects into the two
aforementioned channels. Our results conclude with an interpretation of the direct
effect and a discussion of implications for peer assignment rules.
1.5.1 Average Effect of Self-selection on Performance
We analyze how average performance improvements differ between treatments. For
this purpose, we use percentage point improvements as outcomes and therefore base
our comparisons on the performance in the first run. This specification takes into
account the notion that slower students (i.e., those with a slower time in the first run)
can improve more easily by the same absolute value compared with faster students,
as it is physically more difficult for the latter.
Figure 1.4 presents our first result. Subjects in Random improve on average by
1.93 percentage points when paired with a random peer in the second run. However,
their performance improves evenmore inName and Performance by 3.22 and 3.58
percentage points, respectively. We present the corresponding estimates in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.3. Average treatment effects
(a) Percentage Point Imprv. (b) Time (Second Run)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Name 1.26*** 1.37*** 1.84*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.48*** -0.14***
(0.43) (0.50) (0.46) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.04)
Performance 1.67** 1.69** 1.28** -0.41*** -0.38*** -0.31** -0.15***
(0.62) (0.65) (0.60) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.05)
Time (First run) 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.74***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Class-level Controls No No Yes No No Yes No
Own Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 588 585 515 588 585 515 588
R2 .056 .08 .096 .8 .81 .83 .8
p-value: Name vs. Perf. .51 .62 .38 .8 .98 .28 .8
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions according to equation (1.1) using percentage point improvements in columns (1) to (3) and times of the second run
controlling for times in the first run in columns (4) to (7) as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own and peer characteristics include the Big 5, locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes.
Class-level control variables in columns (3) and (6) include the share of participating students, three variables to capture the atmosphere within a class (missing for four
classes), and indicators for the size of the matching group. Column (7) uses standardized times.
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Figure 1.4. Average performance improvements
Notes: The figure presents percentage point improvements from the first to the second run with corre-
sponding standard errors for the three treatments Random, Name, and Performance corresponding
to column (1) in Table 1.3. We control for gender, grade and school fixed effects as well as age and
cluster standard errors at the class level.
Columns (1)-(3) present the estimated percentage point improvements in time ac-
cording to equation (1.1). Columns (4)-(6) additionally express the results in terms
of times in the second run – and standardized times in column (7) – controlling
for times in the first run to confirm these effects in times rather than percentage
point improvements. Assigning peers based on name-based preferences results in
an additional 1.26 percentage point improvement in performance relative to the
random assignment of peers. The coefficient for self-selected peers based on rela-
tive performance is 1.67 percentage points and thus somewhat larger, although it
does not significantly differ from Name (p-value= 0.51). These effects persist when
controlling for students’ own personal characteristics (column (2)) as well as if we
additionally control for class-level variables capturing the atmosphere within a class
(column (3)). Interestingly, the average treatment effects are about the same size
as the improvement in Random. On average, students are faster in the second run
and this effect is nearly twice as large in Performance and Name compared to
Random. Our baseline effects correspond to additional time improvements of .38 to
24 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
.41 seconds (cf. columns (4)-(6)) and account for 14% of a standard deviation in
Name and 15% in Performance (cf. column (7)).2⁵,2⁶
1.5.2 Peer Characteristics Matter for Individual Improvements
Any decomAny decomposition of the average effect into a direct effect of self-
selection and an indirect effect due to a change in the peer composition relies on
two necessary conditions: first, peer characteristics need to be important for deter-
mining individual outcomes; and second, relative peer characteristics change when
students can self-select their peers. We begin by providing evidence on the former
condition, focusing on students in Random. Therefore, we document the impor-
tance of peer characteristics by asking how much of the variation of performance
improvements in Random can be explained by variation in randomly assigned peer
characteristics.
The intuition why peer characteristics may matter is that not all peers have the
same effect on someone’s performance. For example, friends who serve as a peer
might influence us differently than other potential peers. Alternatively, the relative
rank within a pair or productivity differences between peers may be driving individ-
ual outcomes. If some of these effects exist, then the variation in peer characteristics
can explain some of the variation in the performance improvements of subjects in the
data and in particular when randomly assigning those characteristics in Random.2⁷
In order to show the relevance of peer characteristics, we decompose the coef-
ficient of determination, R2, into variation that is attributable to individual charac-
teristics and peer characteristics.2⁸ Note that we cannot estimate partial models to
25. Appendix 1.C presents additional robustness checks using biased-reduced linearization or
group means to account for the limited number of clusters, specifications that control for outliers and
reports the average treatment effects for different subgroups (by gender, grade, school). Our results
are robust to all of these checks.
26. In Appendix 1.D, we document that the observed performance improvements in the three
treatments described here are a result of the presence of peers and not due to learning. We present
the results of an additional control treatment (NoPeer) and its implementation details. In the control
treatment, subjects run twice without any peer and we find that they do not improve their time from
the first to the second run; in fact, individual performance decreases. The improvements that we
observe here can therefore be attributed to the presence of peers rather than learning or familiarity
with the task.
27. Note that only relative characteristics within a pair can help to explain differences between
treatments. Since we randomize subjects into treatments, the overall distribution of peer character-
istics across treatments and within classrooms remains constant. Our treatments only change with
whom each student interacts within a class, and thus a peer’s characteristics relative to one’s own
characteristics.
28. As peer characteristics, we include the rank within a pair itself as well as the rank interacted
with match quality with respect to both sets of preferences, friendship indicators and productivity
differences. We also include personality traits of a peer and absolute differences in personality traits
between peers. This corresponds to the full specification that we also use in our decomposition (col.
5 of Table 1.6).
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obtain the fraction of variance explained by a set of predictors as an individual’s and
her peer’s characteristics may be correlated (e.g., since both are from the same age
group and age is related to performance, as documented in Table 1.1). We account
for this interplay between different groups of explanatory variables by employing a
variance decomposition based on Shapley values to calculate the marginal contribu-
tion of each group of variables (see Huettner and Sunder, 2012).
We base the variance decomposition on data from Random only and estimate
equation (1.2) to decompose R2 into components attributable to individual as well
as peer characteristics.2⁹ As Table 1.4 reports, we find that 20% of the total variation
in percentage points improvements in individual performance can be attributed to
characteristics of the peer, which corresponds to 78% of the explained variation.
Consequently, only 6% of the total variation or 22% of the explained variation stems
from individual characteristics.3⁰
Table 1.4. Variance decomposition of performance improvements in Random
Variation attributable to
Explained
variation (R2)
Peer
characteristics
Individual
characteristics
.26 (100%) .2 (78%) .06 (22%)
Notes: This table presents a decomposition of the coefficient of determination, R2, using Shapley values
and is based on equation (1.2) estimated on Random only.
The decomposition therefore shows the importance of accounting for peer char-
acteristics in general. Characteristics of peers are responsible for a large share of the
explained variance. Hence, we need to take these peer characteristics into account
for the analysis of our treatments.
1.5.3 Self-selection Changes the Peer Composition
In this section, we document that treatments that allow for self-selection change
with whom someone interacts. Although relative peer characteristics are important
for understanding outcomes – as shown in the previous section – students also need
to interact with systematically different peers when self-selecting them. A second
necessary condition for the indirect effect is therefore that the relative peer charac-
teristics have changed.
29. The corresponding estimates are delegated to column (1) of Appendix Table 1.E.5.
30. Note that we explain percentage point improvements from the first to the second run and
hencemuch of the individual-level variation is already taken out of the dependent variable. When using
time in the second run as an outcome variable, individual characteristics account for approximately
54% (67%when additionally controlling for time in the first run) of the explained variation (R2 = 0.70
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(b) Absolute Differences in Productivity
Figure 1.5. Changes in peer composition
Notes: Figure 1.5a presents the share of all students who nominated their assigned peer as a friend for
each of the three treatments including standard errors. Figure 1.5b shows the average absolute within-
pair difference in productivity (measured in times from the first run) and including standard errors
for each treatment. We control for gender, grade and school fixed effects as well as age and cluster
standard errors at the class level. We present the corresponding regressions and highlight additional
compositional differences of the treatments in Appendix Table 1.A.2.
without time in the first run, R2 = 0.79 with time in the first run), while peer characteristics explain
the remainder of R2. Nevertheless, the variation explained from peer characteristics remains sizable.
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Figure 1.5 shows that our treatments indeed changed the peer composition with
respect to two prime examples of peer characteristics, namely friendship ties and
productivity differences within pairs. More specifically, Figure 1.5a shows that stu-
dents are predominantly paired with friends in Name (76% of all peers are friends),
whereas the share of peers being friends in Random and Performance is 49%
and 37%, respectively. As matching based on preferences over relative performance
(Performance) allows for targeting of other students with a similar or slightly
higher productivity, the students’ absolute time differences in the first run might
change. Panel B of Figure 1.5b confirms this by showing that the average absolute
difference in times from the first run is 1.53 seconds in Performance, while it is
larger than two seconds in the other two treatments (2.24 and 2.16 seconds in Ran-
dom and Name). Even though students could mainly target peers along these two
dimensions, we present how our treatments affect the peer composition along var-
ious other characteristics in Appendix Table 1.A.2. We find that targeting specific
peers also results in systematically different peers in terms of their personality.
This establishes that self-selection changes with whom somebody interacts. The
endogenously selected peers are neither equal to random peers nor to the average
peer. Their characteristics differ with respect to several important dimensions.
1.5.4 Decomposition into Direct and Indirect Effects of Self-selection
We now decompose the average treatment effects from Table 1.3 by taking changes
in the peer composition explicitly into account. As outlined in Section 1.4, the esti-
mated average effects potentially comprise a direct effect as a result of self-selection
and an indirect effect stemming from interacting with different peers. This is the
case as our treatments have two features: on the one hand, our treatments change
with whom someone interacts and those peer characteristics matter as documented
above; and on the other, they change the selection procedure from exogenous assign-
ment to the self-selection of peers. The indirect effect therefore captures changes in
the relative characteristics of peers (e.g., the time differences between the student
and peer in the first run) due to the altered peer composition induced by being able
to select them. The direct effect captures the effect of the treatment due to a change
in the selection rule. The previous two subsections documented that Name and Per-
formance change the peer composition relative to Random and established that
those relative peer characteristics are important in determining individual outcomes.
The decomposition analyzes the extent to which the average treatment effects are
driven by these changes in the peer composition.
The results of the decomposition based on equation (1.2) are summarized in
Table 1.5 and prThe results of the decomposition based on equation (1.2) are sum-
marized in Table 1.5 and presented in further detail in Table 1.6. In Table 1.5, we
use the whole set of characteristics to decompose the average treatment effects into
the direct and indirect effects. Therefore, the size of the direct effects equals the
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Table 1.5. Decomposition of treatment effects
Direct Effects Indirect Effects
PP imprv. Std. Err. PP imprv. Std. Err.
Name 1.24 0.50 0.13 0.24
Performance 2.21 0.68 -0.52 0.23
Notes: The table presents the resulting direct and indirect effects from a decomposition according to
equation (1.2) shown in column (5) of Table 1.6. Indirect effects are defined as the changes in per-
centage point improvements that are explained by changes in peer characteristics relative to Random
and comprises the combined effect of all peer characteristics in column (5) of Table 1.6.
coefficients of the treatment indicators in column (5) of Panel A in Table 1.6. They
correspond to 1.24 percentage points in Name and 2.21 in Performance.
The decomposition shows that even though peer characteristics are highly impor-
tant in understanding the variation in outcomes, the indirect effects of self-selection
in the two treatments are considerably low. They correspond to only 11% of the size
of the direct effect in Name and 24% in Performance.31 In Name, we estimate a
positive and insignificant indirect effect of .13 percentage point improvements (p-
value = 0.59). This means that the altered peer characteristics have only a slightly
positive effect on the students’ performance. For Performance, we find a signifi-
cant indirect effect of -.52 percentage points (p-value = 0.03). Thus, the change in
the peer composition even magnifies the direct effect as it negatively rather than
positively affects performance.
Therefore, our decomposition shows that while self-selection of peers indeed
changes the composition of peers, these changes cannot explain the average treat-
ment effects; rather, the additional performance improvements in Name and Per-
formance stem from a direct effect of self-selection.
We now analyze the detailed results of the decomposition in Table 1.6. Column
(1) replicates the baseline estimates from column (2) of Table 1.3 for means of com-
parison. In columns (2)-(4), we include different sets of peer characteristics, before
we include all of them in column (5). Turning to the separate columns, we find that
the size of the treatment indicators only slightly differ across specifications. Nonethe-
less, some of the included peer characteristics influence the individual performance
in the second run. Performance-based match quality has some predictive power for
31. The indirect effect in our decomposition is induced by the impact of peer characteristics and
their change through self-selection.Therefore, it corresponds to the difference in the average effect for
Name and Performance and the direct effect as the direct and indirect effect add up to the average
effect. The indirect effect also corresponds to multiplying the coefficients for (relative) peer charac-
teristics from column (5) with the change in the peer composition across treatments, as described in
Appendix 1.B and Appendix Table 1.A.2.
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Table 1.6. Decomposition of treatment effects
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline
Match
Quality
Friend-
ship ties
Time
Difference
All
Class
Controls
Direct Effects
Name 1.37*** 1.23** 1.46*** 1.35*** 1.24** 1.46***
(0.50) (0.53) (0.49) (0.46) (0.50) (0.46)
Performance 1.69** 1.78*** 1.61** 1.84*** 2.21*** 1.73**
(0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.61) (0.68) (0.68)
Peer Characteristics
Faster Student
× High match quality (Name)
0.00 0.52 0.69
(0.39) (0.43) (0.45)
Slower Student
× High match quality (Name)
0.31 0.46 0.62
(0.61) (0.66) (0.74)
Faster Student
× High match quality (Perf.)
1.17** 0.43 0.12
(0.52) (0.53) (0.59)
Slower Student
× High match quality (Perf.)
-2.07*** -0.71 -1.15
(0.61) (0.66) (0.73)
Faster Student
× Peer is Friend
-0.77* -1.15** -1.03**
(0.45) (0.53) (0.47)
Slower Student
× Peer is Friend
-0.06 0.13 0.45
(0.53) (0.67) (0.79)
Faster Student
× |∆Time 1|
-0.39*** -0.35** -0.36**
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16)
Slower Student
× |∆Time 1|
1.03*** 1.04*** 0.84***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19)
Slower Student in Pair 3.85*** 2.20*** -0.17 -0.15 0.11
(0.44) (0.49) (0.45) (0.68) (0.76)
Abs. Diff. in Personality No No No No Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics No No No No Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class-level Controls No No No No No Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 585 585 585 585 582 512
R2 .08 .18 .15 .24 .29 .29
p-value: Name vs. Performance .62 .41 .82 .43 .17 .72
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions according to equation (1.2) using percentage point
improvements as the dependent variable. High match quality is an indicator that equals one if the part-
ner was ranked within an individual’s first three preferences. Personality characteristics include the
Big Five, locus of control, social comparison, competitiveness, and risk attitudes. Appendix Table 1.E.6
presents the omitted coefficients of own and peer characteristics, and their absolute differences for our
preferred specification in column (5). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level.
performance improvements in the restricted regression in column (2). However, the
effects are insignificant when controlling for all peer characteristics in column (5).
Overall, the quality of the match, i.e., how well a student’s preferences were satis-
fied by the pairing in the second run, has little to no effect on their performance.
We also observe that initially faster students within a pair reduce their performance
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when paired with a friend, while the relatively slower students do not adjust their
performance differentially for friends as peers (column (3) and (5)). In column (4),
we focus on productivity differences, since faster and slower students within a pair
might be affected differentially. We also allow the effect of productivity differences,
|∆Time1|, to differ by the rank within a pair. We find that differences in times of the
first run have a significant effect on both faster and slower students within a pair.
While slower students within a pair benefit by a 1.03 percentage point improve-
ment from running with a one second faster student, the relatively faster student’s
performance suffers from this productivity difference by .39 percentage points. In
sum, the average performance of a pair thus improves with increasing differences
in productivity.
We control for all of these characteristics jointly in column (5), where we also
add a rich set of relative peer personality characteristics. The effect of friendship
ties on the initially faster students as well as the effects on productivity differences
persist. More importantly, the direct effects of bothName and Performance remain
robust, showing a direct effect of self-selection on individual performance. In order
to further probe the robustness of this finding, we additionally control for proxies of
the class attitude in column (6). While the estimates slightly differ in magnitude, the
results are generally robust. However, as we lose some observations, our preferred
specification is column (5).
Table 1.7. Variance decomposition and the role of unobservables
Panel A: Variance decomposition
Variation attributable to
Explained
variation (R2)
Treatments
Peer
characteristics
Individual
characteristics
0.29 (100%) 0.03 (12%) 0.21 (72%) 0.05 (16%)
Panel B: Role of unobservables
Oster’s δ
R2max = 0.50 R2max = 0.75 R2max = 1.00
Name 2.54 1.19 0.78
Performance -7.05 -3.43 -2.27
Notes: Panel A decomposes the explained variance of specification (5) of Table 1.6 in components
attributable to treatments, peer and individual characteristics similar to Table 1.4. Panel B quantifies
the importance of unobservables relative to observables needed for zero direct effects according to
Oster (2019).
Our results, therefore, provide evidence for a direct effect of self-selection. In
the remainder of this section, we provide further evidence for its robustness. First,
in Panel A of Table 1.7 we replicate the variance decomposition of Table 1.4 for all
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three treatments and confirm the importance of the peer characteristics in terms of
explaining the variation in outcomes. Second, in Panel B of Table 1.7 we address
the possible concern that other characteristics for which we cannot account or con-
trol are driving the direct effect. Our results above remain relatively stable when
adding different sets of peer controls, which is reassuring. A more formal approach
to tackle this concern is to ask how important unobserved characteristics would have
to be to explain our direct treatment effects (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005; Oster,
2019). We follow Oster (2019) and calculate δ, a measurement for the relative im-
portance of unobserved characteristics compared to observed characteristics. This
measure describes how important unobserved variables would have to be relatively
to observed ones to explain the direct effects, i.e., to drive down the direct effects
to zero. Absolute values of δ larger than one indicate that these omitted variables
have to be relatively more important than observed peer characteristics. Negative
values indicate that those unobservable characteristics need to reverse the effect of
observed covariates. We calculate these measures for three scenarios that differ in
the maximum amount of variance that would theoretically be explained if all factors
that might affect the outcomes were observed. More specifically, we calculate δ for
R2max equal to 0.50, 0.75 and 1.00. In all but one extreme scenario the omitted peer
characteristics are required to be more important than the observed peer character-
istics. This suggests that such unobserved characteristics need to have a larger effect
than productivity differences, friendship ties, match quality and all other controls
– including personality traits – combined. Compared to other studies, our analysis
already allows for more peer characteristics to influence subjects’ behavior. There-
fore, we allow for a very rich set of important characteristics and conclude that such
unobserved characteristics are highly unlikely to drive the direct treatment effects.
In addition, we provide several robustness checks in the Appendix 1.E. Appendix
Table 1.E.1 allows for different specifications of match quality by additionally consid-
ering the partner’s match quality, an interaction between one’s own and the partner’s
match quality, as well as feasible match quality. Appendix Table 1.E.2 considers dif-
ferent definitions of friendship ties apart from directed links (i.e., undirected, recip-
rocal, directed and reciprocal friendship ties). The results for all robustness checks
remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar. Furthermore, we show in Table 1.E.3
and Appendix Figure 1.E.1 that the linear specification of productivity differences
is not restrictive. Appendix Table 1.E.4 estimates the coefficients of peer characteris-
tics on the subsample of students in Random only and imposes these coefficients on
the other treatments. Furthermore, Table 1.E.5 presents the robustness of the direct
effects to using only those subjects in Random who are matched in line with their
preferences. These matches occurred by pure chance and not due to self-selection.
All of these robustness checks support our conclusion.
Taken together, our analysis shows that self-selection improves individual per-
formance directly and not due to a change in the peer composition. This means that
subjects react to observationally similar peers differently once they have chosen
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them actively. Characteristics of peers are important in determining outcomes, but
they do not explain the average treatment effects of self-selection, which are driven
by the direct effect of self-selection. Although our treatments allowed for two differ-
ent notions of self-selection, it is reassuring that the estimates of the direct effects
are similar across treatments.
1.5.5 Explanation of the Direct Effect
We interpret the direct effect as a positive effect of self-selection due to increased con-
trol or autonomy over the peer assignment mechanism. However, one might worry
that knowledge of all three treatment conditions could lead students in Random to
react negatively due to disappointment that their preferences have not been taken
into account.32 If these disappointed students drove our findings, we would falsely
attribute effects to self-selection even if students in Name and Performance do
not react positively.33 If the direct effect originated from disappointment, we would
expect students in Random to have less fun in the experimental task. Therefore, in
column (1) of Appendix Table 1.F.1 we analyze the extent to which subjects across
treatments had different perceptions regarding their fun in the second run. We find
zero effects. The absence of direct effects in the fun dimension alleviates the poten-
tial concern that knowledge of all three treatments leads to disappointment when
students are assigned to Random.3⁴
32. This results from the fact that we elicited preferences for peers irrespective of the treatment
and only announced the assignment rule after the survey, but before the second run.
33. At the same time, this also describes a feature of many real-world settings. Imagine that a
person is randomly assigned a partner from a group of available people. Even if this person has not
been asked explicitly with whom she would like to interact, she still has preferences about interacting
with certain people. Therefore, disappointment could also play a role in these settings. This might be
true for all settings that feature exogenous assignment and overrule the underlying preferences of the
involved persons.
34. A related issue would be that the direct effect stems from a positive effect of subjects in
treatments with self-selection as they may react reciprocal towards being treated kindly (see Aldashev,
Kirchsteiger, and Sebald, 2017, for an analysis how reciprocity can influence treatment effects). If
students prefer to be in one of the self-selection treatments (Name or Performance) rather than in
Random and they perceive their assignment as kind, reciprocal students could respond by increas-
ing their performance. This in turn would imply that the direct effects of our treatments are due to
reciprocity or some kind of experimenter demand effects. Then prosocial students should display a
stronger (direct) effect than non-reciprocal students as they are are more likely to react reciprocally.
We proxy prosociality by scoring higher on the agreeableness scale of the Big Five as it is significantly
correlated with reciprocity and altruism (Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, and Kosse, 2012). Column
(3) in Appendix Table 1.F.1 reports the interaction between the agreeableness score and treatment
indicators. If the above motives are the underlying causes of the direct treatment effect, we should
observe a positive and statistically significant interaction between agreeableness and the treatments.
However, our results do not show this relationship. We interpret this finding as evidence against recip-
rocal motives driving our results.
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We therefore conclude that the direct effects in our experiment are due to pos-
itive effects of self-selection. More specifically, we argue that the opportunity to
self-select key aspects of one’s environment – in our experiment having autonomy
over the peer selection – has a direct effect beyond the instrumental value of chang-
ing peer characteristics. Self-determination theory provides a credible explanation
through which self-selection can impact performance directly. The theory identifies
autonomy as a crucial determinant of motivation: individuals who can actively se-
lect parts of their environment – most importantly their tasks in work environments
– display higher intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000).3⁵ Applying this
explanation to our setting suggests that not the selected peer herself increases mo-
tivation, but the mere act of selecting her. However, we do not argue that this be-
havioral effects stems from self-selecting any aspect, but a relevant aspect of one’s
environment.
Self-determination theory and autonomy in particular have recently gained
increasing attention from economists. Cassar and Meier (2018) review the eco-
nomic literature on non-monetary aspects of work environments in the light of self-
determination theory and highlight the importance of autonomy for various behav-
ioral outcomes. A related argument to ours also underlies the findings of Bartling,
Fehr, and Herz (2014) and Owens, Grossman, and Fackler (2014). Although they do
not focus on the effect of autonomy on subsequent outcomes, their studies demon-
strate that people have a willingness to pay for making decisions by themselves and
maintaining autonomy. Similarly, a growing body of literature demonstrates that re-
stricting subjects choice sets and therefore restricting their autonomy and freedom
can negatively influence outcomes (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Therefore, our re-
sults add to this literature by highlighting the motivational benefits of autonomy and
self-determination, and provide novel field evidence that having control positively
affects outcomes.
1.5.6 The Limits of Reassignment Rules
Our results show that self-selected peers lead to substantially larger performance im-
provements than randomly assigned peers. In practice, however, policy makers fre-
quently do not assign peers at random. Rather, they employ a variety of peer assign-
ment rules to help or target specific individuals. Examples include schools employing
tracking (e.g., Betts, 2011; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2011; Fu and Mehta, 2018;
Garlick, 2018) or pairing high-performing students with low-performing ones (e.g.,
Carrell, Sacerdote, and West, 2013). While we have not conducted these treatments
35. Two other components of self-determination theory are relatedness and competence, refer-
ring to the need to care about something and the need to feel challenged, respectively. In our experi-
ment, we hold these other components constant across treatments.
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in our context, we can use our estimates to simulate the effect of such exogenous
peer assignment rules and compare their effect to outcomes under self-selection.
For this purpose, we use our estimates obtained in Section 1.5.4, using the whole
set of peer characteristics (column (5) of Table 1.6). Based on these estimates, we
simulate different (exogenous) assignment rules, calculate the resulting effects on
performance, and compare them to performance improvements observed in our ex-
periment. We first compare the improvements to the counterfactual of assigning the
same peers in Name and Performance without the direct effect of self-selection.
A comparison of other peer assignment rules with these results sheds light on the
question of whether students are able to choose optimal peers. Second, we simu-
late the expected performance improvements under a random matching. Third, we
use several assignment rules that base the assignment on one single and commonly
employed peer characteristic, namely past performance. Our estimates obtained in
Section 1.5.4 suggest that pairs with a higher difference in initial performances will
improve their performance on average. If this is the only characteristic of a peer
that affects performance, aggregate performance would be maximized as long as
the sum of productivity differences within a pair is maximized.3⁶ In order to com-
pare the results of self-selection against exogenous assignment rules that promise
the largest aggregate improvements, we consider two matching rules that maximize
these productivity differences within pairs – Equidistance andHigh-to-Low – that
keep the distance in ranks within the class constant or pair the best-performing stu-
dent with the slowest student. Additionally, we look at the effect of tracking (i.e.,
pairing the best student with the second best, third with the fourth, etc.; Track-
ing). We compare the predicted performance improvements for those rules with
our estimated performance improvements for the three assignment rules used in
the experiment.3⁷
Figure 1.6 presents the simulated average performance improvements of each
assignment rule. The results show that no other peer assignment rule is able to reach
similar performance improvements as those featuring self-selection. In fact, they
are close to the results from our random matching, since students under those peer
assignment rules do not benefit from the additional intrinsic value of self-selection.
We observe that in the absence of a direct effect of self-selection, students do not
experience additional improvements relative to randomly assigned peers. Compared
to Equidistance and High-to-Low, students in Name (exog.) and Performance
(exog.) perform worse indicating that they do not choose their peers optimally.
More surprisingly, the reassignment rules that maximize productivity differences
in pairs – Equidistance and High-to-Low – do not improve average performance
36. Given our specification, this is true for all peer-assignment rules that match each student from
the bottom half of the productivity distribution with a student from the top half.
37. We provide details on the prediction of performance improvements and the peer assignment
rules in Appendix 1.H.
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Figure 1.6. Simulation of other peer assignment rules
Notes: The figure presents predicted percentage point improvements for the two treatments (Name,
Performance) with and without the effect of self-selection, the Random-treatment as well as three
simulated peer assignment rules (Equidistance, High-to-Low and Tracking). We fix the personal
characteristics and other covariates not at the pair level to 0, whereby effect sizes are therefore not
directly comparable to treatment effects above.More details are provided in the text and Appendix 1.H.
compared to the random assignment of peers. Although both rules increase the aver-
age productivity difference in pairs by construction and affect performance through
this channel, those rules also change other characteristics of the peer. The lack of
any additional improvement implies that these other changes in peer characteristics
offset the positive effect of increased productivity differences. This highlights impor-
tant consequences of peer effects that are multidimensional if one wants to enhance
overall performance.
This result suggests that reassignment rules based on specific characteristics may
not work as intended given that other characteristics may affect performance at the
same time. Thus, depending on the correlation structure between the characteristic
used for the peer assignment rule and the omitted characteristics as well as their
effect, the resulting outcomes may be either higher or lower than predicted. If peer
effects are multidimensional, policy makers need to take all potential characteristics
into account when reassigning students into peer groups. Consequently, designing
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optimal peer assignment rules might be more challenging than expected.3⁸ This
insight further helps to understand why we observe a very small indirect effect in
the decomposition of the treatment effects despite the fact that peer characteristics
help to explain much of the variation in individual outcomes (cf. Table 1.6).
The simulations above suggest that self-selection of peers can be an attractive
alternative compared to traditional peer assignment rules to increase individual per-
formance. However, we want to stress that such peer assignments based on self-
selection may also come at a cost. In particular, we show in Appendix Table 1.G.1
that students in Performance experience significantly more pressure compared to
the other two treatments, and individual ranks may be more perturbed between the
two runs in Name and Random relative to Performance. Hence, a policy maker
might not only look at the resulting performances but also how different assignment
rules affect the individuals’ overall well-being.
1.6 Conclusion
Peer effects are an ever-present phenomenon discussed in a wide range of settings
across the social sciences. For many situations, identifying the effect of an actively
self-chosen peer is important beyond estimating peer effects in general. Our framed
field experiment introduces a novel way to study the self-selection of peers in a
controlled manner and is able to separate the impact of a specific peer on a sub-
ject’s performance from the overall effect of self-selection. The results of our exper-
iment provide evidence that self-selecting peers yields performance improvements
of about 15% of a standard deviation relative to random assignment of peers. While
peer characteristics affect the individual performance, they are not the origin of the
estimated treatment effects. Rather, these improvements stem from a direct effect
of self-selection. Based on self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985), we in-
terpret this direct effect such that the ability to select one’s own peer enhances a
student’s intrinsic motivation and subsequently increases individual performance.
Teachers or supervisors might be interested to leverage this direct effect of self-
selection in addition to other forms of non-monetary incentives used in schools
(Levitt et al., 2016) or workplaces (Cassar and Meier, 2018). They may allow stu-
dents to choose their study group themselves or introduce flexible seating patterns
in offices such that employees can self-select their seat mates, office partners or col-
leagues. Since our results suggest that self-selecting peers improves outcomes, the
effectiveness of social comparison interventions in general may be improved if in-
dividuals are given the opportunity to select their relevant comparison themselves
rather than being assigned an unspecific one.
38. In general, designing optimal peer assignment rules requires an optimization taking into
account all potential dimensions in which peers may exert effects. This creates a high-dimensional
optimization problem that is highly difficult to solve.
1.6 Conclusion | 37
One might be eager to infer that our results give rise to a trade-off between
performance improvements as a result of self-selection per se and the exogenous
assignment of performance-maximizing peers. However, our simulations show that
exogenous reassigning rules, which try to lever peer effects in ability, have an impact
close to zero in our case and are in general ambiguous in size and sign. This result
relies on the existence of peer effects in multiple dimensions, which at least partially
offset each other and in turn limit the effectiveness of exogenous reassignment rules.
Hence, positive effects of peer self-selection might be performance-maximizing –
even in the absence of subjects choosing “optimal” peers.
Our experimental design can easily be transferred to situations in which other
production functions are used or where peer effects arise via other channels, e.g.,
implementing team production by reporting a function of both students’ times to the
teacher, or varying the task to allow for learning or skill complementaries as sources
of peer effects. In those settings, it is reasonable to assume that self-selection of peers
may happen or can be implemented. For example, study groups at universities often
form endogenously (Chen and Gong, 2018), researchers select their co-authors and
workers in firms increasingly form self-managed work teams (Lazear and Shaw,
2007), and employees self-select with whom they work by referring others to their
employer (Friebel, Heinz, Hoffman, and Zubanov, 2019; Lazear and Oyer, 2012).
In this paper, we highlight that self-selecting peers can serve as a complement to
other established methods such as incentives and exogenous peer assignment poli-
cies aimed at increasing individual performance. However, further research on the
interplay between endogenous group formation, social interactions and production
environments remains imperative to understand how peer effects work.
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Appendix 1.A Randomization and Manipulation Check
Table 1.A.1 presents the randomization check of our experiment. The residual of
times in the first run are constructed from a regression of times of the first run on
school and grade-specific fixed effects as well as age. As can be seen the difference in
times in the first run can be explained by those observables and hence are an artifact
of the block randomization as classrooms rather than individuals were randomly
assigned to treatments.
Table 1.A.1. Randomization check
Random Name Diff. Perf. Diff.
Socio-Demographics
Age 14.43 14.55 0.13 14.58 0.15
(1.18) (1.24) (0.12) (1.24) (0.12)
Female 0.73 0.62 -0.11* 0.61 -0.12*
(0.45) (0.49) (0.04) (0.49) (0.05)
Doing sports regularly 0.82 0.82 0.00 0.90 0.08
(0.39) (0.38) (0.04) (0.31) (0.04)
Times (in sec)
Time (First Run) 26.81 26.08 -0.73* 26.19 -0.62*
(2.96) (2.93) (0.28) (2.78) (0.28)
Residual of Time (First Run) -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 0.08 0.10
(2.31) (2.35) (0.22) (2.24) (0.22)
Class-level Variables
# Students in class 26.01 25.39 -0.62* 25.61 -0.41
(2.95) (2.02) (0.24) (3.11) (0.30)
Share of participating students 0.72 0.74 0.02 0.73 0.01
(0.16) (0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
Grade 8.68 8.76 0.08 8.75 0.07
(1.07) (1.12) (0.11) (1.13) (0.11)
Observations 221 213 434 193 414
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard deviations in
parentheses in columns 1, 2 and 4; standard errors in column 3 and 5. Residuals of Time (First Run)
are calculated as follows: We first regress all times from the first run on school, grade and gender
fixed effects. We then use the residuals from this regression.
In section 1.3.1, we presented the resultingmatch qualities using the preferences
as elicited in the survey. However, some subjects may prefer relative times, which
are not available to them. For example, the fastest subject in the class might want to
run with someone who is even faster, or a student wants to run with somebody else
who is 1-2 seconds faster but by chance there is no one in the class with such a time.
Similarly, subjects in Name may rank other students which were not present during
the experiment or did not participate. We therefore present an alternative approach
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to evaluate the match quality by taking the availability of peers into account. This
implies that the quality of a match does not correspond directly to the elicited pref-
erences; rather, based on these preferences all available subjects (i.e., the students
participating in the study) are ranked. The quality of the match is then calculated
based on this new ranking and results in a realized feasible match quality.
Consequently, we determine the feasible match quality by calculating how high a
classmate is ranked in a list of available classmates.3⁹ InName, this can only increase
the match quality. If someone nominates another student who is not available as her
most-preferred peer and she received her second highest ranked choice, this means
that she is matched with her most-preferred feasible peer. Similar arguments can
increase the match quality for preferences over relative performance. However, the
match quality in performance can also be lower. Suppose that a student ranks the
category “1-2 seconds faster” highest and there are three students in that category.
However, she is only matched with her second highest ranked category. There would
have been three subjects whom shewould have preferredmore, generating a feasible
match quality of 4. We present the corresponding histograms in Figure 1.A.1 and
observe that the median of the feasible match quality is actually higher for both
treatments relatively to the match qualities depicted in Figure 1.3.
As our treatments change the peer composition, they also change the relative
characteristics of peers. In order to understand which characteristics change, we
analyze how our treatments affect the peer composition in other dimensions apart
from the match quality in Table 1.A.2.
39. We code peers who are not ranked among the first six preferences with a match quality of 7.
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Table 1.A.2. Effects of treatments on peer composition
Match Qual.
(name)
Match Qual.
(time)
Friendship
Ties
Time 1
Locus of
Control
Social
Comparison
Competi-
tiveness
Name 0.49*** 0.07 0.32*** -0.08 0.12 0.00 0.03
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Performance -0.06 0.24*** -0.07 -0.70*** 0.46*** -0.19** 0.12
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.21) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
Age (standardized) -0.03 -0.12* 0.03
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
N 588 588 294 294 292 293 291
p-value: Name vs. Perf. 1.0e-11 .0002 1.3e-07 .0037 .003 .079 .37
Mean in Random .23 .3 .4 2.4 .98 1.1 1.1
Extra-
version
Agree-
ableness
Conscien-
tiousness
Neuro-
ticism
Openness Risk
Name 0.07 -0.14 0.09 -0.15 0.11 -0.15
(0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10)
Performance 0.05 0.01 0.14 -0.20 0.28** 0.12
(0.11) (0.17) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11)
N 292 292 292 292 292 292
p-value: Name vs. Perf. .76 .19 .53 .63 .19 .031
Mean in Random 1.1 1.2 1 1.1 .98 1.1
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using absolute differences in pairs’ characteristics except for match quality and friendship as the dependent variable.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level. All regressions control for gender,
grade and school fixed effects as well as age in regressions with individual outcomes.
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Figure 1.A.1. Feasible match quality across treatments
Notes: The figure presents a histogram of match qualities for each treatment evaluated according to
either the students’ name-based preferences (upper panel) or performance-based preferences (lower
panel). Vertical lines denote median match qualities.
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Appendix 1.B Econometric Framework
In this appendix, we outline how to interpret our estimates in light of a mediation
analysis similar to Heckman and Pinto (2015). A key difference between their frame-
work and ours is that we are interested in the direct effect of our treatments as well
as indirect effects of a change in the production inputs, rather than only the latter.
In general, any observed change in outcomes of our experiment can be attributed
to one of two main sources: first, different peer-assignment mechanisms may affect
peer interactions directly; and second, self-selection changes the peers and therefore
the difference between the student’s and his or her peer’s characteristics. We there-
fore decompose the average treatment effect into a direct effect of self-selection as
well as a pure peer composition effect. This takes into account the change in relative
peer characteristics across treatments.⁴⁰
Consider the following potential outcomes framework. Let YP and YN and YR
denote the counterfactual outcomes in the three treatments. Naturally, we only ob-
serve the outcome in one of the treatments:
Y = DNYN + DPYP + (1 − DP)(1 − DN)YR (1.B.1)
Let θd be a vector characterizing a peer’s relative characteristics in treatment
d ∈ {R,N, P}.⁴1 Similar to the potential outcomes above, we can only observe the
peer composition vector θ in one of the treatments and thus θ = DPθP + DNθN +
(1− DP)(1− DN)θR and define an intercept α analogously. The outcome in each of
the treatments is therefore given by
Yd = αd + βdθ + γX + d (1.B.2)
where we implicitly assume that we have a linear production function, which can
be interpreted as a first-order approximation of a more complex non-linear function.
The outcome depends on own characteristics X as well as treatment-specific effects
of relative characteristics of the peer θ and a zero-mean error term d, independent
of X and θ.
Potentially, there are unobserved factors in θ. We therefore split θ in a vector with
the observed inputs (θ¯) and unobserved inputs (θ˜)⁴2 with corresponding effects β¯d
40. Our treatments do not change the distribution of characteristics or skills within the class or of
a particular subject; rather, the treatments change with whom from the distribution a subject interacts.
Due to the random assignment, we assume independence of own characteristics and the treatment.
41. In our estimations, we include the following characteristics in θd: indicators whether the
peer ranked high in the individual preference rankings, effects of absolute time differences for slower
and faster students within pairs, the rank and presence of friendship ties within pairs, and absolute
differences in personal characteristics (Big 5, locus of control, competitiveness, social comparison and
risk attitudes).
42. Furthermore, we assume that unobserved and observed inputs are independent conditional
on X and D.
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and β˜d and can rewrite equation (1.B.2) as follows:
Yd = αd + β¯dθ¯ + β˜dθ˜ + γX + d (1.B.3)
= τd + β¯dθ¯ + γX + ˜d (1.B.4)
where τd = αd + β˜dE[θ˜] and ˜d = d + β˜d(θ˜ − E[θ˜]). We assume ˜d d=  ,i.e., are
equal in their distribution with a zero-mean. We can express the effect of θ¯ in Name
and Performance relative to the effect in Random by rewriting βd = β +∆R,d.
Accordingly, we rewrite the coefficients β¯d of θi as the sum of the coefficients in
Random denoted by β and the distance of the coefficients between treatment d and
Random (denoted by ∆R,d).
Yd = τd + β¯θ¯ + ∆¯R,dθ¯ + γX + ˜d (1.B.5)
= τˆd + β¯θ¯ + γX + ˜d (1.B.6)
In what follows, we are interested in τ¯d = E[τˆd − τˆR] (d ∈ {N, P}; τˆd = τd + ∆¯R,dθ¯)
, i.e., the direct treatment effect of Name and Performance conditional on indi-
rect effects from changes in the peer composition captured in θ¯. This direct effect
subsumes the effect of the treatment itself (αd − αR), the changed impact of the
same peer’s observables (∆¯R,dθ¯), and changes in unmeasured inputs as well as their
effect ((β˜ + ∆˜R,d)θ˜). We interpret this direct effect as an additional motivation due
to being able to self-select a peer. This focus on the direct effect is a key difference
compared with Heckman and Pinto (2015), who are mainly interested in the indi-
rect effects of the mediating variables. The empirical specification of (1.B.6) is given
by
yigs = τ¯ + τ¯NDNi + τ¯PDPi + βθi + γXi + ρs + λg + uigs (1.B.7)
where we are interested in τ¯N and τ¯P, the direct effects of our treatments relative to
Random. Indirect effects are captured by βθi, the effect of changed peer character-
istics on the outcome yigs.
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Appendix 1.C Robustness Checks for Average Treatment
Effects
In Table 1.C.1, we compare the clustered standard errors with clustered standard
errors using a biased-reduced linearization to account for the limited number of
clusters. Comparing the first two columns, we observe that the results are robust to
this alternative specification of the standard errors. In column (3), we additionally
check whether looking at matching group-specific group means – i.e., the average
percentage point improvement for males and females in each class – affects the es-
timates. While the power is reduced due to the small number of observations, the
treatment effects persist and the coefficients on the treatment effects are not sig-
nificantly affected. Columns (4) and (5) analyze the sensitivity of our estimates
with respect to outliers. We use two different strategies. First, we apply a 90% win-
sorization, which replaces all observations with either a time or a percentage point
improvement below or above the threshold with the value at the threshold. We re-
place a time of improvement below the 5th percentile with the corresponding value
of the 5th percentile and all observations above the 95th percentile with the 95th
percentile. Second, we truncate the data and keep only those pairs where no time
or no improvement falls into the bottom 5% or top 5%. Neither winsorization nor
truncation significantly changes the estimated treatment effects.
Table 1.C.1. Robustness checks
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline BRL
Group
means
Winsori-
zation
Trun-
cation
Name 1.26*** 1.26** 1.13* 1.05*** 0.95***
(0.43) (0.50) (0.61) (0.37) (0.35)
Performance 1.67** 1.67** 1.96*** 1.51*** 1.43***
(0.62) (0.72) (0.62) (0.51) (0.43)
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 588 588 70 588 496
R2 .056 .056 .27 .072 .087
p-value: Name vs. Perf. .51 .55 .15 .37 .27
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the depen-
dent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in
parentheses and clustered at the class level. Column (1) presents the baseline specifications as used in
Table 1.3. Columns (2) uses biased-reduced linearization (BRL) to account for the limited number of
clusters. Column (3) uses matching group-specific means as the unit of observation. Finally, columns
(4) and (5) apply a 90% winsorization and truncation, respectively.
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We further analyze the robustness of our results by looking at different subsam-
ples. We therefore split our sample first by grades in the upper panel of Table 1.C.2
and by schools as well as gender in the lower panel and estimate the treatment ef-
fects separately for those samples. The table shows the robustness of the estimated
treatment effects as these effects persists for all subsamples with similar magnitude.
Table 1.C.2. Robustness checks – Subsample analyses
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline
7th
grade
8th
grade
9th
grade
10th
grade
Name 1.26*** 1.95*** 2.60*** 1.53** 1.08*
(0.43) (0.08) (0.35) (0.59) (0.61)
Performance 1.67** 2.78*** 2.51*** 2.53*** 1.32
(0.62) (0.63) (0.15) (0.62) (0.88)
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 588 116 116 174 182
R2 .056 .073 .064 .16 .039
p-value: Name vs. Perf. .51 .21 .82 .19 .82
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Female Male
School
1
School
2
School
3
Name 1.26* 1.21*** 1.36*** 1.44** 2.09***
(0.65) (0.44) (0.11) (0.65) (0.37)
Performance 1.68** 1.63* 1.53*** 2.29*** 2.22*
(0.77) (0.85) (0.05) (0.55) (1.12)
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 390 198 148 274 166
R2 .057 .065 .065 .1 .12
p-value: Name vs. Perf. .53 .62 .3 .14 .88
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the de-
pendent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Column (1) presents the estimates using the whole
sample as in Table 1.3. Columns (2)-(5) restrict the sample to one grade, columns (6) and (7) to each
gender and columns (8)-(10) to one school.
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Appendix 1.D Control Treatment to Disentangle Peer
Effects from Learning
Table 1.D.1 and Figure 1.D.1 present the estimated average treatment effects and the
margins including an additional control treatment. The NoPeer treatment featured
the same design as all other treatments. The only difference was that students partic-
ipated in the running task twice without a peer. Moreover, we shortened the survey
for this treatment by removing the questionnaires on personal characteristics. The
control treatment was conducted to show that the observed performance improve-
ments are not due to learning. If learning drives our effects, we should observe
performance improvements in NoPeer, which is not the case. Even if this control
treatment had yielded performance improvements, this would not affect any of our
results. To see this, note that we are interested in a between treatment comparison
of performance improvements. Learning effects between the runs should therefore
be constant across treatments.
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
5
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
 I
m
pr
ov
em
en
ts
 (
± 
s.
e.
m
.)
No Peer Random Name Performance
Figure 1.D.1. Average treatment effects
Notes: The figure presents percentage point improvements from the first to the second run with cor-
responding standard errors for the three treatments Random, Name, and Performance and an addi-
tional control treatment, where students run two times without a peer (NoPeer). See column (1) in
Table 1.D.1 for the corresponding regression. We control for gender-grade and school fixed effects as
well as age and cluster standard errors at the class level.
Appendix 1.D Control Treatment to Disentangle Peer Effects from Learning | 47
Table 1.D.1. Robustness checks
(a) PP. Imprv. (b) Time (Second Run)
(1) (2) (3)
Name 1.29*** -0.37*** -0.14***
(0.42) (0.11) (0.04)
Performance 1.65** -0.40*** -0.15***
(0.62) (0.14) (0.05)
NoPeer -2.84*** 0.82*** 0.31***
(0.61) (0.16) (0.06)
Controlling for Time (First Run) No Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes
N 715 715 715
R2 .14 .81 .81
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements in column
(1) or times from the second run in columns (2) and (3) as the dependent variables. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
the class level.
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Appendix 1.E Peer Composition Robustness Checks
We run several robustness checks for the results presented in Table 1.6. First, in Ta-
ble 1.E.1 we use different specifications for match quality. We consider the partner’s
match quality, an interaction between one’s own and the partner’s match quality, and
feasible match quality as defined in Appendix 1.A, and find that the estimates of our
direct effects are qualitatively and quantitatively the same. Second, in Table 1.E.2,
we show that our results do not depend on the precise definition of friendship ties.
We check whether our results change when we define friendship ties as undirected
or reciprocal rather than directed. As can be seen from the table, the coefficients
on the direct effects as well as on other peer characteristics remain the same. Third,
we control for differences in productivity in a more flexible way in Table 1.E.3 by
allowing for quartic rather than linear effects of productivity differences in column
(2) (see also Figure 1.E.1 comparing linear and quartic terms graphically). In addi-
tion, we allow for a second flexible specification using fixed effects for productivity
differences. More specifically, we include an indicator for each one-second interval
of productivity differences between subjects within a pair. This allows for a poten-
tial non-linear influence of productivity differences on our estimates. Comparing the
estimates shows that neither the quartic functional form nor the fixed effect speci-
fication is restrictive. Fourth, we estimate the influence of peer characteristics (and
individual characteristics) on the sample of Random subjects only in Table 1.E.4
and use these coefficients to decompose the average effect. For this purpose, we
first net out the effect of group variables such as school and gender-grade fixed ef-
fects (as well as individual characteristics) from both the outcome and independent
variables such as peer characteristics according to the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem
using the whole sample. In a first version, we regress the outcome and peer char-
acteristics on the fixed effects only. In a second version, we additionally net out the
effect of individual characteristics from peer characteristics and the outcome. We
use the residuals of those regressions to decompose the treatment effect. We then
begin by estimating the influence of peer characteristics on the outcome using only
subjects from Random and the residualized outcome as well as peer characteristics
(column (1) and (3)). In a second step, we restrict the influence of those peer char-
acteristics and estimate the direct treatment effects (column (2) and (4)). Finally,
Table 1.E.5 restricts the control group sample to subjects with a high match quality
within Random to show that the treatment effects persist for these subjects and the
coefficients on peer compositional effects do not substantially change. Table 1.E.6
presents the ommited coefficients of own and peer characteristics, as well as their
absolute differences, from column (5) Table 1.6 in the main text.
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Table 1.E.1. Robustness Checks for match quality
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3)
Partner’s MQ Interaction Feasible
Direct Effects
Name 1.15** 1.14* 1.19**
(0.55) (0.57) (0.47)
Performance 2.23*** 2.21*** 2.05***
(0.70) (0.69) (0.66)
Peer Characteristics
High match quality (partner; Name) 0.28 0.18
(0.42) (0.56)
High match quality (partner; Perf.) -0.07 0.21
(0.40) (0.44)
High match quality (own and partner; Name) 0.19
(0.84)
High match quality (own and partner; Perf.) -0.58
(0.94)
Faster Student × High match quality (feasible; Name) 0.02
(0.42)
Slower Student × High match quality (feasible; Name) 1.38*
(0.79)
Faster Student × High match quality (feasible; Perf.) 0.83*
(0.41)
Slower Student × High match quality (feasible; Perf.) 0.32
(0.86)
Faster Student × Match Quality (name-based) 0.45 0.37
(0.40) (0.44)
Slower Student × Match Quality (name-based) 0.41 0.30
(0.65) (0.75)
Faster Student × Match Quality (perf.-based) 0.43 0.75
(0.51) (0.65)
Slower Student × Match Quality (perf.-based) -0.71 -0.48
(0.65) (0.61)
Friendship Ties and Performance Differences Yes Yes Yes
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes
N 582 582 582
R2 .29 .29 .29
p-value: Name vs. Performance .16 .18 .24
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the de-
pendent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own and peer characteristics include the Big Five, locus
of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in personality
include the difference in those. Column (1) adds the partner’s match quality in addition to own match
quality as in Table 1.6, while column (2) additionally controls for the interaction of own and partner’s
match quality. Finally, column (3) uses a different measure of match quality, (feasible match quality –
see also Appendix 1.A), which acknowledges the fact that certain preferred peers may not be available.
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Table 1.E.2. Different definitions of friendship ties
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
directed undirected reciprocal dir. & rec.
Direct Effects
Name 1.24** 1.20** 1.21** 1.14**
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Performance 2.21*** 2.13*** 2.21*** 2.19***
(0.68) (0.69) (0.68) (0.68)
Faster Student × Peer is friend -1.15** -1.67*
(0.53) (0.85)
Slower Student × Peer is friend 0.13 -0.38
(0.67) (0.83)
Faster Student × Peer is friend (undirected) -1.63***
(0.58)
Slower Student × Peer is friend (undirected) 0.16
(0.80)
Faster Student × Peer is friend (reciprocal) -0.56 0.76
(0.59) (0.94)
Slower Student × Peer is friend (reciprocal) 0.47 0.73
(0.53) (0.63)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.35** -0.34** -0.34** -0.34**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.05*** 1.05***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Slower Student in Pair -0.15 -0.47 0.05 -0.18
(0.68) (0.74) (0.69) (0.68)
Match quality and performance differences Yes Yes Yes Yes
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 582 582 582 582
R2 .29 .29 .29 .29
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the de-
pendent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own and peer characteristics include the Big Five, locus
of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in personality
include the difference in those. Column (1) presents the last specification of Table 1.6 for reference us-
ing directed friendship ties. Column (2) uses undirected friendship ties, column (3) reciprocal directed
friendship ties, while column (4) allows for a differential effect of directed and reciprocal friendship
ties.
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Table 1.E.3. Robustness checks for absolute time differences
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3)
Linear Quartic FEs
Direct Effects
Name 1.24** 1.28** 1.20**
(0.50) (0.49) (0.52)
Performance 2.21*** 2.23*** 2.25***
(0.68) (0.68) (0.74)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.35** -2.70**
(0.16) (1.26)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 1.04*** 1.27
(0.20) (1.75)
Slower Student in Pair -0.15 -1.82*
(0.68) (0.91)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1|2 0.90
(0.56)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1|2 -0.00
(0.97)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1|3 -0.12
(0.09)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1|3 -0.01
(0.18)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1|4 0.00
(0.00)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1|4 0.00
(0.01)
Time Diff. FEs No No Yes
Match Quality and Friendship Ties Yes Yes Yes
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes
N 582 582 582
R2 .29 .29 .3
p-value: Name vs. Performance .17 .17 .14
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the de-
pendent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own and peer characteristics include the Big Five, locus
of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in personality
include the difference in those. Column (1) presents the last specification of Table 1.6 for reference.
Column (2) includes quartic terms of time differences in the first run (also illustrated in Appendix
Figure 1.E.1) and column (3) fixed effects for every one-second difference in productivity levels of the
two students.
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Figure 1.E.1. Robustness of linear specification in time differences
Notes: The figure presents marginal effects (solid lines) from a least squares regression using percent-
age point improvements as the dependent variable including 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines).
It plots the linear specification (black lines) as used in the main text as well as a second specification
using quartic polynomials (orange lines) of absolute time differences in the first run as regressors. We
use the same set of controls as in column (5) of Table 1.6 and cluster standard errors at the class level.
The corresponding regressions are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table 1.E.3.
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Table 1.E.4. Restricting coefficients of peer characteristics
Percentage Point Improvements
Fixing only FEs Fixing FEs & own char.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
only Random all only Random all
Direct Effects
Name .77* .79*
(.46) (.47)
Performance 1.67** 1.66**
(.67) (.67)
Peer Characteristics
Faster Student × High match quality (Name) .76 .76 .76 .76
(.85) (.78)
Slower Student × High match quality (Name) .26 .26 .38 .38
(1.09) (1.01)
Faster Student × High match quality (Perf.) .18 .18 -.15 -.15
(1.11) (1.13)
Slower Student × High match quality (Perf.) -.41 -.41 -.14 -.14
(1.15) (1.2)
Faster Student × Peer is friend -.14 -.14 -.19 -.19
(.66) (.59)
Slower Student × Peer is friend .03 .03 -.06 -.06
(1.28) (1.15)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -.51* -.51 -.5 -.5
(.3) (.28)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| .78** .78 .84** .84
(.32) (.3)
Slower Student in Pair .13 .13 -.1 -.1
(.99) (.87)
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Own Characteristics No No Yes Yes
N 204 582 204 582
R2 .24 .22
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the de-
pendent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own and peer characteristics include the Big Five, locus
of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in personality
include the difference in those. We use residualized dependent and independent variables, where we
take out the variation of individual-specific variables. The first two columns take out the variation of
the set of fixed effects, while the last two columns additionally take out variation of own characteris-
tics. Columns (1) and (3) present least squares regressions in Random only, while columns (2) and
(4) use all three treatments, but restrict the coefficients to equal the preceding columns.
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Table 1.E.5. Only high match quality sample as comparison group
Percentage Point Improvements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Random All
Random
& Name
with
Controls
Random
& Perf.
with
Controls
Direct Effects
Name 1.24** 1.83*** 1.93***
(0.50) (0.55) (0.47)
Performance 2.21*** 2.38*** 1.75**
(0.68) (0.71) (0.64)
Peer Characteristics
Faster Student
× Match Quality (name-based)
0.89 0.52 -0.47
(0.95) (0.43) (1.28)
Slower Student
× Match Quality (name-based)
0.15 0.46 -0.56
(1.10) (0.66) (1.15)
Faster Student
× Match Quality (perf.-based)
0.06 0.43 -0.51
(1.08) (0.53) (0.65)
Slower Student
× Match Quality (perf.-based)
-0.51 -0.71 -1.21
(1.22) (0.66) (0.86)
Faster Student × Peer is friend 0.10 -1.15** -1.53 -0.98
(0.74) (0.53) (1.05) (1.87)
Slower Student × Peer is friend 0.01 0.13 -1.18 -1.38
(1.15) (0.67) (1.06) (1.13)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.54** -0.35** -0.72** -0.07
(0.25) (0.16) (0.29) (0.51)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 0.73** 1.04*** 1.25*** 1.08**
(0.32) (0.20) (0.38) (0.47)
Slower Student in Pair 0.43 -0.15 -0.44 -0.97
(1.15) (0.68) (1.70) (1.47)
Abs. Diff. in Personality Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 204 582 208 207 162 160
R2 .28 .29 .16 .52 .16 .37
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using percentage point improvements as the de-
pendent variable. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. Own and peer characteristics include the Big Five, locus
of control, social comparison, competitiveness and risk attitudes. Absolute differences in personality
include the difference in those. Column (1) and (2) present the last specification of Table 1.6 for Ran-
dom and the full sample for reference. Columns (3) to (6) show that even if we restrict the comparison
group to the sample of individuals in Random that received a peer with high match quality accord-
ing to their name- (columns (3) and (4)) or performance-based preferences (columns (5) and (6)),
respectively, the direct effects persist and the coefficients on peer compositional effects do not change
much.
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Table 1.E.6. Omitted Coefficients from Table 1.6 column (5)
Own
characteristics
Peer
characteristics
Abs. Diff in
characteristics
Agreeableness 0.12 -0.11 0.29
(0.22) (0.20) (0.29)
Conscientiousness 0.01 0.13 -0.13
(0.21) (0.17) (0.23)
Extraversion 0.03 0.06 -0.51∗∗
(0.24) (0.20) (0.25)
Openness to Experience -0.49∗∗ -0.18 0.52
(0.19) (0.17) (0.33)
Neuroticism -0.16 -0.16 -0.65∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.27)
Locus of Control 0.17 0.09 -0.15
(0.20) (0.19) (0.31)
Social Comparison 0.32∗ 0.21 -0.21
(0.18) (0.16) (0.31)
Competitiveness -0.08 -0.37 0.35
(0.30) (0.23) (0.21)
Risk Attitudes 0.04 0.06 1.32
(0.18) (0.17) (1.70)
Notes: This table presents omitted coefficients from Table 1.6 in the main text. Columns (1) and (2)
show the coefficients on own and peer characteristics, respectively. Column (3) presents the coeffi-
cients on the absolute differences in personality measures. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level.
56 | 1 Self-selection of Peers and Performance
Appendix 1.F Additional Material for Discussion of Direct
Effects
Table 1.F.1 presents three regressions to support section 1.5.5’s discussion of the psy-
chological effect underlying the direct effects. First, we show that students in Ran-
dom are not disappointed by having a partner assigned. If they were disappointed,
they should have less fun during the second run. As column (1) show this is not the
case. Secobd, we do not find evidence that subjects with self-selected perceive win-
ning in the second run as more important as we do not see a differential effect on
fun between being faster or slower in the second run. Third, we show that prosocial
students, that is individuals that score higher on agreeableness, do not show dif-
ferentially direct effects. This is suggestive evidence against experimenter demand
effects or other reciprocal motives driving the estimated direct effects.
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Table 1.F.1. Potential psychological mechanisms for the direct effect
Fun (std.). PP. Imprv.
(1) (2) (3)
Direct Effects
Name -0.01 0.01 1.24**
(0.10) (0.14) (0.50)
Performance -0.10 -0.07 2.20***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.68)
Name × Slower Student in Pair (2nd Run) -0.05
(0.18)
Performance × Slower Student in Pair (2nd Run) -0.07
(0.17)
Name × Agreeableness 0.02
(0.38)
Performance × Agreeableness 0.42
(0.45)
Peer Characteristics
Faster Student (2nd Run) × |∆Time 2| -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Slower Student (2nd Run) × |∆Time 2| -0.14*** -0.14***
(0.04) (0.04)
Slower Student in Pair (2nd Run) 0.04 0.07
(0.18) (0.20)
Faster Student × |∆Time 1| -0.35**
(0.16)
Slower Student × |∆Time 1| 1.05***
(0.20)
Slower Student in Pair -0.20
(0.66)
Match quality Yes Yes Yes
Friendship indicators Yes Yes Yes
Own Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Peer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Abs. Diff. in Personality Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Gender-Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes
N 582 582 582
R2 .34 .34 .29
p-value: Name vs. Performance .46 .63 .18
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using a standardized measure of fun in the second
run (columns (1) and (2)) or percentage point improvements (column (3)) as the dependent variable.
Column (2) uses the full specification of Table 1.6 and additionally interacts the treatment indicators
with one’s own measure of agreeableness as a proxy of prosociality. Column (1) focuses on fun as
an outcome variable that was elicited after the second run (“How much fun did you have during the
second run? Please rate this on a scale from 1 – no fun at all – to 5 – a lot of fun.”) and uses the full
specification of Table 1.6 adapted using times and ranks from the second run. Column (2) additionally
interacts treatment indicators with the final rank in the second run. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the class level.
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Appendix 1.G Additional Material for Implications
Our treatments also have implications for individual ranks of students within a class
since slower students improve more than faster ones. As ranks are important in
determining subsequent outcomes (Elsner and Isphording, 2017; Gill et al., 2019;
Murphy and Weinhardt, 2018), a policy maker has to take the distributional effects
of peer assignment mechanisms into account.⁴3 Since low-ability students improve
relatively more than high-ability students in Name and Random, these treatments
yield potentially large changes of a student’s rank within the class between the two
runs. By contrast, Performance will tend to preserve the ranking of the first run
as improvements are distributed more equally relative to the two other treatments.
We confirm this intuition in Table 1.G.1 in which we regress the absolute change
in percentile scores from the first to the second run on treatment indicators. The
outcome variable measures the average perturbation of ranks within in a class across
the two runs. The results show that Performance shuffles the ranks of students
less in comparison to Random and Name. While in Random students change their
position by about 15 out of 100 ranks, we find significantly less changes in the
percentile score in Performance relative to Random. This change corresponds to a
27% reduction in reshuffling. However, in Namewe do not find any effect compared
to Random.
As another side effect we consider the pressure students experienced during the
second run due to their peer. We find that students in Performance experience
significantly more pressure than students in the other two treatments.
43. Suppose that a policy maker wants to establish a rank distribution (ranks based on times in
the second run) that mirrors the ability distribution (ranks based on times in the first run) due to some
underlying fairness ideal (e.g., she wants to shift the distribution holding constant individual ranks).
In other words, she might want to implement a peer assignment mechanism that preserves individual
ranks rather than shuffle them.
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Table 1.G.1. Side effects of reassignment rules
Absolute Change in Percentile Scores Pressure (std.)
(1) (2) (3)
within
matching group
within
treatment
Name -0.01 -0.02 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.18)
Performance -0.04** -0.04*** 0.46**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.15)
Gender/Grade/School FEs, Age Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No Yes
N 588 588 161
R2 .056 .051 .32
p-value: Name vs. Performance .018 .085 .17
Mean in Random .15 .14 -.16
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using absolute change in percentile scores or a
standardized measure of pressure during the second run as the dependent variable. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
the class level. Absolute changes in percentile scores within matching groups are calculated based on
the change of individual ranks of students in the their class and gender from the first to the second.
Percentile scores within treatment are calculated for all students within the same treatment and gender
(i.e., across classrooms). Other controls include the same controls as the mediation model in Table 1.6,
where we use times and ranks from the second rather than the first run as the pressure variable has
been elicited after the second run. Note that information on pressure was only elicited at one of the
three schools.
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Appendix 1.H Simulation of Matching Rules
We simulate three matching rules and predict their impact on performance improve-
ments using our estimates from Table 1.6. In a first step, we create artificial pairs,
based on the employed matching rules described below. In a second step, we then
calculate the vector θ of differences for the artificial pairs as well as the matching
quality of artificial peers. Finally, we use the estimated coefficients from the col-
umn (5) of Table 1.6 to predict the performance improvements we would observe
for the artificial pairs. As peer-assignment rules only change θ, we are interested in
the difference in the respective sums of the indirect effect and direct effect, that is
between τ¯ + βθsimi and τ¯ + βθobsi from equation (1.2), where sim and obs denote
simulated and observed pair characteristics, respectively. As we consider exogenous
assignment rules, we assume that the direct effect of the simulated policies equals
zero as in in Random. We additionally fix the covariates X to 0 and leave out the
fixed effects for the simulations and predictions. This means, we calculate the per-
formance improvements for a particular baseline group for our treatments as well
as the simulations. This enables us to compare our results of the simulations directly
to the peer-assignment rules using self-selection implemented in the experiment, as
we compare the performance improvements for the same group.
In addition to our three treatments, we simulate four types of peer assignment
rules. First, we simulate two settings in which we assign the self-selected peers ex-
ogenously (Name (exog.) and Performance (exog.)). Hence, the resulting pairs
are the same as in the self-selection treatment, but we exclude the direct effect of self-
selection. Second, we implement an ability tracking assignment rule, Tracking, in
the spirit of the matching also employed in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004). Students
are matched in pairs, starting with the two fastest students in a matching group and
moving down the ranking subsequently. This rule minimizes the absolute distance
in pairs. Third, we employ a peer assignment rule that fixes the distance in ranks for
all pairs (Equidistance). We rank all students in a matching group and match the
first student with the one in the middle and so forth. More specifically, if G denotes
the group size, the distance in ranks is G/2− 1 for all pairs. This rule is one way
to maximize the sum of absolute differences in pairs, but keeps the distance across
pairs similarly. Fourth, we match the highest ranked student with the lowest one,
the second highest ranked with the second lowest one and so forth (High-to-Low).
This is similar to Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2013), who match low-ability stu-
dents with those students from whom they would benefit the most (i.e., the fastest
students). Again, this assignment rule maximizes the sum of absolute differences in
pairs. Table 1.H.1 summarizes initial performance differences within pairs of the ex-
perimental treatments as well as the simulated assignment rules and the predicted
performance improvements.
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Table 1.H.1. Overview of simulated peer assignment rules
Peer assignment rule
Mean absolut Predicted
Descriptionproductivity differences improvement
(in sec) (in pp.)
Name 2.09 2.43 Self-selected peers based on names
Performance 1.41 2.69 Self-selected peers based on relative performance
Name (exog.) 2.09 1.19 Self-selected peers based on names without self-
selection effect
Performance (exog.) 1.41 0.48 Self-selected peers based on relative performance
without self-selection effect
Random 2.42 1.12 Randomly assigned peers
Equidistance 3.11 1.44 Same distance in ranks across pairs
High-to-Low 3.11 1.36 First to last, second to second to last etc.
Tracking 0.90 0.72 First to second, third to fourth etc.
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Appendix 1.I Experimental Instructions and Protocol
The instructions below are translations of the German instructions for the experiment.
Introduction to the Experiment
Welcome everyone to today’s physical education session. As you might have already
noticed, today’s session is going to be different. As you already know, you will take
part in a scientific study. For that purpose, you received a parental consent form and
handed it back to your teacher. If you have not handed it back to your teacher, you
will not take part in the study.
The study is going to be conducted by the three of us: Lukas Kiessling, Sebastian
Schaube and I am Jonas Radbruch. If you have any questions throughout the study,
you can address us at any point in time.
The study comprises several parts. For the first part, we would like you to do a
running task called suicide runs. My colleague will shortly demonstrate this exercise.
(The following verbal explanation was accompanied with physical demonstration of
the exercise)
You start at the baseline of the volleyball court and run to to this first line. You touch
it with your hand and run back to the baseline. You touch the baseline with your
hand and run to the next line. Touch it again, back to the baseline; touch it, and
then to the third line, back to the baseline, to the fourth line and then you return to
the baseline.
Everyone of you will run alone and the goal is to be as fast as possible. After this
run, we will hand you a computer to fill out a survey.
After all of you have ran and filled out the survey, you will run for a second time.
This time at the same time as another student. During the survey we will ask you –
among other questions – with whom you would like to run. You will receive detailed
information about this later on.
The goal during both runs is to be as fast as possible. We will record your running
times and hand it to your teacher. Your teacher will grade your performance during
both runs.
Before we start with the study, we would like to remind you again that your
participation is voluntary. If anyone does not want to take part in the study, then
please inform us now.
Do you have any further questions? If this is not the case, please start with the
warm-up, before we start with the experiment.
(After a short warm-up, all students were asked to leave the gym and wait in an accom-
panying the hallway until they were called in the gym to take part in the first run. We
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asked students whether they understood the task and, if necessary, explained the task
again. Directly afterwards, they were asked to leave the gym and were led to a different
room. There we asked them to complete the survey on a computer we handed them.)
Screenshots of the Preference Elicitation during the Survey
(The following two screenshots, Figures 1.I.1 and 1.I.2, display translated elicitation
screens for performance- and name-based preferences for peers.)
Figure 1.I.1. Performance-based preferences
Figure 1.I.2. Name-based preferences
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Introduction to the Second Run for the Whole Class
(Class was gathered for announcement)
We will shortly start with the second run. For this purpose a partner for you has
been selected. In your class, the partner has been selected randomly [based on
your indication how fast you want your partner to be] [based on the classmates you
nominated]. We would like to remind you that the objective is to be as fast as
possible and it is only about your own time. Your teacher will receive a list with
your performance, but no information about the pairs.
(The list with pairs was read out aloud to the students and students were accompanied
to the waiting zone. Students were called into the gym one pair after the other. In the
gym they were led to separate, but adjacent tracks. Each student was accompanied by
one experimenter, who recorded their time as well their responses to four additional
questions.)
Individual Introduction Directly Before the Second Run
The two of you will now run simultaneously. Your partner has been selected ran-
domly [based on your indication how fast you want your partner to be] [based on
the classmates you nominated].
(We then asked each subject to assess their relative performance in the first run)
Please guess, who of you two was faster during the first run?
Post-run Questionnaire after the Second Run
(Directly after a pair participated in the second run, we asked each of the two subjects
the following three questions in private)
(1) How much fun did you have during the second run? Please rate this on a
scale from 1 – no fun at all – to 5 – a lot of fun
(2) If you were to run again, would you prefer to run alone or with a partner)
(3) How much pressure did you feel form your partner during the second run?
Please rate this on a scale from 1 – no pressure at all – to 5 – a lot of pressure.
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.Chapter 2
Determinants of Peer Selection
Joint with Jonas Radbruch and Sebastian Schaube
2.1 Introduction
Peer effects have been documented across many different environments: skills of
classmates influence grades at school (Sacerdote, 2011), co-workers affect own per-
formance both in highly stylized settings (Falk and Ichino, 2006) as well as work-
places (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2009; Mas and Moretti, 2009). Peers, there-
fore, constitute a crucial determinant of our performance. But who are these people
that we select as peers? Answering this question is important for the design of poli-
cies that exploit social comparisons in educational contexts or firms. The successful
implementation of such policies presupposes an understanding of the formation and
composition of reference groups (e.g., Carrell, Sacerdote, and West, 2013; Kőszegi,
2014; Manski, 1993). However, we do not know much about the underlying process
of peer selection. Several, sometimes conflicting determinants of peer selection are
conceivable. If high-performing peers serve as a reference point, they can motivate
individuals to exert more effort (e.g., Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman, 2011; Koch
and Nafziger, 2011). Others choose peers to compete or they select specific friends,
as they might make a task more enjoyable (Park, 2019).
In this paper, we study the selection of peers and link these choices to three
potential determinants. Specifically, we measure with whom individuals want to in-
teract and analyze the extent to which these preferences for specific peers depend
on (i) relative performance, (ii) personality differences, and (iii) the presence of
friendship ties.1 By studying these determinants, we can quantify the magnitudes
of performance and social aspects in the peer selection process and examine their
relationship. In this paper, we therefore highlight the role of individual characteris-
1. We differentiate between friends and peers as two distinct, albeit related concepts. While
friends can be peers, not all friends have to be peers across all situations.
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tics for reference group formation. In doing so, we provide a microfoundation for
models of differential and nonlinear peer effects.
In order to study the selection of peers, we use data from a framed field exper-
iment with over 600 students aged 12 to 16. In the experiment, students took part
in two running tasks, first alone, then simultaneously with a peer. Between the two
runs, we collected two different types of preferences for peers, which were subse-
quently used to form pairs for the second run. More specifically, we elicited students’
preferences for peers by allowing them to name up to six classmates with whom
they would like to be paired (name-based preferences) or choose their peer’s rela-
tive performance (performance-based preferences). Moreover, we elicited personality
measures and the social network within each class. Our setup thus has four crucial
features to analyze peer selection in detail. First, the classroom environment enabled
students to state meaningful preferences for known peers (name-based preferences)
allowing for social aspects. Second, using a running task yields direct measures of
performance. This allows us to isolate preferences over the relative performance of
peers (performance-based preferences), creating a preference measure for peers that
abstracts from social considerations. Third, our analysis relies on preference mea-
sures. This overcomes the notion that preferences for peers may not necessarily be
satisfied in observed selection outcomes, e.g. due to the limited availability of peers.
Fourth, by focusing on a single peer in the second run, we circumvent issues asso-
ciated with multiple reference points (Kahneman, 1992) as students interact with
one peer only.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we describe the heterogeneity in
both preference measures, finding that friendship ties play a crucial role. About
80% of the three most-preferred name-based peers are friends. Nonetheless, this
figure declines to less than 50% when considering the fifth or sixth ranked peer.
Moreover, we observe that students on average prefer slightly faster peers (0.20 SD
in terms of performance in the first run). However, this masks large heterogeneities
in performance-based preferences. Approximately half of the students want to inter-
act with similar (slightly faster or slower) students. The other half prefer peers who
differ in their relative performance by more than one second.
In a second step, we study the determinants of peer selection based on names.
In particular, we consider the extensive – whom to select – as well as the intensive
margin, namely the ranking of peers. We estimate the extent to which peer selection
patterns can be explained by differences in past performance, differences in person-
ality, and the presence of friendship ties. We find that all three dimensions matter,
although friendship ties are the most important determinant. If two students are
friends, this increases their nomination probability (rank) by 39 percentage points
(1.7 ranks). Moreover, we find substantial homophily in both past performance as
well as personality. Accordingly, students select peers with whom they are similar.
A one standard-deviation difference in past performance (difference in personality)
reduces the probability of selecting a given classmate by approximately 6 percentage
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points (4.5 pp.) corresponding to 0.38 ranks (0.30 ranks). These homophily effects
hold conditional on friendship ties: students select those friends as peers who are
close to them with respect to personality and performance. Moreover, our results
uncover heterogeneities across sub-groups. We show that the importance of these
dimensions differs between males and females as well as high- and low-ability stu-
dents. In particular, male subjects exhibit a stronger homophily in performance than
female subjects.
In a third step, we explore the relationship between performance- and name-
based preferences. Our results show that when students select peers based on names,
they try to target their preferred relative performance level. This demonstrates that
subjects nominate similar performing peers not only due to homophily, but also due
to preferences over relative performance. The social dimensions of peer selection re-
main unaffected, which highlights the multidimensionality of preferences for peers.
This paper relates to the rich literature on peer effects. Although their impor-
tance is undisputed, evidence on whom people select as peers remains scarce. Yet,
Manski (1993, p. 536) already noted that the “informed specification of reference
groups is a necessary prelude to [the] analysis of social effects”. This implies that stud-
ies on peer effects have to take a stance on who constitutes a reference or peer
group, thus specifying who exerts potential peer effects. For example, it is common
to specify the set of classmates or co-workers as reference groups on an ad-hoc basis.
However, only parts of these groups may constitute relevant peers and misspecifica-
tions thereof attenuate peer effect estimates due to measurement error (Cornelissen,
Dustmann, and Schönberg, 2017; Dube, Giuliano, and Leonard, 2019). In order to
circumvent this problem and accommodate different peer definitions, a growing
body of literature estimates peer effects for different groups separately, differentiat-
ing between genders (Beugnot, Fortin, Lacroix, and Villeval, 2019; Black, Devereux,
and Salvanes, 2013; Hoxby, 2000; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) or allowing friends
and non-friends to exert different peer effects (Aral and Nicolaides, 2017; Bandiera,
Barankay, and Rasul, 2009; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2010). We document
that friendship is the most important determinant for peer selection, thereby validat-
ing the use of friends as a proxy for peers.2 Moreover, our results show that people
exhibit systematic peer choice patterns. This suggests that only a subset of people
serve as peers and affect behavior. In particular, this motivates the separate estima-
tion of peer effects for different sub-groups and demographic characteristics, i.e.,
differential peer effects.3 Relatedly, an individual’s impact may differ across the abil-
2. A more general interpretation of this finding is that individuals prefer familiar peers and
coworkers. Support for this stems from observations that only those coworkers with whom individuals
have sufficiently large overlaps in working time exert peer influences (Mas andMoretti, 2009) and that
familiarity between coworkers has positive effects on workers’ performance more generally (Huckman,
Staats, and Upton, 2009).
3. In principle, differential peer effects can be due to (i) only some individuals being relevant
peers, (ii) only some individuals exerting peer effects, or a combination of both.
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ity distribution: it might be large on classmates or co-workers with similar abilities,
whereas for others with vastly different ability levels the effect might be small. Non-
linear peer effects implicitly incorporate these patterns of peer selection since they
allow different individuals (e.g., in terms of their ability) to exert different effects
(Burke and Sass, 2013; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Tan and Netessine, forthcoming).⁴
In general, individuals often self-select into workplaces or organizations based
on institutional characteristics or individual traits. For example, employees select
into workplaces based on latter’s characteristics (e.g., incentive schemes, Dohmen
and Falk, 2010; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), students and their parents choose
schools based on the academic performance of the school (Burgess, Greaves, Vig-
noles, and Wilson, 2014), and individuals sort into occupations and organizations
based on individual traits (e.g., prosociality, Carpenter and Myers, 2010; Friebel,
Kosfeld, and Thielmann, forthcoming). We advance this literature by studying the
process of peer selection within those organizations or social groups. In a similar
vein, Cicala, Fryer, and Spenkuch (2018) study how students choose peer groups
by sorting into specific tasks based on their comparative advantage. Our approach
differs and links peer selection to social and non-social determinants to investi-
gate how individuals weight these. By this, our paper adds to a growing literature
modeling the selection of friends and the formation of social networks (see for an
overview Graham, 2015; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). However, we
deliberately differentiate between friends and peers as two distinct, albeit related
concepts. Friendship ties may be one factor that determines whether to choose a
specific individual as a peer. Although it is quantitatively the most important factor
in the peer selection process, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient indicator for ac-
tual peer choices. Methodologically, we adopt a similar framework to Girard, Hett,
and Schunk (2015). Whereas they study friendship formation at a university and
find homophily in several personality traits and economic preferences, we focus on
peer selections within established social networks and allow – among other factors
– friendship ties to affect these.
Our results help to develop a deeper understanding of the selection process for
peers – or reference group formation more generally – which can be levered to de-
sign successful policy interventions. By reorganizing teams, organizations or groups,
policy-makers can change the availability of potential peers and thereby channel
peer interactions. By providing suitable peers, they can exploit the resulting effects
(e.g., Roels and Su, 2014). The findings presented here might help to design policies
and incentive contracts incorporating social interactions (Carrell, Sacerdote, and
West, 2013; Kőszegi, 2014). We show that their effects potentially differ across sub-
4. Policymakers or employers can potentially exploit these nonlinearities to optimally assign
peers or teams (Bhattacharya, 2009), although the consequences of such reassignments vary across
studies (Booij, Leuven, andOosterbeek, 2017; Carrell, Sacerdote, andWest, 2013; Kiessling, Radbruch,
and Schaube, 2018).
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groups. This suggests, for example, that high-ability individuals select more similar
peers compared to low-ability individuals, who place more emphasis on friendships.
Therefore, separating students or workers by ability should only slightly change
high-ability individuals’ reference groups. However, it might have larger effects for
their low-ability counterparts, affecting subsequent behavior differentially.
Our evidence on the determinants of peer selection informs the literature on the
specification and formation of reference points (see for an overviewO’Donoghue and
Sprenger, 2018). Selected peers can serve as an “aspiration level” or goal that con-
stitutes a reference point, as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and used
similarly for example by Brookins, Goerg, and Kube (2017) and Koch and Nafziger
(2011). Some studies (e.g., Cerulli-Harms, Goette, and Sprenger, 2019; Schwerter,
2016) debate the nature and the location of reference points. We add to this litera-
ture by demonstrating that social reference points can arise endogenously through
peer selection. Heterogeneous preferences over peers highlight how reference points
are linked to individual characteristics.
In our experiment, we induce peer effects by allowing for social comparisons. We
analyze explicitly individual preferences for social comparisons and do not focus on
their consequences.⁵ Only a handful of papers study to whom people compare: while
some studies (Clark and Senik, 2010; Knight, Song, and Gunatilaka, 2009) find
that people compare themselves to friends, co-workers or neighbors, others focus
on comparisons along performance levels (Falk and Knell, 2004) or with one’s own
past (Senik, 2009). By contrast, ours is the first study to combine preferences along
social dimensions with information about preferences for relative performance and
the personality of the peer.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the
data and describes our sample. Section 2.3 documents two kinds of preferences for
peers, based on relative performance and names. We analyze the general determi-
nants of the name-based preferences in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
In most environments, it is difficult to observe with whom people compare their own
performance. This is especially difficult when there is not a single peer available
as an objective standard but rather when several peers are observed at the same
time. Additionally, peer selection may not only be based on preferences over some
target performance; rather, it is potentially based on a much broader set of peers’
characteristics.
5. Social comparisons may harm effort provision and work performance (Ashraf, Bandiera, and
Lee, 2014; Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann, and Schneider, 2014), reduce job satisfaction (Card, Mas, Moretti,
and Saez, 2012), change consumption patterns (Kuhn, Kooreman, Soetevent, and Kapteyn, 2011),
and negatively affect happiness and overall well-being (Clark and Senik, 2010).
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In this paper, we use the dataset of a framed field experiment studying the self-
selection of peers (Kiessling, Radbruch, and Schaube, 2018) to overcome these dif-
ficulties. The experiment elicited preferences for peers in a sample of over 600 stu-
dents and thus allows us to study the peer selection process. In addition to these
preferences, the experiment elicited the social network and several personal charac-
teristics.
2.2.1 Experiment
The experiment was embedded into physical education classes in German secondary
schools. Subjects participated in two suicide runs, each comprising a series of short
sprints along the lines of a volleyball court⁶: first, at the beginning of the experi-
ment alone, then at the end of the experiment simultaneously with a peer. No other
classmates were presented during the first or second run. For the second run, we
randomly assigned classes to one of three treatment conditions, which implemented
different peer assignment rules: random assignment, self-selection based on names,
or self-selection based on relative performance. The treatments with self-selection
of peers used the elicited preferences for peers to assign students into pairs for the
second run. For this, we implemented a “stable roommate” algorithm proposed by
Irving (1985) to form stable pairs. Hence, in order to be matched with their most-
preferred possible peer, students had to reveal their true preferences. Students were
matched within their own gender only. In order to incentivize students in both runs,
we reported the individual times to teachers for grading. Moreover, students them-
selves were intrinsically motivated expressed by a strong interest in their individual
time. Between the two runs, subjects participated in a survey. In addition to sociode-
mographics, the survey asked students to reveal their preferences for peers according
to two dimensions and elicited several personal characteristics as well as the social
network of the class. In the following, we describe each of these survey elements in
more detail.
2.2.2 Preference Elicitation
The survey elicited two distinct measures for peer preferences, which were used
to implement self-selected peers in the experiment. First, we elicited preferences
for situations solely based on relative performance (performance-based preferences).
Second, we asked for preferences for those settings in which social information is
6. The exact task was to sprint and turn at every line of the volleyball court. Subjects had to
line up at the baseline, from where they started running to the first line of the court (6 meters). After
touching this line, they returned to the baseline again, touching the line on arrival. The next sprint
took the students to the middle of the court (9 meters), the third to the second attack line (12 meters)
and the final sprint to the opposite baseline (18 meters), each time returning back to the baseline.
They finished by returning to the starting point. The total distance of this task was 90 meters.
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available (name-based preferences). These preferences were elicited for the whole
sample and independent of the treatment itself, as the treatment was only assigned
after the survey took place. Note that these preferences are revealed, rather than
stated preferences. In particular, there was a positive probability that these prefer-
ences were taken into account due to the random assignment of treatments after
the survey.
We first discuss the elicitation of preferences for peers based on relative per-
formance. For this purpose, the survey presented subjects with ten categories com-
prising one-second intervals starting from (4, 5] seconds slower than their own per-
formance in the first run, to (0, 1] seconds slower and (0, 1] seconds faster up to
(4, 5] seconds faster. We present a screenshot of the elicitation procedure in Fig-
ure 2.1. Subjects indicated from which relative performance interval they would
prefer a peer for the second run, irrespective of the potential peer’s identity. This
means the students could not base their decision on any characteristics besides the
relative performance. In the first row of the table, subjects indicated their most-
preferred time interval and thereby the peer’s relative performance. In the second
row, they indicated their second most-preferred interval, and so forth. The prefer-
ence for peers based on relative performance corresponds to the highest ranked time
interval. We asked students to rank their seven most-preferred time intervals and
therefore elicited a partial ranking of potential peers for performance-based pref-
erences. Naturally, each time interval could only be chosen once, but it potentially
included several peers. Similarly, some intervals might have been empty.
Figure 2.1. Screenshot of the survey question on performance-based peer prefer-
ences
Notes: The figure presents a screenshot of the survey module eliciting the preferences over relative
performance. In particular, it elicits a partial ranking of ten categories of relative ability ranging from
4 to 5 seconds slower to 4 to 5 seconds faster.
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The second preference measure elicited preferences for situations in which se-
lection can be based on the identity of the peer (name-based preferences), i.e., sub-
jects could condition their decision on all known characteristics of their peers. We
asked each student to state his or her six most-preferred peers from the same gender
within their class. These classmates had to be ranked, creating a partial ranking of
their peers.
When subjects nominated a student, they were asked to indicate their belief
about the relative performance of the person. The belief elicitation was similar to
that of the performance-based preferences described above: subjects had to indicate
their beliefs about the performance of the potential peer in the first run using the
same ten intervals and the same layout.
2.2.3 Personal Characteristics and Social Network
The survey also included several measures for personality traits and preferences:
the Big Five inventory as used in the youth questionnaire of the German socioeco-
nomic panel (Weinhardt and Schupp, 2011), a measure of the locus of control (Rot-
ter, 1966), competitiveness⁷, general risk attitude (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde,
Schupp, et al., 2011), and a short version of the INCOM scale for social compari-
son (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999; Schneider and Schupp, 2011). For each multiple
item scale, we extracted one underlying factor with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one.
At the end of the survey, we elicited the social network of the class.⁸ The elici-
tation asked every student to name up to six friends in their class. Due to this con-
straint, we focus on undirected links. We define that friendship ties exist between
person i and j if j was either nominated by student i as a friend, or j herself nomi-
nated i as a friend. This means that students can have more than six friends if they
were nominated by participants who they did not nominate themselves.⁹
7. Rather than using tournament entry decisions as measures of competitiveness, we introduced
a continuous measure based on a student’s agreement to four items on a seven-point Likert scale.
The statements were: (i) “I am a person that likes to compete with others”, (ii) “I am a person that
gets motivated through competition”, (iii) “I am a person who performs better when competing with
somebody”, and (iv) “I am a person that feels uncomfortable in competitive situations” (reversely
coded). We then extracted a single principal component factor from those four items
8. As preferences were elicited as the first part of the survey, this ordering induced the maximum
possible time lag between the two elicitations. This makes potential spillovers between these two
measures unlikely.
9. About 79% of the students nominated six friends. Thus, we were concerned that a maximum
of six friends might be restrictive and accordingly define friendships as undirected rather than directed
links. In robustness checks, we explore different friendship definitions, whereby our results are robust
to using different definitions, such as directed and reciprocal friendships.
2.2 Data | 77
2.2.4 Summary statistics
We present summary statistics of our sample in Table 2.1. Overall, we have prefer-
ence measures and the social network for 619 individuals from 39 classes of grades
7 to 10 (aged 12 to 16) with 66% of students being female.1⁰ This amounts to 73%
of all students in a class participating in the experiment.11 The average class size is
about 26 and students have approximately seven friends on average, with 80% of
those friends being from a student’s own gender. On average, females took 27.57
seconds to finish the first run, which does not vary by age. By contrast, male per-
formance improves with age: while the average time of males in grade 7 is 25.33
seconds, it improves to 23.21 seconds in grade 10.
Table 2.1. Summary statistics
7th
grade
8th
grade
9th
grade
10th
grade
Total
Sociodemographic Variables
Age 12.77 13.80 14.76 15.82 14.51
(0.48) (0.45) (0.39) (0.53) (1.22)
Female 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.73 0.66
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.47)
Number of friends 6.93 7.18 7.01 6.50 6.86
(1.35) (1.75) (1.57) (1.70) (1.63)
Share of friends of own gender 0.84 0.75 0.85 0.75 0.80
(0.19) (0.24) (0.20) (0.26) (0.23)
Times (in sec)
Time 1 (Females) 28.03 27.06 27.32 27.81 27.57
(2.75) (2.06) (2.28) (2.71) (2.50)
Time 1 (Males) 25.33 24.18 23.60 23.21 24.04
(1.93) (2.02) (1.82) (2.11) (2.11)
Class-level Variables
# Students in class 25.54 25.97 26.29 25.01 25.68
(2.71) (1.96) (2.56) (3.17) (2.74)
Share of participating students 0.75 0.69 0.77 0.71 0.73
(0.11) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
Observations 123 122 179 195 619
10. These classes are from three Germany secondary schools from the highest track, preparing
students for university entry after grade 12 (Gymnasien). The smallest of the three schools is a female-
only school, resulting in the somewhat increased share of females in our sample.
11. Only those students who submitted parental consent forms prior to the experiment, who did
not choose to abstain from the study (which nobody did), and who were not absent from the physical
education lesson took part in the study. Since students did not know the exact date where the study
took place, we do not have any concerns about study-related absences from the classes.
78 | 2 Determinants of Peer Selection
2.3 Preferences for Peers
In this section, we describe two types of preferences for peers: first, students could
select their most-preferred relative performance (performance-based preference); and
second, students could select their preferred peers based on names (name-based
preferences), allowing students to condition their peer choice on all characteristics
known to them. These two distinct preference measures allow us to describe stu-
dents’ peer selection, namely who they prefer as a peer.
2.3.1 Performance-based Preferences
As described in section 2.2, we elicited a partial ranking over ten categories, with
each category corresponding to a one-second time interval of relative performance.
Figure 2.1 presents the preferences for the relative performance of peers. First, turn-
ing to the distribution of the most-preferred relative performance (Figure 2.1a), we
find that students prefer performances from the entire possible set. Some students
prefer peers who are 4 to 5 seconds slower, whereas others prefer peers who are
up to 4 to 5 seconds faster than their own performance. Second, around half of the
students prefer similar performing peers, i.e., their most-preferred peer has a per-
formance within one second of their own performance in the first run. Finally, the
majority of students prefers faster peers: the median of the distribution lies in the
category with slightly faster peers and on average students prefer peers who were
.56 seconds faster in the first run, corresponding to .20 SD in terms of performances
in the first run. Figure 2.1b shows the relationship of the first performance-based
preference with the second and third one. We observe that the second and third
preference are centered around the first performance-based preference.12 Moreover,
Appendix Figures 2.A.2a and 2.A.2b reveal that the distributions across genders is
similar, with males preferring somewhat faster peers than females: while males pre-
fer peers who are .90 seconds faster (.31SD in terms of performances in the first
run), females select peers who are .38 seconds (.13SD) faster.
In general, these preferences partially support the conjecture of Festinger (1954,
p. 121) that people compare themselves with others who are “close to [their] own
ability” and are in line with evidence from other disciplines noting tendencies to en-
gage in upward comparisons (e.g. Huguet, Dumas, Monteil, and Genestoux, 2001).
12. In Appendix Figures 2.A.1a and 2.A.1b, we present the distributions of the second and third
highest ranked interval. While the probability mass in these histograms is shifted away from an indi-
vidual’s own performance, this is simply an artifact of the limited number of categories, as can be seen
in Figure 2.1b. The categories in which students preferred a much faster or much slower peer as the
first preference naturally show a different pattern due to censoring. This explains why we do not find
a perfect relationship with a slope of 1. When estimating a Tobit model accounting for censoring at
the lower and upper limit, the regression coefficient on the second preferences is .97 with a standard
error of .05 and we cannot reject that the coefficient equals unity.
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Figure 2.1. Preferences for relative performance
Notes: Figure (a) presents a histograms of students’ preferences over relative performance. The inter-
vals used here and in the survey are one-second intervals of relative performances in the first run.
Vertical lines indicate own performance (black; equals zero by definition) and mean preference (red;
where we used the midpoint of each interval to calculate the mean). Figure (b) presents the relation-
ship of the first performance-based preference and the second/third preference.
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Nonetheless, this does not hold for all of our subjects. In particular, there is a sizable
share of students preferring peers who do differ in ability.
2.3.2 Name-based Preferences
The second set of preferences allows students to state their preferences by selecting
peers from a list of their classmates’ names. In contrast to performance-based pref-
erences, in principle students can take into account all information known to them
when selecting their preferred peer.
Table 2.1. Share of name-based preferences who are friends
Name-based preference 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th Average
Share of peers being friends 0.89 0.79 0.73 0.60 0.49 0.41 0.65
Notes: This table presents the share of nominated peers for each of the six name-based preferences
elicited in the survey who are friends.
Table 2.1 presents the share of selected peers who are also friends of an indi-
vidual. While 89% of all individuals select a friend as their most-preferred peer, this
number decreases by about 10 percentage points for each of the following, lower
ranked nominations. This pattern might be partially driven by the fact that students
do not have a sufficient number friends of the same gender in the class who they
can select. Nonetheless, our data shows that students have on average about seven
friends, of which 78% are of their own gender, implying that students on average
have 5.3 same-sex friends who they could select (see Table 2.1). Thus, this finding
shows that students predominately consider their friends as peers, which is also con-
firmed by our more formal analysis below. However, they do not solely choose their
peers based on friendship ties. Some students seem to avoid some of their friends in
favor of other class members.
2.4 Determinants of Peer Selection
In order to more formally explore the underlying determinants of peer selection,
we analyze how the three fundamental dimensions – performance, personality, and
friendship – affect who is selected as a peer and quantify the relative importance.
For our analysis, we use a nomination model similar to the social network formation
literature (e.g., Girard, Hett, and Schunk, 2015). As students could nominate more
than one potential peer and had to rank them, we can analyze the event that some-
one is nominated in the name-based preference elicitation and additionally study
their rank among the selected peers. We therefore investigate the extensive and in-
tensive margins of the selection process and highlight associated heterogeneities. In
a second step, we look at the role of one determinant – the preferences for a rela-
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tive performance – in greater detail. In particular, we analyze the extent to which
students target their performance-based preferences.
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In order to analyze the determinants of peer selection in a structured way, we pro-
ceed in two steps. First, we analyze the extensive margin of peer selection. Let yij
equal one if individual i nominates individual j and zero otherwise. The dataset
therefore contains one observation for each possible nomination within a group. In
our main analysis, we define a person to be selected as a peer if this person is part of
the first three nominated name-based peers, i.e., if she is one of the three students
who somebody would bemost willing to be paired with in the second run.13 Wewant
to understand the extent to which i’s nomination of j depends on three determinants:
(i) differences in terms of performance in the first run (∆t
(
ti, tj
)
), (ii) differences in
personality (∆p
(
pi, pj
)
), and (iii) the presence of friendship ties (Fij). Additionally,
we allow for individual-level heterogeneity in terms of observed and unobserved
characteristics by including either individual characteristics (Ωij = λXi + piXj) or
individual-level fixed effects (Ωij = νi + νj) as well as some idiosyncratic shock (ij)
for each nomination. Our main specification is therefore given by:
yij = α∆t
(
ti, tj
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Differences
in performance
+β∆p
(
pi, pj
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Differences
in personality
+ γFij︸︷︷︸
Friendship
ties
+ Ωij︸︷︷︸
Controls for
heterogeneity
+ ij (2.1)
In our application, we measure differences in terms of the Euclidean distance of the
respective characteristic. Hence, similarity in terms of past performance is measured
by the absolute distance ∆t
(
ti, tj
)
= |ti − tj|. In order to measure the difference in
personality, we combine the set of standardized personality measures elicited in
the survey (Big Five, locus of control, competitiveness, attitudes to engage in social
comparisons and risk attitudes) to define the distance∆p
(
pi, pj
)
=
√∑
k
(
pik − pjk
)2
with k indexing different personality measures.1⁴ Therefore, the coefficients α and β
can be interpreted as the influence of differences in past performance and personal-
ity on the likelihood of nominating someone as a peer. Negative coefficients (α < 0,
13. Accordingly, we define yij = 1 if and only if j is nominated in i’s first three name-based pref-
erences and yij = 0 otherwise. Given that groups were normally not very large and – as shown in
Kiessling, Radbruch, and Schaube (2018) – 81% of students were matched with one of their first
three preferences in the name-based matching, we consider those individuals as the most important
ones. Our results are robust to this cut-off. In the Appendix, we relax this definition and consider dif-
ferent cut-offs. Panel A of Appendix Table 2.B.2 presents the results and shows that they qualitatively
and quantitatively similar.
14. In robustness checks, we allow each of these personality measures to enter separately to
explore what is driving the estimated effects. The advantage of the index is that it reduces the degrees
of freedom and yields a single coefficient, which makes the impact of personality easily comparable
to absolute differences in performances.
82 | 2 Determinants of Peer Selection
β < 0) provide evidence of homophily, namely the tendency of individuals to select
others with similar characteristics (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Sim-
ilarly, positive coefficients (α > 0, β > 0) support heterophily, namely the tendency
to avoid others who are similar.
In a second step, we study the intensive margin of peer selection. We adopt the
same specification as for the extensive margin (equation (2.1)), with two crucial
modifications: first, we restrict the sample to all individuals who have been nomi-
nated as peers; and second, we change the dependent variable to be j’s rank in i’s
preferences. For this, we define yij to the rank that individual i assigns individual j
in the nomination process. The highest ranked peer receives a score of 6 and this
score decreases by one with each rank in the preferences.1⁵
2.4.2 Extensive Margin of Peer Selection
We begin our analysis by studying the extensive margin of peer selection, i.e., who
individuals select as peers. Figure 2.1 provides first evidence of systematic peer se-
lection patterns. Figure 2.1a shows that as the difference in initial performance be-
tween two individuals increases, the likelihood of nominating the other as a peer
decreases. Similarly, Figure 2.1b shows a similar trend for differences in personality.
Taken at face value, these relationships point towards homophily in both perfor-
mance and personality. Yet, these associations could be driven by a common under-
lying factor (e.g., friendship ties) and potentially measure the same effect.
In order to disentangle the contribution of different factors in the peer selection
process, Panel A of Table 2.1 presents a more structured analysis of the extensive
margin. In particular, we estimate equation (2.1) using own and peer characteristics
as well as class fixed effects in column (1), as well as individual and peer fixed effects
in column (2). The results show that friendship ties are the most important deter-
minant of peer selection. If two students are friends, this increases the nomination
probability by 38 percentage points. However, we also find evidence of homophily
in terms of both performances in the first run as well as personality. According to the
estimates in column (2), a one-second difference in past performance or a difference
of one standard deviation in personality reduces the probability of nominating a per-
son by 3-4 percentage points. While these effects initially seem modest compared to
the effect of friendship ties, it is necessary to take into account the underlying dis-
tributions of these variables. Conditional on friendship ties, increasing the absolute
difference of performances in the first run by one standard deviation (2.10 sec) re-
duces the nomination probability by 6.3 percentage points. Similarly, increasing the
difference in personality by one standard deviation reduces nomination probability
15. The exact score does not matter for our estimates, as the level is taken out by individual fixed
effects. For the interpretation of the results, it is important to note that there is a difference of one
between the scores.
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Figure 2.1. Extensive margin of peer selection
Notes: These figures present local linear regressions of peer nominations on (a) absolute differences
in initial performance and (b) absolute differences in personality including 95% confidence intervals.
The underlying histograms show the distribution of the respective regressor.
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by 4.5 percentage points.1⁶ Moreover, comparing columns (1) and (2) reveals that
controlling for unobserved individual-level heterogeneity is important. Individual
fixed effects allow us to capture this heterogeneity and thus controls for e.g., the
popularity of students, which is otherwise unmeasured.
In order to understand the relationship between those three dimensions of peer
selection, we analyze their interactions in column (3). We find that differences in
performance and personality do not interact and seem to be independent, whereby
the resulting coefficient is close to zero and precisely estimated. Although the coef-
ficient of friendship ties interacted with absolute differences in personality is neg-
ative – suggesting stronger homophily in personality among friends – this effect is
insignificant at conventional levels. Interestingly, we find that existing friendship ties
increase the importance of differences in past performance. The homophily among
friends almost doubles from 3 percentage points to 5.4 percentage points for a one-
second difference in initial performance. Additional support for these results are
presented in column (4). Here, we restrict the sample to the set of friends and thus
ask whether the effects carry over to selection among friends. Homophily effects re-
main significant and even increase in magnitude. Hence, the peer selection effects
estimated here are distinct from homophily that is often present in friendship forma-
tions (e.g., Girard, Hett, and Schunk, 2015; Selfhout, Burk, Branje, Denissen, Van
Aken, et al., 2010).1⁷ Even conditional on being part of someone’s social network,
students select only those friends as peers who share similar characteristics.
To understand which personality facets are driving the results, we decompose
aggregate impact of personality in Appendix 2.B.3 by allowing all personality mea-
sures to enter the model separately. The results show that the effect mainly stems
from homophily in agreeableness, tendencies to engage in social comparisons, and
– to a lesser extent – competitiveness. Importantly, the coefficients on absolute dif-
ferences in performances of the first run and the presence of friendship ties remain
constant, indicating that the aggregation to a single distance measure does not seem
to be restrictive. Moreover, we consider different definitions of friendship ties. While
in our main specification of Table 2.1 we defined friendship ties as undirected, we
consider directed and reciprocal friendships in Appendix Table 2.B.4. The coefficient
on the friendship indicator increases when using those alternative definitions, which
arguably measure more intense friendships, although coefficients on absolute differ-
ences in performance and personality remain unaffected. This is reassuring as it
alleviates the concern that the homophily terms in peer selection are mere artifacts
of different friendship intensities.
16. Appendix Table 2.B.1 presents summary statistics of the absolute differences in these charac-
teristics.
17. Appendix Table 2.B.1 documents that the average absolute difference is only slightly smaller
for the sets of friends relative to the overall sample, indicating only a modest degree of homophily in
friendship nominations.
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Table 2.1. Extensive and intensive margin of peer selection
(A) Peer Nominated (B) Peer Nomination Ranking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.058*** -0.178***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.035)
Abs. Diff. in Beliefs over Times in First Run -0.184***
(0.051)
Friendship Indicator 0.381*** 0.392*** 0.515*** 1.710*** 1.756***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.049) (0.115) (0.118)
Abs. Diff. in Personality -0.017*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.092*** -0.270*** -0.261***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.073) (0.079)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run × Abs. Diff. in Personality 0.002
(0.002)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run × Friendship Indicator -0.024***
(0.007)
Abs. Diff. in Personality × Friendship Indicator -0.016
(0.011)
Controls for heterogeneity Characteristics Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Sample All All All Friends only All Beliefs
Observations 6654 6646 6646 2872 2756 2756
Individuals 612 612 612 612 612 612
R2 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.39
Notes: Panel A presents the results from the extensive margin analysis using a linear probability model according to equation (2.1) with an indicator of being nominated
as one of the three most-preferred name-based peers as the dependent variable. Column (4) restricts the sample to the set of friends. Panel B presents results of the
intensive margin using the ranking among those who are nominated as peers. While column (5) uses homophily in performances from the first run, we use beliefs over
relative past performance rather than actual relative performance in column (6). Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the class level. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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2.4.3 Intensive Margin of Peer Selection
Although the extensive margin analysis highlights whom students consider as peers,
it reveals little about their relative importance. Since peers had to be ranked ex-
plicitly, we can exploit this information to more closely explore what makes a peer
relatively more important. Panel B of Table 2.1 focus on this intensive margin of the
peer selection process by analyzing the determinants of a peer’s rank. Again, we esti-
mate equation (2.1), but adjust the dependent variable as described in Section 2.4.1.
Column (5) replicates the analysis of column (2), but uses the peer’s rank as an out-
come and restricts attention to all classmates that appear in the first six name-based
peer preferences.1⁸ We find similar determinants for the ranking of peers as for the
extensive margin: on average, friends are ranked 1.71 ranks higher than non-friends
and students exhibit homophily in performance in the first run as well as in their
personality. In particular, we find that the rank of a peer decreases by .18 ranks for
each one-second time difference and by .27 ranks for each one standard-deviation
difference in personalities.1⁹
For the preceding analysis, we used absolute differences in past performances
as a determinant of peer preferences. However, students in the experiment were not
informed about their times in the first run, nor about those of their classmates. Ac-
cordingly, they had to rely on their beliefs about the relative performance of their
peers when choosing them. We therefore check the robustness of our results by in-
cluding the beliefs over relative performance rather than actual relative performance
in column (8) and find that this does not affect our results.2⁰ As a second robustness
check, we retain all classmates and estimate a Tobit model, in which the ranking is
censored. The idea here is that all students who were not nominated have a lower
rank than those who were nominated, but we do not observe their exact ranking.21
18. In order to analyze the ordering, we exploit the whole ranking of peers to increase power
rather than analyzing the subset of the three most-preferred peers as for the extensive margin.
19. Column (2) of Table 2.B.3 in the Appendix splits up the aggregated personality measure. Sim-
ilar to the extensive margin, we observe that agreeableness and the extent of engaging in social com-
parisons underlie the observed homophily in personality. More specifically, a one standard-deviation
larger difference in agreeableness or social comparison attitudes is associated with a decrease of 0.25
and 0.16 ranks, respectively.
20. Note that we only elicited beliefs over relative performance for those students who were
nominated as peers. Hence, we can only conduct this robustness check for the intensive margin and
not for the extensive one. Nonetheless, as our results reveal, our conclusions neither change in a
qualitatively nor quantitatively sense when using beliefs rather than actual performances. In fact,
Appendix 2.C shows that beliefs and actual relative performance are strongly related to each other and
validates their consistency. For this, we lever a second belief elicitation over the relative performance
of the peer in the first run that was elicited just before the second run took place. This second belief
measure and the one used in the elicitation of name-based preferences are indeed highly correlated,
indicating that the beliefs are meaningful.
21. Since we coded the highest ranking as 6, we code all students who are not part of the six
most-preferred peers as 0.
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In Panel B of Appendix Table 2.B.2, we document that the results are qualitatively
similar, although friendship ties become even more important than in our main spec-
ification. In summary, our results show that the results from the extensive margin
analysis carry over to the intensive margin.
2.4.4 Heterogeneities in Name-based Preferences
While the previous sections have documented robust evidence of homophily in the
peer selection process, different groups may choose peers differently. In order to
predict the effects of different policies such as assigning students into classrooms or
workers into teams, it is important to understand whether peer selection patterns
differ across observable characteristics. Hence, we now shed light on the underlying
heterogeneity of our estimates across sub-groups. Motivated by policies interested
in promoting females or targeting low-ability students, we analyze whether males
and females as well as high- and low-ability students select peers differently.
We present heterogeneities by gender and initial performance in Table 2.2.
Columns (1) and (2) split the sample by gender and reveal some profound differ-
ences in the peer selection behavior of males and females. In particular, we find that
males exhibit significantly stronger homophily in past performance as well as person-
ality. By contrast, females seem to emphasize the presence of friendship ties more,
although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect is the same across genders.
In columns (4) and (5), we check for heterogeneities in ability. More specifically, we
perform a median split of times in the first run within each gender and grade, and
estimate equation (2.1) separately for both groups. The effect of friendship ties is
more pronounced for slower students, while faster students show larger homophily
effects in personality. Heterogeneities at the intensive margin are qualitatively sim-
ilar as shown in Appendix Table 2.B.5.
These results highlight differential peer selection across different sub-groups.
These findings have to be taken into account when thinking about peer or group
assignment policies. Moreover, differences in peer selection criteria help to under-
stand why peer effects work differently across different groups: if high-ability stu-
dents exhibit strong homophily in their peer selection, they will tend to select other
high-performing students as peers. Nonetheless, low-ability students choose their
friends as peers, who may have low or high ability.
2.4.5 Targeting of Preferred Relative Performances
Finally, we examine the role of the preferred relative performances for the peer selec-
tion process and examine the relationship between the two sets of preferences. More
specifically, we analyze the extent to which students target a relative performance
level in the name-based selection process. In Appendix 2.D, we provide graphical ev-
idence on the relation between the preferred relative performance and the selected
peers. We observe that both set of preferences are positively associated with each
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Table 2.2. Heterogeneities on the extensive margin of peer nominations
Peer Nominated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males Females p-value Low Abil. High Abil. p-value
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.057*** -0.027*** 0.089 -0.022** -0.042** 0.768
(0.016) (0.005) (0.010) (0.016)
Friendship Indicator 0.348*** 0.400*** 0.257 0.434*** 0.358*** 0.004
(0.039) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Abs. Diff. in Personality -0.105*** -0.025*** 0.002 -0.027** -0.047*** 0.067
(0.020) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
Controls for heterogeneity Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Observations 1408 5238 3303 3244
Individuals 207 405 308 301
R2 0.39 0.35 0.44 0.43
Notes: This table replicates Panel A, column (2) of Table 2.1 for different sub-samples. More specifically, it presents results from the extensive margin analysis using
a linear probability model according to equation (2.1) with an indicator of being nominated as one of the three most-preferred name-based peers as the dependent
variable. Columns (1) and (2) analyze male and female sub-samples, whereas columns (4) and (5) focus on high and low ability, defined according to the gender- and
grade-specific median performance in the first run. Columns (3) and (6) present p-values of tests of equality between the two preceding columns. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered at the class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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other but not perfectly related. Our preferred explanation for this imperfect relation
is the fact that preferences for peers are multi-dimensional. They do not stem from
a single factor, but rather are determined by the interplay of several factors.22 There-
fore, we ask whether students target peers with certain performance levels similar
to their own, as indicated by the homophily documented in the previous section, or
whether they try to target their preferred relative performance when selecting peers
based on names.
In order to illustrate the notion that preferences for peers are indeed multi-
dimensional, we enrich our previous model. In particular, we include the absolute
deviation of a name-based peer’s performance from the most-preferred performance
in the peer selection model in equation (2.1). Table 2.3 presents the results of this
exercise analogous to Table 2.1.
Focusing on the extensive margin of the selection process in Panel A, we observe
that the estimated homophily in past performance is much smaller than documented
in Table 2.1. Instead, there is a sizable effect of targeting one’s preferred relative
performance, with highly significant coefficients ranging between 1.0 and 4.9 per-
centage points. At the same time, the point estimate for differences in performance
remains negative in all specifications and significant in some. Together, these two
effects are similar in size to the homophily in performance documented in Table 2.1.
Thus, students mainly select individuals who are close to their most-preferred per-
formance (targeting of specific relative performances) but they also select peers who
are close to their own performance (homophily in performances). Importantly, the
other coefficients on friendship ties and personality differences remain unaffected
by the inclusion of the preference for relative performance.23 This highlights that the
previous results are not a mere artifact of a preference for a specific relative perfor-
mance; rather, it provides evidence that additional social dimensions are important
for the peer selection process beyond mere reference points in performance.
If we concentrate on the intensive margin of the selection process in Panel B, a
similar picture emerges: the absolute difference from themost-preferred relative per-
formance is a strong predictor for the ranking among selected peers. A one-second
increase in differences between the nominated peer’s performance and the most-
22. A second possible explanation is that the true relation is indeed perfect and measurement
error attenuates this association. Subsequently, given a true coefficient of unity, the estimated coeffi-
cients correspond to the attenuation factor λ. Using the relationship λ = 1/(1+ s) with s being the
noise-to-signal ratio (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 903f.), we can calculate s. Based on the estimates
in Table 2.D.1, in which we regress the preferred relative performance on a student’s belief over the
relative performance of her most-preferred peer, we obtain a coefficient βˆ = 0.44, implying s = 1.27.
This ratio exceeds one, implying that the beliefs would need to contain more noise components than
actual information. We thus conclude from this that measurement error alone is unlikely to be the sole
cause for the imperfect relationship.
23. Similar to the estimates previously presented, we split the personality index in its components
in Appendix Table 2.D.3
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preferred relative performance leads to a decrease of .15 ranks for that peer. Again,
the coefficient for homophily in performance is much smaller than before. The re-
maining determinants are unaffected by the inclusion of the preference for relative
performance. Column (4) confirms these results using beliefs rather than actual
performance. Unlike the specification with actual performance, beliefs over relative
performance remain significant when including deviations from the preferred per-
formance.
These results highlight that preferences over a peer’s relative performance play
a crucial role when selecting peers. While the most-preferred relative performance
and the performance of the selected peer are strongly related, these measures do not
coincide perfectly; rather, individuals also take into account other dimensions such
as peers’ similarity in terms of past performance and personality as well as exist-
ing friendship ties. By selecting peers based on their names, students can therefore
condition on a richer information set. This suggests that social comparisons incor-
porate classical conceptualizations of reference points for effort provision, but they
also depend on social factors.
2.5 Conclusion
Whom do individuals choose as peers? Answering this question is crucial to under-
stand how peer effects work and how to design policies leveraging them. We use
data from a framed field experiment and study preferences for peers to shed light
on this issue. We find that individuals choose their peers predominantly, but not
exclusively, along their social network. Friendship ties drive peer selections, but our
sample also exhibits significant homophily in terms of individuals’ performance and
personality. Interestingly, among friends, similarity in performance becomes even
more important for peer selection. While males choose more similar peers than
females, low-performing individuals emphasize friendships more than their high-
performing counterparts. By eliciting the desired relative performance of a peer, we
find that most prefer peers with slightly higher but similar performance, which is
in line with findings in social sciences (e.g., Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, and Kuyper,
1999; Huguet et al., 2001). When selecting peers, individuals target a specific rel-
ative performance. Peer selection is therefore based on homophily in personality,
friendship ties and a desired performance level.
Our results have important implications for estimating peer effects, designing
mechanisms with social preferences and policy interventions. First, if friends are
more likely to be chosen as peers, this could give rise to relatively larger impact of
friends compared to non-friends. Similarly, if individuals choose peers with specific
performances, these preferences may result in those peers exerting stronger effects
than others. The evidence presented in this paper therefore provides a rationale for
estimating models of differential (in terms of gender and friends) or nonlinear peer
effects (in terms of own and peer ability). Second, by demonstrating to whom indi-
2.5
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Table 2.3. Targeting of preferred relative performances
(A) Peer Nominated (B) Peer Nomination Ranking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.007* -0.012* -0.016 -0.052
(0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.048)
Abs. Diff. in Beliefs over Times in First Run -0.149***
(0.051)
Abs. Diff. from Perf.-based Preference -0.010*** -0.022*** -0.049*** -0.150*** -0.175***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.043) (0.029)
Friendship Indicator 0.381*** 0.392*** 1.705*** 1.722***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.117) (0.121)
Abs. Diff. in Personality -0.017*** -0.039*** -0.094*** -0.269*** -0.260***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.023) (0.072) (0.076)
Controls for heterogeneity Characteristics Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Sample All All Friends only All Beliefs
Observations 6654 6646 2872 2756 2756
Individuals 612 612 612 612 612
R2 0.26 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.41
Notes: This table presents the results of the linear probability model according to equation (2.1) using an indicator of being nominated as one of the three most-preferred
name-based peers as the dependent variable and the absolute deviation from the most-preferred relative performance as an additional explanatory variable. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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viduals compare their performance we inform theories of reference group formation.
These insights in turn can be used to predict the effect of reorganizations and incen-
tive contracts in a theoretically-disciplined manner (Ederer and Patacconi, 2010;
Kőszegi, 2014). Finally, by using reassignment policies, teachers or managers influ-
ence the set of people from whom one can choose peers. On the one hand, these
policies can have unintended consequences if sub-groups emerge (Carrell, Sacer-
dote, and West, 2013). On the other hand, policy-makers that are aware of such
preferences for peers can provide suitable peers and hence indirectly affect peer
selection.
The preferences for peers analyzed in this paper and their link to personal char-
acteristics might be specific to situations where only own performance matters and
with competitive components. Other peers might be selected in cooperative settings.
Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the heterogeneity in social reference points and
peer selection is based on systematic patterns of past performance, personality and
friendship ties. These determinants are also likely to matter in other settings.
At the same time, our results open avenues for new interventions and research
projects: if some peers exert positive effects on an individual’s performance, can we
encourage individuals to select into specific peer groups that help them to unfold
their full potential? Relatedly, are students aware how their peers affect their own
performance? Both of these issues raise the question whether preferences for peers
would change if we provide individuals with information about peer effects or even
“nudge” people to select specific peers. Our results are therefore a first step towards
understanding the different aspects underlying peer choices. Future research on the
interaction of personality, selection into environments and the influence of peers is
needed to improve our understanding of social comparison processes, the endoge-
nous formation of peer groups as well as their long-term consequences.
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Appendix 2.A Additional Material for Performance-based
Preferences
Figure 2.A.1 presents the distribution of the second and third most-preferred rela-
tive performance. We observe that these are also centered around the [0,1] second
faster category but show some different pattern. Nonetheless, as reported in sec-
tion 2.3.1, the differences in the distribution are due targeting the most-preferred
relative performance. We thus restrict our attention to the first preference only.
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Figure 2.A.1. Distribution of second and third performance-based peer preferences
Notes: Figure (a) presents a histograms of students’ preferences over relative performance. The inter-
vals used here and in the survey are one-second intervals of relative performances in the first run.
Vertical lines indicate own performances (black; equals zero by definition) and mean preference (red;
where we used the mean of each interval to calculate the mean). Figure (b) presents the relationship
of the first performance-based preference and the second/third preference.
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In Figures 2.A.2a and 2.A.2b, we present gender splits of the most-preferred rel-
ative performance. While both distributions are relatively similar, males prefer some-
what faster peers than females. On average, females prefer peers being .38 seconds
faster, whereas males prefer peers being .90 seconds faster. These correspond to 13
and 31% of a standard deviation in performances of the first run.
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(a) Females
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Figure 2.A.2. Distribution of performance-based peer preferences by gender
Notes: Figure (a) presents a histograms of students’ preferences over relative performance. The inter-
vals used here and in the survey are one-second intervals of relative performances in the first run.
Vertical lines indicate own performance (black; equals zero by definition) and mean preference (red;
where we used the mean of each interval to calculate the mean). Figure (b) presents the relationship
of the first performance-based preference and the second/third preference.
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Appendix 2.B Additional Material for Peer Selection
Analysis
This appendix provides descriptive statistics and robustness checks for the analysis of
the peer selection process. Table 2.B.1 provides summary statistics for the variables
used in the analysis. In Table 2.B.2 Panel A we consider someone to be nominated
if he is nominated at all, i.e. among the first six most-preferred peers, and zero oth-
erwise. Similarly, Panel (B) estimates a Tobit specification using all potential peers,
where we only observe the ranking for six most-preferred peers and is censored oth-
erwise. Table 2.B.3 splits up the aggregate measure of personality and includes all
dimensions separately. Table 2.B.4 uses alternative definitions of friendship to show
that our results are robust with respect to the exact definition. Finally, Table 2.B.5
presents the heterogeneous effects for peer selection at the intensive margin.
Table 2.B.1. Distribution of absolute differences
Absolute differences
Mean SD
25th
perc.
50th
perc.
75th
perc.
Full sample
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run 2.55 2.10 0.93 2.06 3.59
Friendship Indicator 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Abs. Diff. in Personality 3.99 1.12 3.20 3.92 4.66
Abs. Diff. in Agreeableness 1.13 0.85 0.44 0.96 1.65
Abs. Diff. in Conscientiousness 1.12 0.84 0.45 0.97 1.62
Abs. Diff. in Extraversion 1.13 0.84 0.45 0.95 1.66
Abs. Diff. in Openness 1.11 0.87 0.42 0.93 1.60
Abs. Diff. in Neuroticism 1.06 0.78 0.43 0.91 1.53
Abs. Diff. in Locus of Control 1.09 0.83 0.43 0.90 1.58
Abs. Diff. in Social Comparison 1.09 0.82 0.43 0.92 1.59
Abs. Diff. in Competitiveness 1.07 0.78 0.44 0.91 1.58
Abs. Diff. in Risk Preferences 1.12 0.87 0.45 0.90 1.79
For friends only
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run 2.33 1.95 0.84 1.87 3.25
Abs. Diff. in Personality 3.89 1.10 3.13 3.80 4.50
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for absolute differences in several characteristics. The
upper panel considers all characteristics for the whole sample, while the lower panel restricts the
characteristics to friends only.
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Table 2.B.2. Robustness checks: All nominated peers and censoring
(A) Peer Nominated (B) Peer Nomination Ranking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.017*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.145***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.042)
Friendship Indicator 0.495*** 0.507*** 0.515*** 4.981***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.049) (0.311)
Abs. Diff. in Personality -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.040*** -0.059*** -0.077*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.044)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run × Abs. Diff. in Personality 0.002
(0.002)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run × Friendship Indicator -0.024***
(0.007)
Abs. Diff. in Personality × Friendship Indicator -0.016
(0.011)
Controls for heterogeneity Characteristics Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Sample All All All Friends only All
Observations 6654 6646 6646 2872 6654
Individuals 612 612 612 612 612
R2 0.35 0.46 0.37 0.44
Notes: Panel A presents the results from the extensive margin analysis using a linear probability model according to equation (2.1) with an indicator of being nominated
as one of the sixth most-preferred name-based peers (i.e. whether a person is nominated as a peer at all) as the dependent variable. Column (4) restricts the sample to
the set of friends. Panel B presents results of the intensive margin using the whole sample but allow for censoring of those classmates that were not nominated on the
extensive margin. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Table 2.B.3. Robustness checks: Splitting up personality index
(A) Peer Nominated
(B) Peer Nomination
Ranking
(1) (2)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.029*** -0.173***
(0.005) (0.032)
Friendship Indicator 0.393*** 1.716***
(0.017) (0.113)
Abs. Diff. in Agreeableness -0.033*** -0.249***
(0.009) (0.054)
Abs. Diff. in Conscientiousness -0.002 -0.054
(0.008) (0.053)
Abs. Diff. in Extraversion -0.015 -0.104
(0.010) (0.063)
Abs. Diff. in Openness -0.004 0.025
(0.010) (0.069)
Abs. Diff. in Neuroticism -0.014 -0.141*
(0.009) (0.083)
Abs. Diff. in Locus of Control -0.003 -0.056
(0.009) (0.079)
Abs. Diff. in Social Comparison -0.022*** -0.163***
(0.007) (0.055)
Abs. Diff. in Competitiveness -0.018* -0.072
(0.009) (0.059)
Abs. Diff. in Risk Preferences -0.005 0.006
(0.009) (0.086)
Controls for heterogeneity Fixed effects Fixed effects
Sample All All
Observations 6646 2756
Individuals 612 612
R2 0.37 0.40
Notes: Panel A presents the results from the extensive margin analysis using a linear probability model
according to equation (2.1) with an indicator of being nominated as one of the three most-preferred
name-based peers as the dependent variable, but in which we allow for each personality measure to
enter separately. Panel B presents analogous results of the intensive margin using the ranking among
those who are nominated as peers. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the
class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Table 2.B.4. Robustness checks: Alternative definitions of friendship ties
Peer Nominated
(1) (2) (3)
Undirected Directed Reciprocal
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Abs. Diff. in Personality -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.032***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Friendship Indicator 0.392*** 0.454*** 0.507***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Controls for heterogeneity Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Observations 6646 6646 6646
Individuals 612 612 612
R2 0.37 0.41 0.42
Notes: This table presents the results from the extensive margin analysis using a linear probability
model according to equation (2.1) with an indicator of being nominated as one of the three most-
preferred name-based peers as the dependent variable for varying definitions of friendship ties. Col-
umn (1) uses undirected friendships as in the main text, column (2) defines friendship ties as directed,
while column (3) only considers reciprocal links. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clus-
tered at the class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Table 2.B.5. Heterogeneities on the intensive margin of peer nominations
Peer Nomination Ranking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males Females p-value Low Abil. High Abil. p-value
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.162 -0.180*** 0.884 -0.195*** -0.028 0.765
(0.116) (0.036) (0.060) (0.112)
Friendship Indicator 1.441*** 1.776*** 0.234 2.174*** 1.436*** 0.012
(0.245) (0.134) (0.140) (0.202)
Abs. Diff. in Personality -0.486*** -0.200** 0.063 -0.204* -0.304** 0.778
(0.119) (0.092) (0.113) (0.128)
Controls for heterogeneity Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Observations 777 1979 1260 1230
Individuals 207 405 308 301
R2 0.46 0.38 0.51 0.50
Notes: This table replicates Panel B of Table 2.1 for different sub-samples. More specifically, it presents results from the intensive margin analysis using the ranking
among those who are nominated as peers, in which better rankings correspond to higher values of the dependent variable (6: highest, 1: lowest). Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered at the class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Appendix 2.C Relationship of Beliefs and Actual
Performance
In this section, we first describe the relationship between beliefs and actual perfor-
mance. Afterwards, we provide evidence that the beliefs are meaningful, which is
consistent over time by leveraging a second measurement of the same belief.
Beliefs over relative performance and actual relative performance do not neces-
sarily coincide. We therefore check how these two relate to each other. Figure 2.C.1a
presents a scatter plot of the belief over relative performance of name-based peers
and their actual relative performance. We observe that although the relationship is
not perfect, these two are significantly related as is confirmed by the corresponding
regressions in Table 2.C.1. Figure 2.C.1b displays the absolute differences between
the beliefs and the actual relative performance. On average, these two have an ab-
solute difference of 1.95 seconds.
Table 2.C.1. Relationship between beliefs over and actual relative performance
(a) Peer’s relative
time (continuous)
(b) Peer is faster
(binary)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative time of most-preferred
name-based peer
0.25*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.04)
Preferred name-based peer is faster 0.27*** 0.25***
(0.05) (0.05)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 566 562 566 562
R2 .21 .23 .16 .17
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using a peer’s relative performance according to
the beliefs of the name-based preferences as the dependent variable. Figure 2.C.1 presents the results
graphically. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the class level. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Moreover, we are interested whether the beliefs capture pure noise or whether
they are constant over time. To check for consistency of the beliefs, we lever a second
(binary) belief elicited right before the second run and compare it to the beliefs
elicited as part of the name-based preferences. The first two columns of Table 2.C.2
use the continuous measure of beliefs over relative performance as elicited in the
name-based preferences as the dependent variable. The second set of columns uses
a binary version of this indicating whether the student believed that the peer has
been faster or slower. The sample is restricted to those students with peers that
are nominated somewhere in the name-based preferences (i.e., for whom we have
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beliefs) and that are matched as a peer in the second run (i.e., only for those for
whom we have a second belief measure). This naturally oversampled observations
in Name. We thus check whether the pattern differs depending on the treatment.
As can be seen, the two measures are significantly related with a correlation of .58.
Moreover, this correlation does not significantly vary with the assigned treatment.
Table 2.C.2. Consistency of beliefs
(a) Continuous belief (b) Binary belief
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Believe peer is faster 1.96*** 0.58***
(0.23) (0.05)
Random × Believe peer is faster 2.00*** 0.53***
(0.27) (0.06)
Name × Believe peer is faster 1.92*** 0.59***
(0.23) (0.05)
Performance × Believe peer is faster 2.01*** 0.58***
(0.23) (0.05)
N 345 345 345 345
R2 .26 .27 .3 .31
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using the beliefs over the peer’s performance as
elicited in the name-based preferences as the dependent variable. The sample is restricted to those
subjects with peers that are nominated in the name-based preferences and are actually matched for
the second run, for which we have elicited a second (binary) belief measure. 89 observations are
from students in Random, 180 from Name, and 87 from Performance. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses and clustered at the class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent level.
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Figure 2.C.1. Relationship of beliefs and actual performance
Notes: Figure (a) presents the relationship beliefs over and actual relative performance of the name-
based peers. The corresponding regression is presented in Table 2.C.1. Figure (b) presents a histogram
of the absolute difference in beliefs and actual performance. The vertical line in (b) indicates mean
absolute difference (red; where we used themean of each interval to calculate themean). The intervals
used here and in the survey are one-second intervals of relative performances in the first run.
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Appendix 2.D Additional Material for Relationship of
Preferences
Figure 2.D.1 and Table 2.D.1 provide a first view on the relation of performance- and
name-based preferences. More specifically, we associate preferred relative perfor-
mances of each individual with beliefs over the relative performance of their peers
nominated in the name-based preferences. We observe a positive relationship be-
tween the two measures as shown in Figure 2.D.1.
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Figure 2.D.1. Relationship of performance- and name-based preferences for peers
Notes: The figures present the relationship between performance- and name-based preferences using
beliefs over peer’s performance. Corresponding regressions are presented in Table 2.D.1.
Table 2.D.1 quantifies this relationship: if students select a peer who they believe
is one second faster, this is associated with an increase in the relative performance in
the performance-based preference by .44 seconds on average (columns (1) and (2)).
Similarly, we observe a significant positive relationship between binary indicators
of believing that the most-preferred name-based peer is faster and choosing a faster
peer in the performance-based preference in columns (3) and (4). Nonetheless, the
relationship between name- and performance-based preferences is not perfect, as it
would be the case if the preferences over relative performance were the only determi-
nants of name-based preferences. If this were the case, we should observe regression
coefficients of unity.
One potential explanation for the imperfect relationship between performance-
and name-based preferences is measurement error. Here, we show that measure-
ment error is unlikely to explain the imperfect association alone. Assume that
we have classical measurement error and the true coefficient corresponds to one
(β = 1), then by the standard attenuation bias formula (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005,
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Table 2.D.1. Relationship between preferences based on names and relative perfor-
mance
Peer preference over rel. perf.
(a) Continuous (b) Binary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Belief over peer’s rel. perf. 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 627 623 582 578
R2 .25 .28 .17 .2
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using a peer’s relative performance in one-second
intervals or an indicator for preferring a faster peer according to the performance-based preferences
as the dependent variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the class level.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Figure 2.D.1 presents the results
graphically.
p. 903f.), we have that if x∗ = x + v with v being a mean-zero error with variance
σ2v ,
p lim βˆ = σ
2
x∗
σ2x∗ + σ2v
β = λβ = λ (2.D.1)
as β = 1 and where λ is the attenuation factor.2⁴ Thus the regression coefficients in
Table 2.D.2 correspond to the attenuation factors that would be needed for a perfect
relationship. For a more intuitive interpretation, we rewrite the factor in terms of the
noise-to-signal ratio s such that λ = 1/(1 + s). The noise-to-signal ratio tells us how
much noise relative to signals the data should have if the true relationship is given by
β = 1. We reproduce Table 2.D.1 here and additionally present the corresponding
noise-to-signal ratios of each coefficient below the corresponding regressions. We
find that all ratios exceed one, which implies that the measurements would need
to have more noise components than actual information. We thus conclude that
measurement error alone cannot explain the imperfect relationship.
24. For the multivariate case the formula is slightly different, but the basic idea remains the same.
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Table 2.D.2. Relationship between performance- and name-based preferences
(a) Peer’s relative
time (continuous)
(b) Peer is faster
(binary)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Using name-based beliefs
Belief over peer’s performance 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.06) (0.06)
Belief over peer’s performance (0/1) 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.04) (0.04)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 627 623 627 623
R2 .25 .27 .17 .2
Noise-to-signal ratio for β = 1 1.3 1.3 2.5 2.5
Panel B: Using name-based actual perf.
Relative time of peer 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.03) (0.03)
Peer is faster (0/1) 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Personality No Yes No Yes
Class FEs, Gender, Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 566 562 566 562
R2 .11 .13 .095 .12
Noise-to-signal ratio for β = 1 9.2 10 26 28
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions using the most-preferred name-based peer’s rela-
tive performance in one-second intervals or an indicator for preferring a faster peer according to the
performance-based preferences as the dependent variable. Standard errors are shown in parentheses
and clustered at the class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
The reported signal-to-noise ratio describes the extend of measurement error needed if the true rela-
tionship is actually perfect (i.e., β = 1) rather than imperfect (β < 1). Accordingly, a noise-to-signal
ratio larger than one indicates more noise than signal, equal to one corresponds to as much signal as
noise and less than one more signal than noise. Figure 2.D.1 presents the results graphically.
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Table 2.D.3. Robustness checks: Splitting up personality index
(A) Peer Nominated
(B) Peer Nomination
Ranking
(1) (2)
Abs. Diff. in Time of First Run -0.011* -0.052
(0.006) (0.045)
Abs. Diff. from Perf.-based Preference -0.022*** -0.145***
(0.006) (0.042)
Friendship Indicator 0.394*** 1.711***
(0.017) (0.114)
Abs. Diff. in Agreeableness -0.034*** -0.242***
(0.009) (0.057)
Abs. Diff. in Conscientiousness -0.002 -0.055
(0.008) (0.052)
Abs. Diff. in Extraversion -0.015 -0.103
(0.010) (0.063)
Abs. Diff. in Openness -0.003 0.033
(0.010) (0.069)
Abs. Diff. in Neuroticism -0.014 -0.136
(0.009) (0.082)
Abs. Diff. in Locus of Control -0.003 -0.055
(0.009) (0.078)
Abs. Diff. in Social Comparison -0.021*** -0.161***
(0.007) (0.054)
Abs. Diff. in Competitiveness -0.018* -0.072
(0.010) (0.057)
Abs. Diff. in Risk Preferences -0.005 -0.006
(0.009) (0.085)
Controls for heterogeneity Fixed effects Fixed effects
Sample All All
Observations 6646 2756
Individuals 612 612
R2 0.37 0.41
Notes: Panel A presents the results from the extensive margin analysis using a linear probability model
according equation (2.1) with an indicator of being nominated as one of the three most-preferred
name-based peers as the dependent variable, but in which we allow for each personality measure to
enter separately and add absolute deviations of the most-preferred relative performance as an addi-
tional regressor. Panel B presents analogous results of the intensive margin using the ranking among
those who are nominated as peers. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the
class level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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.Chapter 3
Understanding Parental
Decision-making: Beliefs about
Returns to Parenting Styles and
Neighborhoods
3.1 Introduction
Parents play a crucial role for the development and success of children, as inequali-
ties can be traced back to early life (Francesconi and Heckman, 2016; Kalil, 2015).
Yet, not much is known about the factors determining how parents decide to raise
their children. In particular, evidence on the parental decision-making process and
the consequences of different parenting styles remains scarce, in part due to their
complexity (Attanasio, 2015). In a recent study, Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) argue
that the economic environment creates incentives to engage in different forms of
parenting. As parents decide where to live and how to raise their children, it is im-
portant to understand how parents perceive their environments and parenting to
interact.1
In this paper, I study how parents perceive the returns to two factors affecting the
development and long-term outcomes of children: First, I focus on parenting styles
describing strategies that parents use in raising their children (Baumrind, 1967),
and second, I focus on the quality of the neighborhood in which a family lives. In
addition, I examine their perceived substitutability or complementarity, analyze the
heterogeneity in perceived returns, and investigate the relevance of these beliefs for
actual parental decision-making. Studying how parents perceive different parenting
1. In general, any observed choice may be consistent with different combinations of preferences
and beliefs. Manski (2004) therefore argues that one cannot solely rely on observed behavior to infer
underlying beliefs, and advocates for a direct elicitation of beliefs.
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styles and neighborhoods to interact helps to predict their behavioral responses to
(policy-induced) changes in the quality of neighborhoods.
In order to investigate parental beliefs, I adopt a hypothetical scenario approach
used by Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013), Boneva and Rauh (2018), Bhalotra, Dela-
vande, Font, and Maselko (2017), and Attanasio, Boneva, and Rauh (2019). I con-
struct eight scenarios in which parents raise their children. Across scenarios, I vary
the parenting style that parents adopt – commonly defined as different intensities
of warmth and control employed in raising children (Maccoby and Martin, 1983)2
– as well as the quality of the neighborhood families are living in. In addition, I
randomize the children’s age and gender across respondents. For each of these sce-
narios, I then elicit parental expectations about the future earnings and expected
life satisfaction of the child at the age of 30.3 This design has several noteworthy
features: First, by eliciting parents’ beliefs for all eight scenarios and varying one
dimensions at a time, I can infer parents’ perceived returns to one particular dimen-
sion while controlling for (unobserved) heterogeneity across respondents. Second,
comparing scenarios that change several factors at the same time allows me to in-
vestigate the perceived substitutability or complementarity of parenting styles and
neighborhoods. Third, having access to several elicited beliefs per parent, I can esti-
mate how each parent perceives these returns and subsequently link them to their
characteristics and actual parenting styles. I implement the scenarios in a survey of
2,119 parents with school-aged children in the United States, who are selected to
be representative in terms of their gender, age, income, and region.
I find that parents expect considerable returns to the warmth dimension of par-
enting, but not to control. An increase of one standard deviation in warmth is associ-
ated with parents expecting 15.3 percent higher earnings for children at the age of
30, whereas increasing control is not perceived as yielding any returns. In addition,
my estimates show that parents expect earnings to increase by 22.6 percent when
raising a child in a relatively good neighborhood. When analyzing the interaction
of the different factors, parents seem to adapt their expectations. Parents perceive
warmth and control as complements, increasing expected earnings by an additional
2. Parenting styles have a long tradition in developmental psychology going back to Baumrind
(1967). Initially, she identified three parenting styles, while Maccoby and Martin (1983) extend her
original typology to four styles defined according to two dimensions – the extent of warmth, on the
one hand, and control used in raising children, on the other. Depending on their intensities, these
two dimensions define four distinct parenting styles: authoritative (high warmth, high control), per-
missive (high warmth, low control), authoritarian (low warmth, high control), and neglecting (low
warmth, low control). The psychology literature often refers to these dimensions as responsiveness
and demandingness instead of warmth and control.
3. This approach of eliciting future wage expectations dates back to Dominitz andManski (1996)
and has subsequently been used in a range of studies focusing on returns to human capital investments
(e.g., Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014; Hastings, Neilson, Ramirez, and Zimmerman, 2016; Jensen,
2010; Kaufmann, 2014; Nguyen, 2008).
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4.6 percentage points if combining high levels of both warmth and control. More-
over, parenting is perceived as being more effective in low-quality neighborhoods.
The perceived return to warmth (control) is 1.4 (1.5) percentage points higher in
low-quality neighborhoods, corresponding to an increase of approximately 9 per-
cent of the perceived return to warmth. Parents therefore expect their parenting to
compensate at least in part for deprived environments. Yet, authoritative parenting
styles featuring warmth and control are perceived as being more effective in high
quality neighborhoods. In addition, I show that these results are not restricted to
the monetary domain, but carry over to the life satisfaction domain.
How do these perceived returns vary by age and gender of the child? First, my
results reveal a pronounced age gradient: high levels of warmth are perceived as
more effective for younger children, while exerting control is especially important
for older, teenage children living in adverse environments. I do not find differences
in perceived returns by child gender. However, when focusing on parental gender, I
find pronounced differences in perceived returns. Mothers expect higher returns to
warmth and neighborhoods than fathers, while there are no differences in the con-
trol dimension of parenting styles. Although there is a large dispersion in perceived
returns, I do not find systematic associations with other sociodemographic charac-
teristics, which is in line with findings by Attanasio, Boneva, and Rauh (2019), but
contrasts with Boneva and Rauh (2018). My findings imply that parental beliefs
about returns to parenting styles and neighborhoods are similar for parents from
different socioeconomic backgrounds and thus unlikely to explain socioeconomic
differences in parenting behavior. Despite the absence of socioeconomic differences
in perceived returns, there are systematic variations. In particular, I show that par-
enting values – parents’ altruism and paternalism towards their own child – are
strongly related to perceived returns. In particular, altruistic parents expect high
payoffs for being responsive (high warmth) and living in good neighborhoods, while
paternalistic parents expect larger returns to exerting control. These patterns pro-
vide empirical support for assumptions made in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) and
underline the role of parental preferences and parenting values for understanding
perceived returns.
Finally, I investigate whether perceived returns are relevant for actual parenting
behavior. Importantly, I find that perceived returns to both parenting dimensions
are related to actual parenting behavior in the respective dimension: parents who
expect larger returns to warmth (control) are more likely to raise their own children
with warmth (control), highlighting that parental beliefs are consistent with actual
behavior.
These results contribute to three strands of the literature. First, the paper relates
to a growing literature on subjective expectations in the context of human capital
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formation.⁴,⁵ It is most closely connected to studies of parental beliefs about the
process of human capital formation pioneered by Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013).
Boneva and Rauh (2018) and Attanasio, Boneva, and Rauh (2019) build on their
hypothetical scenario approach to study the timing (childhood or adolescence) or
type of investment (time or money), while Bhalotra et al. (2017) consider differ-
ent forms of time investments (intensity of breastfeeding and child interaction). By
contrast, I study a different margin by allowing the mode of interaction, i.e., the par-
enting style, to vary. The rationale behind this is that a time investment of one hour
can have different effects, depending on the intensity of parent-child interactions
and thus I pay attention to the quality rather than the quantity margin of parental
investments. Apart from analyzing a new and distinct margin, I also add method-
ologically to this literature on subjective expectations by embedding a second belief
measure to correct for measurement error. In particular, when studying the rele-
vance of perceived returns for actual behavior, I lever two distinct measures of the
same underlying factor, but measured in different domains (monetary or life satis-
faction) to mitigate attenuation bias by applying a measurement error correction
proposed by Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2019).
Second, I contribute to a series of papers that explicitly incorporate parenting
styles in addition to parental investments in their analyses. These studies analyze
the development (Cobb-Clark, Salamanca, and Zhu, 2019; Cunha, 2015; Del Bono,
Francesconi, Kelly, and Sacker, 2016; Ermisch, 2008; Fiorini and Keane, 2014)
and intergenerational transmission of skills and preferences (Brenøe and Epper,
2019; Falk, Kosse, Pinger, Schildberg-Hörisch, and Deckers, forthcoming; Zumbuehl,
Dohmen, and Pfann, 2018), a child’s behavior (Dooley and Stewart, 2007) or school
outcomes (Cosconati, 2012). While these papers, as well as the developmental psy-
chology literature, are primarily concerned with the consequences of particular in-
vestments or parenting styles for child outcomes, Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) and
Doepke, Sorrenti, and Zilibotti (forthcoming) choose a different approach. They
focus on parental decision-making and argue that economic incentives created by
4. The literature discussed here builds on a growing literature analyzing students’ subjective
expectations about schooling decisions (Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2014; Giustinelli, 2016; Jensen,
2010; Kaufmann, 2014) and major choices (Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang, 2012; Beffy, Fougère, and
Maurel, 2012; Hastings et al., 2016; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015;
Zafar, 2013), or family and job preferences as well as the resulting gender differences (Kiessling,
Pinger, Bergerhoff, and Seegers, 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018a; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018b).
5. I focus on a literature that assesses subjective expectations as part of decision-making pro-
cesses. In the context of parental beliefs, there also exist some papers (e.g., Dizon-Ross, 2019; Kinsler
and Pavan, 2018) that concentrate on the accuracy of parental beliefs for outcomes such as the perfor-
mance of children in school. For these outcomes, parents can learn about realizations and thus verify
beliefs in principle, while for the subjective expectations considered here this is typically not the case.
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the environment shape parents’ parenting style choices.⁶,⁷ The present paper com-
plements these papers by focusing on the parental decision-making process and by
presenting evidence on the perceived long-term consequences of different parent-
ing styles in two relevant domains – earnings and life satisfaction. Moreover, my
results provide support for modeling choices made in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017),
namely that parental altruism and paternalism are key to understanding the choice
of parenting styles.
Lastly, the paper relates to the literature showing how neighborhoods affect long-
term outcomes of children (see, e.g., Chetty, Friedman, Hendren, Jones, and Porter,
2018; Chetty and Hendren, 2018a; Chetty and Hendren, 2018b; Deutscher, forth-
coming, for evidence that neighborhood exposure affects a variety of social and
economic outcomes) and the literature that analyzes parents’ behavioral responses.
Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2005), Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013), and Han (2019)
provide evidence that parents are more involved in their children’s upbringing in
low-quality neighborhoods. By contrast, Patacchini and Zenou (2011) suggest that
parental involvement actually increases with neighborhood quality. I contribute to
this discussion by providing first evidence on parental perceptions of both neigh-
borhood effects, as well as their interactions with parenting decisions. Moreover,
my results show that parents perceive the returns to high warmth or high control
parenting as being relatively larger in low quality neighborhoods. However, these
effects are reversed when I analyze authoritative parenting styles, characterized by
high levels of warmth and control. This indicates that conflicting findings in the lit-
erature may be due to a focus on different parenting behaviors. Collectively, these
papers as well as my paper therefore suggest that the way in which parents raise
their children interacts with neighborhood quality, thus pointing towards an addi-
tional mediator of neighborhood effects besides schools (e.g., Laliberté, 2018) or
peers (e.g., Agostinelli, 2018).
6. In particular, they focus on inequality and occupational mobility (in terms of an incumbency
premium) as two features of the environment that create such incentives. Using data from the World
Value Survey, Doepke and Zilibotti (2017) provide cross-country evidence that these two measures
correlate with average parenting styles in a country. Dohmen, Golsteyn, Lindahl, Pfann, and Richter
(2019) provide related evidence from Sweden that the effectiveness of parenting styles indeed hinges
on the economic environment. In contrast to these papers, I focus on the decision-making process of
individual parents and ask whether parents think such associations exist, and study the size of and
heterogeneity in those perceived returns, investigating whether these perceived returns are related to
the actual decision-making of parents.
7. Relatedly, Cuellar, Jones, and Sterrett (2015) review the psychological literature on the re-
lationship between parenting styles and neighborhoods. While a general finding in developmental
psychology is that an authoritative form of parenting is most effective in raising successful children,
there exists a large variety in adopted parenting styles (e.g., Chan and Koo, 2011; Dornbusch, Ritter,
Leiderman, Roberts, and Fraleigh, 1987; Lamborn, Mounts, Steinberg, and Dornbusch, 1991; Stein-
berg, Mounts, D., and Dornbusch, 1991).
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In the next section, I describe the main survey instrument as well as the data
collection process. Section 3.3 documents parents’ beliefs about the returns to par-
enting styles and neighborhoods before Section 3.4 turns to an individual-level anal-
ysis. Section 3.5 examines the relevance of individual perceived returns for parental
decision-making. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Survey Description and Data
My aim is to study parental beliefs about the effectiveness of different parenting
styles and to analyze their interaction with the economic environment a family is
living in. In order to study these beliefs, I conduct a survey with a representative
sample of 2,119 parents in the United States. In this section, I describe the survey
instrument and the sample for this study.
3.2.1 Hypothetical Scenario Approach
Analyzing parental beliefs is difficult for several reasons: First, inferring beliefs from
observed behavior can be challenging, as different sets of preferences and beliefs
can in principle rationalize a given action (Manski, 2004). Second, eliciting beliefs
only about the consequences of one’s own actual parenting style ignores important
counterfactual beliefs that are an integral part of the decision-making process (Ar-
cidiacono, Hotz, and Kang, 2012). Third, collecting beliefs about the parents’ own
behavior towards their child might trigger motivated or self-serving beliefs, result-
ing in over- or understating of their beliefs. In order to circumvent these issues, I
adopt a hypothetical scenario approach used by Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013),
Boneva and Rauh (2018), Bhalotra et al. (2017), as well as Attanasio, Boneva, and
Rauh (2019), and elicit beliefs about the consequences of different parenting styles
directly. These scenarios have the advantage of allowing me to elicit returns over
different dimensions and counterfactuals by varying one dimension at a time while
holding other factors constant. In addition, by asking about the consequences of a
hypothetical family, I reduce the scope for self-serving beliefs.
The survey instrument consists of different scenarios varying the parenting style
of parents, as well as the quality of the environment in which a family is living. I
adopt the typology of parenting styles introduced by Baumrind (1967) and further
specified by Maccoby and Martin (1983) and vary whether parents raise their chil-
dren with high or low warmth, as well as high or low control. The combination
of these two dimensions results in four distinct parenting styles: neglecting (low
warmth, low control), authoritarian (low warmth, high control), permissive (high
warmth, low control), and authoritative (high warmth, high control). In order to
study how the effectiveness of these different parenting styles depends on the qual-
ity of the neighborhood, I elicit parents’ expectations about the consequences of the
four parenting styles in two different environments: one neighborhood (the “good”
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neighborhood) describes an environment with low unemployment and little crime,
while the other has relatively high unemployment and more crime (“bad” neigh-
borhood). This allows me to test whether parents believe that the effectiveness of
different parenting styles hinges on the environment in which a family is living, as
suggested in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017). Moreover, this enables me to examine
whether parents perceive one parenting style as optimal, independently of the so-
cioeconomic environment. Table 3.1 summarizes the resulting eight scenarios.
Table 3.1. Survey scenarios
Bad neighborhood (nL) Good neighborhood (nH)
Low High Low High
control control control control
(cL) (cH) (cL) (cH)
Low warmth
y1 y2
Low warmth
y5 y6(wL) (wL)
High warmth
y3 y4
High warmth
y7 y8(wH) (wH)
Notes: This table summarizes scenarios j (j = 1, . . . , 8) in which respondents are asked to provide
expected earnings for children at age 30 (yj) for different parenting style combinations (low and high
warmth/control) and neighborhoods (low or high neighborhood quality).
More specifically, I present respondents two hypothetical average American fam-
ilies, each having a single child whose age and gender are randomly determined, as
described below. The two families differ only in the neighborhood in which they are
living. One family, the “Joneses”, lives in a good neighborhood that has a relatively
low unemployment rate (2%), as well as a low crimes rate (10 violent crimes per
10,000 inhabitants). The other family, the “Smiths”, lives in a relatively deprived
neighborhood with higher unemployment (10%), as well as a higher crime rate (60
violent crimes per 10,000 inhabitants).⁸ The scenarios stress that apart from liv-
ing in different neighborhoods, both families have similar levels of education and
income, and both families invest equal levels of time and money in their children.
Across scenarios, I vary the warmth and control dimension of the parenting styles
(low-low, low-high, high-low, high-high). In order to describe different parenting
styles, I adopt descriptions based on established measures of parenting styles for
warmth as well as control and vary the number of times parents engage in a certain
8. The underlying idea is that unemployment and crime rates correspond to measures of a latent
neighborhood quality factor that potentially subsumes several other facets such as school quality or
the availability of amenities. Similar proxies for neighborhood quality have been used before (e.g.,
Han, 2019).
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type of behavior by one standard deviation of the respective distribution.⁹ Appendix
3.A presents the wording of the scenarios.
Taken together, the hypothetical scenarios vary (a) the parenting style a family
adopts by varying the intensity of the two dimensions warmth and control from
low to high, and (b) the quality of the family’s neighborhood (“good” or “bad” char-
acterized by high or low unemployment and crime). Importantly, respondents are
asked not only about one of the scenarios, but answer all of them. This feature al-
lows me to infer the perceived returns over all three dimensions warmth, control,
and neighborhood quality for each individual. By comparing individual responses
across these scenarios, I am able to infer perceived returns of the three dimensions
as well as their relationship in terms of their substitutability and complementarity.
3.2.2 Outcomes
The survey instrument elicits respondents’ expectations for two outcomes of the hy-
pothetical children at age 30. First, as a main outcome, I elicit parents’ expectations
about the expected gross yearly earnings of the children in terms of today’s USD if
they are working full-time. This measure allows me to calculate monetary returns
over the different dimensions. In order to test whether the inferred returns carry
over to other dimensions, I also elicit the expected life satisfaction at age 30 as a
second outcome (measured on a scale from 1, low, to 100, high). Moreover, I can
use this measure to correct for measurement error when analyzing the relation of
perceived returns and actual parenting behavior. To do this, I adopt the “obviously
related instrumental variable” approach proposed by Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv
(2019).
3.2.3 Randomizations
In order to analyze the extent to which parental beliefs depend on the character-
istics of the child, I implement two randomizations: First, I randomly determine
the gender of the child.1⁰ One group answers the scenarios in which both families
have sons (“John” or “Simon”), while for another group, the families have daughters
(“Emily” or “Sarah”).11 By comparing elicited beliefs between respondents seeing a
9. Before the actual survey, I conducted a pilot study to decide on the items in the scenarios. In
particular, I chose the items that had the highest predictive power for the warmth and control dimen-
sion of parenting styles. In addition, I elicited the number of times parents engage in the respective
behavior to obtain estimates of the frequency distribution. This distribution was then used to calibrate
the scenarios corresponding to approximately one standard deviation difference between low and high
intensities of warmth and control.
10. The randomization of gender and age is on the level of the respondent and not on the level of
the hypothetical family. In other words, both families a respondent sees have either sons or daughters
only, and these children have the same age.
11. These names correspond to the most popular names at the beginning of the 2000s, i.e., at a
time when the hypothetical children of the scenarios were born.
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son or a daughter, I can study gender differences in perceived returns. Second, the
age of the child in the scenarios is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution be-
tween 6 and 16 years. The rationale for this is to analyze whether specific parenting
styles are perceived more effective in certain periods as the literature on parental
investments has identified periods during childhood which are crucial for skill devel-
opment and long-term outcomes of children (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach, 2010). Similarly, this helps to analyze whether parents
perceive neighborhoods to be particularly important at certain ages.
3.2.4 Additional Survey Elements
In addition to the hypothetical scenarios described above and standard socioeco-
nomic characteristics, the survey elicits respondents’ actual parenting styles. To do
this, I adopt two established measures of parenting styles as used in the German So-
cioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP). In particular, I use the short versions of the warmth
and control dimension of parenting styles employing three- and four-items scales
based on Perris, Jacobsson, Lindström, Knorring, and Perris (1980) and Schwarz,
Walper, Gödde, and Jurasic (1997), respectively. Moreover, I elicit several parenting
values such as the parents’ belief about the malleability of their child’s skills and the
degree of altruism as well as paternalism towards their child.12
Furthermore, I ask parents to assess the quality of the neighborhood in which
they are living by eliciting their agreement to the three statements (i) “My neighbor-
hood is a good place to raise children”, (ii) “I feel safe in my neighborhood”, and (iii)
“My child attends a school of good quality”, which I use to extract a factor for subjec-
tive neighborhood quality. Additionally, based on respondents’ postcodes, I can link
several neighborhood characteristics provided by Chetty and Hendren (2018a,b).
3.2.5 Summary Statistics
In October and November 2018, I collected a sample of 2,119 parents in the United
States in collaboration with the market research company Research Now. To be eli-
gible to take part in the study, respondents have to share a household with at least
one child aged between 6 to 16, and respondents were sampled to be representa-
tive in terms of their gender, age, household income, and geographic distribution.13
Table 3.2 presents sociodemographic statistics of the final sample and the Current
Population Survey (CPS): 61% of the respondents are female, with an average age of
40 years. The average household has an annual income of USD 82,644 and matches
12. These values are measured using the agreement of parents to the following statements: “I
am usually willing to sacrifice my own desires to satisfy those of my child” (altruism), “As a parent, I
sometimes need to be strict if my child acts against what I think is good for it” (paternalism), and “My
child develops at its own pace, and there is not much I can do about that” (malleability of skills).
13. If more than one child in this age range is present in the household, one child is randomly
selected, and answers to child-specific questions are elicited with regard to this child.
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the geographic distribution across census regions similar to the Current Population
Survey (CPS). Moreover, the sample also matches several non-targeted character-
istics, such as the share of married respondents (75%) and the average number of
children (2.13), but has slightly higher level of education and a lower level of em-
ployment than the CPS sample.
Table 3.2. Summary statistics
(A) Sample (B) CPS
Mean SD Mean
Sociodemographic variables
Female 0.61 0.49 0.57
Age 40.25 7.38 40.89
Employed 0.72 0.45 0.79
College degree 0.52 0.50 0.36
Household income (in USD) 82644 55117 78018
Family structure
Married 0.75 0.43 0.74
Cohabitating 0.08 0.27
Single parent 0.16 0.37
Number of children 2.13 1.08 2.05
Share of female children 0.46 0.37
Geographic distribution
Northeast 0.16 0.37 0.15
Midwest 0.19 0.40 0.21
South 0.39 0.49 0.37
West 0.26 0.44 0.27
Observations 2119
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of the sample collected for this study in Panel (A) and
representative statistics of American parents based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) in Panel
(B).
3.3 Parental Beliefs about the Effectiveness of Parenting
Styles and Neighborhoods
In this section, I study parental beliefs about the effectiveness of different parent-
ing styles and neighborhoods. I begin by documenting the beliefs in the scenarios
elicited in the survey and estimate returns to different levels of warmth, control, and
neighborhood quality. In a second step, I analyze whether the perceived returns for
boys and girls, as well as younger and older children, differ from each other based
on randomizations across respondents.
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In order to analyze parental beliefs, I estimate the perceived returns to different
parenting styles and neighborhoods by comparing an individual’s beliefs in different
scenarios to each other. I therefore identify returns from the within-respondent vari-
ation in beliefs. More specifically, let wj and cj be equal to 1 if scenario j corresponds
to a parenting style with high warmth or high control, respectively, and zero oth-
erwise. Analogously, let nj be equal to 1 if scenario j corresponds to a high-quality
neighborhood, and zero otherwise. Moreover, yij denotes respondent i’s expectation
over the gross yearly earnings of a child at age 30 in scenario j. Mymain specification
is then given by
log(yij) = βwwj + βccj + βnnj
+ βwc(wj × cj) + βwn(wj × nj) + βcn(cj × nj) + fi(Xi) + ij.
(3.1)
The main coefficients of interest are βw, . . . ,βcn, which describe the parents percep-
tions about the returns to the different factors. While βk with k = w, c, n denote
the first-order returns to warmth, control, and neighborhoods, the coefficients on
the interaction terms (k=wc, wn, cn) capture whether two dimensions are comple-
ments (βk > 0) or substitutes (βk < 0). Positive coefficients on interaction effects
therefore imply that parents expect the return of two dimensions to increases when
they are paired; negative coefficients mean that the returns are jointly lower than
separately. The term fi(Xi) either controls for a vector of individual-specific charac-
teristics (fi(Xi) = X0iγ) or individual fixed effects (fi(Xi) = δi) to absorb any observed
or unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, respectively. Finally, ij is an idiosyn-
cratic error term clustered on the individual level.1⁴
Estimating equation (3.1) on the whole sample yields perceived returns to par-
enting and neighborhoods for a representative set of parents in the United States.
In the following, I will also lever the individual panel dimension of the data to in-
fer individual-level perceived returns that I can subsequently link to their determi-
nants and actual decision-making. For this, I estimate a simplified version of equa-
tion (3.1) for each respondent separately. This recovers individual-level perceived
returns denoted by Rwarmth,i, Rcontrol,i, and Rneighborhood,i for warmth, control, and
neighborhoods.1⁵
14. In my main specification, I follow Boneva and Rauh (2018) and Attanasio, Boneva, and Rauh
(2019), and restrict my attention to interactions of two dimensions (warmth and control, warmth
and neighborhoods, control and neighborhoods). In Table 3.1, I present additional results including
a triple interaction of high levels of warmth and control, as well as good neighborhoods.
15. This approach differs from Attanasio, Boneva, and Rauh (2019) and Boneva and Rauh (2018).
They calculate returns to each dimension by calculating log differences between high and low charac-
teristics and averaging over the other two dimensions. By contrast, I estimate the same specification
as used for the whole sample to obtain individual-level returns and thereby control for the presence
of perceived interaction effects.
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3.3.1 Representative Evidence on Perceived Returns
How do parents’ expectations vary over the scenarios, and what returns do they as-
sociate with different parenting styles and neighborhoods? Figure 3.1 depicts the
mean parental beliefs for each of the eight scenarios from Table 3.1. Several find-
ings emerge: First, parental beliefs for earnings of a child at age 30 vary strongly
across scenarios ranging between USD 40,000 and USD 57,000, with an average of
USD 47,810.1⁶ Second, comparing the same parenting styles across neighborhoods
reveals that parents expect large returns to neighborhoods. Being raised in a rela-
tively good neighborhood increases expected earnings by USD 7,000 to USD 8,000
on average. Third, there are sizable returns to different parenting styles. Parents
expect authoritative parenting with high levels of warmth and control to compen-
sate partly for raising children in low-quality neighborhoods. Moreover, the patterns
suggest that the different dimensions interact with each other.
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Figure 3.1. Parental beliefs about expected earnings
Notes: This figure presents parents’ expectations about a child’s earnings at age 30 in each of the eight
scenarios. The first four bars correspond to scenarios with low neighborhood quality, while the latter
four bars correspond to scenarios with high neighborhood quality. Moreover, wjck (j, k= L, H) indicate
different parenting styles with a low (wL) or high level of warmth (wH) and a low (cL) or high level of
control (cH), respectively; cf. Table 3.1. Error bars indicate standard errors to the mean.
16. Conditional on working, respondents in the CPS earn approximately USD 46,200 at age 30.
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In order to analyze these patterns in more detail, Table 3.1 presents OLS esti-
mates as specified in equation (3.1). In columns (1) through (3), I focus on returns
to primary dimensions only, while columns (4) to (6) acknowledge the presence
of interactions between different dimensions of parenting styles as well as neigh-
borhoods. Finally, column (7) investigates the interaction of all three dimensions
and asks whether authoritative parenting (high warmth and high control) is more
effective in good neighborhoods.
I find that parents perceive large returns to the warmth and neighborhood di-
mension, but no returns from exerting control. Increasing the warmth dimension
of parenting by one standard deviation in column (1) increases a child’s expected
earnings by 16.9 percent, while the estimated perceived return to control is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.2
to 1.2 percent. The perceived return to neighborhoods amounts to 21.1 percent.
Neither the inclusion of sociodemographic controls in column (2) nor taking out all
individual-level unobserved heterogeneity by including individual fixed effects in
column (3) affects the coefficients of interest, i.e., the returns to warmth, control,
and neighborhoods.
Columns (4) through (6) additionally allow for interaction effects between
warmth, control, and neighborhoods. These specifications allow, for example, that
the warmth and control dimensions of parenting styles are perceived as substitutes
or complements, or that returns to parenting differ across neighborhoods. First, I
find that the primary effects on the dimensions are similar to the previous estimates
without interactions. Second, when considering interaction terms, the estimates re-
veal a perceived complementarity between warmth and control. Parents expect an
additional return of 4.6 percentage points if children are raised with both high lev-
els of warmth and control. Hence, parents expect authoritative forms of parenting
(i.e., high warmth and high control) to be most effective for children’s long-term
success. This is similar to what has been found in the psychology literature (Baum-
rind, 1967; Dornbusch et al., 1987; Lamborn et al., 1991). Interestingly, there are
negative interactions of good neighborhoods with warmth and control. Thus, par-
ents perceive parenting to be more important in relatively adverse environments or
strict parenting is less necessary if the surrounding conditions are favorable. In other
words, respondents expect parenting to partly compensate for the lack of a beneficial
neighborhood. This is consistent with the observation that parents become more in-
volved in raising their children when the quality of a neighborhood decreases (e.g.,
Han, 2019; Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2005; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013).1⁷
Finally, column (7) introduces a triple interaction of high levels of warmth and
control, as well as living in a good neighborhood, and thus measures the additional
17. For example, Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2005) provide evidence that families in high-poverty
neighborhoods spend a large fraction of their time monitoring their children and keeping them safe,
i.e., they exert high levels of control in raising them.
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Table 3.1. Beliefs about the returns to parenting styles and neighborhoods
log. of expected earnings at age 30 (log(yij))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High warmth 0.169∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
High control 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Good neighborhood 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
High warmth
× High control
0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
High warmth
× Good neighborhood
-0.014∗ -0.014∗ -0.014∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
High control
× Good neighborhood
-0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
High warmth × High control
× Good neighborhood
0.041∗∗∗
(0.013)
Individual-level controls
Female -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
Age -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
White -0.030 -0.030
(0.025) (0.025)
College degree 0.097∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
Employed -0.052∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.024) (0.024)
log(Household income) 0.196∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019)
Single parent 0.021 0.021
(0.026) (0.026)
Number of children 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.010)
Share of female children 0.014 0.014
(0.025) (0.025)
Mean exp. income (in USD) 47810 47810 47810 47810 47810 47810 47810
Controls for heterogeneity No Controls FE No Controls FE FE
Observations 16952 16952 16952 16952 16952 16952 16952
Individuals 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119
R2 .052 .14 .73 .052 .14 .74 .74
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions of log earnings expectations based on equa-
tion (3.1). Columns (1) through (3) focus on first-order effects. Columns (4) to (6) additionally in-
clude two-way interactions, while column (7) also adds a three-way interaction of warmth, control
and neighborhoods. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
perceived return to authoritative parenting (high warmth and high control) in good
neighborhoods. While the main conclusions remain qualitatively as well as quan-
titatively similar to the previous results, the additional interaction shows that par-
ents perceive the complementarity of warmth and control to be stronger in favor-
able neighborhoods compared to detrimental ones. Thus, parents perceive neighbor-
hoods and intensive parenting (i.e., authoritative parenting styles) as complements.
As far as these perceptions correspond to actual returns, this result suggests that
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increasing segregation may help to explain why the rich adopt more intensive par-
enting styles with higher investments, while the poor invest investments less (see
also the discussion in Doepke, Sorrenti, and Zilibotti, forthcoming). Moreover, this
helps to reconcile the finding of cultural complementarity in Patacchini and Zenou
(2011) with my previous findings, as well as other studies documenting substitu-
tion effects between neighborhoods and parenting (e.g., Pop-Eleches and Urquiola,
2013). While parents may try to compensate for the lack of a good environment by
increasing their involvement in raising children, living in a high-quality neighbor-
hood may induce an additional complementarity for very intensive forms of parent-
ing (e.g., authoritative parenting).
3.3.2 Perceived Returns by the Child’s Gender and Age
While the previous estimates are average returns across all scenarios, the design of
the survey allows me to go one step further. In particular, I vary both the gender
(male/female) as well as the age of the child in the scenario (6–16 years) across
respondents. Table 3.2 analyzes whether parental expectations differ across these
randomizations. As shown in columns (1) to (3), parents expect boys to earn more
than girls when they are grown up. They expect boys to earn on average 49,492
USD and girls to earn around 7% less (46,123 USD). Despite these level differences,
I do not find evidence for differences in the perceived returns across gender. Yet,
there are significant changes in perceived returns when varying the age of the child.
More specifically, the warmth dimension becomes less important the older the child
is, according to parents’ expectations. While for 6 to 9-year-old children a standard
deviation increase yields a perceived return of 18.6 percent, it amounts to only 14.7
and 12.7 percent, respectively, for 10 to 12-year-old and 13 to 16-year-old children
(corresponding t-tests of the difference between coefficients yield p-values of p =
0.060 and p = 0.003). In line with county exposure effects in Chetty and Hendren
(2018a), I do not find evidence of perceived critical age effects, during which living
in certain neighborhoods is crucial for long-run outcomes. Rather, I find that the
interaction of the control dimension of parenting and neighborhoods is perceived to
be of particular importance for older children. More specifically, parents associate
control to yield a 2.9 percentage point return in adverse environments for the oldest
age group in my sample. By contrast, there is no such effect for the youngest age
group (test of the difference between coefficients: p = 0.042). Thus, parents adapt
their return expectations to characteristics of children, such as their age.
3.3.3 Robustness Checks Using Different Sample Restrictions
In Table 3.3, I check the robustness of the main findings by restricting the sample
in various ways. First, I restrict the sample in column (1) to those respondents who
report being one of the main caregivers of the child. Second, after eliciting expecta-
tions in the scenarios, I asked how certain parents were about their responses and
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Table 3.2. Perceived returns by child’s gender and age
log(yij) p-value log(yij) p-values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Boys Girls (1)-(2)
6-9
years
10-12
years
13-16
years
(4)-(5) (4)-(6) (5)-(6)
High warmth 0.163∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.209 0.186∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.060 0.003 0.325
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
High control -0.018∗ -0.003 0.266 -0.018 -0.008 -0.005 0.557 0.434 0.832
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Good neighborhood 0.219∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.462 0.241∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.439 0.248 0.711
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
High warmth
× High control
0.052∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.547 0.037∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.510 0.575 0.924
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
High warmth
× Good neighborhood
-0.023∗∗ -0.006 0.255 -0.019 -0.019 -0.006 0.974 0.447 0.521
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
High control
× Good neighborhood
-0.011 -0.020∗∗ 0.468 0.001 -0.017 -0.029∗∗∗ 0.237 0.042 0.454
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Mean exp. income (in USD) 49492 46123 48373 46999 47915
Controls for heterogeneity FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 8528 8416 5888 4896 6168
Individuals 1066 1052 736 612 771
R2 .75 .71 .75 .74 .72
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions of log earnings expectations based on equation (3.1) for different sample splits according to the child’s gender
(columns 1 and 2) and age group (columns 4-6). Reported p-values stem from t-tests of interaction terms in fully interacted regression models. Standard errors
clustered by respondent in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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exclude in column (2) those who report being uncertain or very uncertain. Third, it
is possible that respondents either pay little attention and quickly click through the
survey or simply perform other activities besides answering the survey. I therefore
exclude respondents with the 5% lowest and highest response times in column (3).
Finally, I focus on those respondents who have children similar to those in the sce-
narios and potentially hold more accurate beliefs. Thus, I restrict the sample to those
who have children of the same gender (column 4), the same age group (column 5),
or both the same gender and age group (column 6). As shown in Table 3.3, neither
excluding non-main caregivers, focusing on certain respondents only, or removing
respondents with very short or long response times affects the estimates in columns
(1) through (3). When restricting the sample to those respondents who answer sce-
narios with hypothetical children sharing their own children’s characteristics, the
estimates remain robust, although they lose some precision due to smaller samples.
Table 3.3. Robustness of perceived returns for different samples
log. of expected earnings at age 30 (log(yij))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main
caregivers
Certain
response
Response
time
Same
sex
Same
age
Same
sex+age
High warmth 0.154∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
High control -0.012∗ -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 -0.007 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Good neighborhood 0.226∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.021)
High warmth
× High control
0.046∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019)
High warmth
× Good neighborhood
-0.014∗ -0.009 -0.018∗∗ -0.014 -0.009 -0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016)
High control
× Good neighborhood
-0.014∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.012 -0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Mean exp. income (in USD) 47835 48932 47040 48802 48390 49278
Controls for heterogeneity FE FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 16384 12792 15272 12312 7376 4000
Individuals 2048 1599 1909 1539 922 500
R2 .74 .74 .73 .73 .73 .74
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions of log earnings expectations based on equa-
tion (3.1). Column (1) restricts the sample to respondents who are main caregivers to their children.
Column (2) excludes parents who report being uncertain about their responses. Column (3) excludes
respondents with the 5% highest and lowest response times. Columns (4) to (6) restricts the sample to
parents whose children and the child in the scenario have the same characteristics in terms of gender
(column 4), age group (column 5), and gender, as well as age group (column 6). Standard errors
clustered by respondent in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level.
128 | 3 Understanding Parental Decision-making
3.3.4 Relationship of Returns in the Earnings and Life Satisfaction
Domain
The previous results stem from scenarios in which parents were asked about their
expectations for children’s earnings at age 30, who are raised with a particular par-
enting style and in a specific neighborhood. Although monetary returns are appeal-
ing for their ease of interpretation, one potential concern with them is that parents
may not perceive expected earnings at age 30 as the relevant outcome to evaluate
the consequences of different parenting styles. Parents may perceive non-monetary
outcomes such as well-being or life satisfaction as more important. In order to test
whether the results from the monetary domain are comparable to those from other
domains, I study a second outcome measure, expected life satisfaction of children
at age 30 (measured on a scale from 1 to 100), which parents may have in mind
when deciding about the adoption of different parenting styles.
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Figure 3.2. Correlations of earnings and life satisfaction expectations
Notes: This figure presents the distribution of individual-level correlations of earnings and life satisfac-
tion expectations. The red line indicates the mean correlation across respondents of .63.
In Figure 3.2, I examine the relationship between expectations in the earnings
and life satisfaction domain. More specifically, the figure displays the distribution
of individual-level correlations between expectations across the two domains. For
each individual, I calculate the correlation of their expectations for earnings and life
satisfaction across the eight scenarios. As depicted, most correlations exceed 0.50
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with a mean correlation of 0.63.1⁸ When analyzing the correlation of individual-
level returns rather than levels, I also find strong correlations between returns in
the monetary and returns in the life satisfaction domain, as shown in Appendix Ta-
ble 3.B.1. Furthermore, Appendix Table 3.B.2 replicates Table 3.1 by using expected
life satisfaction instead of expected earnings as an outcome. The results are both
qualitatively and quantitatively similar. This implies that responses in terms of ex-
pected earnings are sensible outcomes, capturing returns that not only apply to a
monetary domain. In the following, I therefore restrict my attention to monetary
returns.
3.3.5 Accuracy of Beliefs and Perceived Returns
How accurate are the beliefs parents report in the scenarios? In this section, I briefly
discuss their accuracy. As reported in Table 3.1, the average expected earnings across
all eight scenarios is USD 47,810, which is similar to the mean annual earnings in
the CPS (approx. USD 46,200 for individuals aged 30 and working). The coefficients
on individual-level controls in columns (2) and (5) also reveal patterns consistent
with findings from the literature on subjective wage expectations (e.g., Kaufmann,
2014): Females expect lower earnings, while college educated individuals as well
as those with higher household incomes report higher earnings expectations. More-
over, similar to findings from the psychology literature (e.g., Chan and Koo, 2011;
Dornbusch et al., 1987; Lamborn et al., 1991), parents associate neglecting parent-
ing (low warmth and control) with low outcomes, and authoritative parenting (high
warmth and control) with high future outcomes.
In order to compare the perceived returns to actual returns, I conduct two com-
parisons.1⁹ First, I compare perceived returns from my sample to average marginal
effects of intensive parenting styles from Falk et al. (forthcoming). They estimate
how children’s skills develop as a function of intensive parenting styles. While they
do not consider different dimensions of parenting styles (i.e., warmth and control),
they construct a latent factor based on similar survey items. Falk et al. find marginal
effects ranging from 0.313 to 0.424, which are somewhat higher than the combined
effects of warmth and control reported in Table 3.1.2⁰ Second, I exploit the fact that
18. Appendix Figure 3.B.1 presents the distribution using rank correlations. These have the ad-
vantage of merely requiring an ordinal rather than a cardinal scaling for life satisfaction. The figure
reveals that the individual-level correlations are even higher when relying on ranks rather than levels.
19. Boneva and Rauh (2018) show in a related setting, in which they analyze the perceived
returns to parental investments at different ages, that the hypothetical scenario approach adopted in
this paper yields perceived returns similar to actual returns.
20. Note that the outcomes I am interested in here are long-term outcomes at age 30. In contrast,
Falk et al. (forthcoming) are interested in the development of skills during childhood. Since these skills
translate only imperfectly into earnings, these higher returns are consistent with the perceived returns
reported here.
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respondents were asked to state their beliefs for children of average American fami-
lies. I draw on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97),
in which children aged 12-17 in 1997 evaluate both their mothers’ and their fathers’
parenting style. Regressing the log earnings of respondents in 2013, when they were
on average 30 years old, on indicators for warmth and control, as well as their inter-
action (see Appendix Table 3.C.1) reveals returns similar to the average perceived
returns in my sample: The return to mother’s warmth and control is .104 and .020,
respectively, while the coefficient on the interaction is .026, indicating returns both
quantitatively and qualitatively consistent with those in Table 3.1. Using their fa-
thers’ parenting styles yields similar results.21 Taken together, the perceived returns
in my dataset seem to be consistent with actual returns from other settings.
3.4 Heterogeneity in Individual-level Returns
The previous section documented perceived returns to different parenting styles and
neighborhoods. Yet, these returns depict only average patterns. Hence, I additionally
estimate equation (3.1) individual by individual to recover each parent’s perceived
returns, and subsequently link these to individual determinants.22
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 present the distributions of returns to the three dimen-
sions warmth, control, and neighborhood. Several findings emerge. First, there is
large heterogeneity in perceived returns. The majority of respondents expect pos-
itive returns to all three dimensions, with less than 20% of the sample expecting
negative returns to warmth and neighborhoods. This number amounts to approxi-
mately 40% for control. Second, there is a sizable fraction of parents who do not
expect parenting styles or neighborhoods to matter, with shares of 14% for neigh-
borhoods to 32% in the control dimension. Third, correlations of returns across the
three dimensions are positive, though not perfect, indicating that the different di-
mensions are related, but capture distinct concepts.23 Taken together, most parents
expect that parenting can pay off for children’s long-term outcomes.
To what extent is the heterogeneity in the distribution of perceived returns sys-
tematic? One point of departure is to investigate potential differences in the per-
ceived returns by parental gender. In particular, there is evidence that mothers spend
21. Note that these estimates are correlations and should not be interpreted as causal. Yet, re-
spondents in the survey were asked to state their beliefs over the outcomes of children of average
American families. Hence, looking at these basic regressions is informative, despite not accounting
for measurement error, the endogeneity of parenting styles, and other confounding factors. In addi-
tion to monetary returns, Appendix Table 3.C.1 also presents results from the NLSY on children’s high
school GPA with similar patterns: The warmth dimension of parenting has large positive returns, while
control has smaller, albeit positive returns.
22. To avoid results being driven by outliers, I winsorize perceived returns at the 1% and 99%
level.
23. Moreover, expecting zero returns is highly correlated across the different dimensions; see
Appendix Table 3.D.1.
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of individual-level perceived returns
Notes: This figure presents the distributions of individual-level perceived returns based on equa-
tion (3.1) for the dimensions warmth (Rwarmth,i; dotted), control (Rcontrol,i; dashed), and neighborhood
(Rneighb.,i; solid).
Table 3.1. Correlations of individual-level perceived returns
Rwarmth,i Rcontrol,i Rneighb.,i
Rwarmth,i 1.000
Rcontrol,i 0.254∗∗∗ 1.000
Rneighb.,i 0.290∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 1.000
Notes: This table presents correlations of individual-level returns across the three dimensions warmth
(Rwarmth,i), control (Rcontrol,i) and neighborhood (Rneighb,i). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10,
5, and 1 percent level.
about twice as much time on child-rearing activities as fathers (Guryan, Hurst, and
Kearney, 2008).2⁴ I therefore analyze differences in the distribution of perceived
returns between fathers (dark, dashed lines) and mothers (light, solid lines) in Fig-
ures 3.2a–3.2c to the three dimensions warmth, control, and neighborhood. The fig-
ures reveal significant gender differences in parental perceptions: Mothers expect
larger returns than fathers in the warmth (t-test of equality of means: p < 0.001;
24. Moreover, data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 suggest that mothers
are approximately 5.7 and 1.8 percentage points more likely to adopt parenting styles featuring high
levels of warmth and control, respectively (see Appendix Table 3.C.2).
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions: p < 0.001) and neighbor-
hood dimensions (t-tests: p < 0.001, KS-test: p = 0.004), while there are no sig-
nificant differences in the control dimension (t-test: p = 0.291, KS-test: p = 0.150).
Moreover, mothers’ higher perceived returns seem to be relatively uniform across
the distribution.
In the following, I analyze whether perceived returns are related to other
parental characteristics besides gender. For this, I estimate
Rk,i = α0 + α1Xi + ηk,i, (3.1)
in which Rk,i denotes the perceived return of individual i to dimension k ∈ {warmth,
control, neighborhood}, estimated based on equation (3.1), Xi is a vector of parental
characteristics, and ηk,i denotes idiosyncratic noise. I consider two sets of variables:
First, I employ sociodemographic characteristics such as gender, age, and education;
second, I associate returns with a respondent’s parenting values (malleability of
skills, altruism, and paternalism towards a child).
Table 3.2 presents estimates based on equation (3.1) for each return measure
separately. Panel A focuses on sociodemographic determinants of perceived returns.
Interestingly, apart from gender differences in the warmth (+6.2%) and neighbor-
hood dimensions (+6.3%) as shown in Figure 3.2, almost no other characteristics
seem to be systematically associated with perceived returns. In particular, I cannot
reject the hypothesis that all other sociodemographic coefficients jointly equal zero
in each of the three specifications regarding warmth (F-test: p = 0.108), control
(F-test: p = 0.935), and neighborhoods (F-test: p = 0.300) in columns (1)–(3), re-
spectively. The absence of a relationship is surprising, given that Boneva and Rauh
(2018) find systematic associations for some characteristics, but it is in line with
other studies (e.g., Attanasio, Boneva, and Rauh, 2019), which do not find associ-
ations either.2⁵ Thus, there are sizable differences in perceived returns by parental
gender, but no differences along variables capturing differences in socioeconomic
status. Moreover, these perceived returns are highly predictive for actual parent-
ing styles, as I will show in the next section. The absence of associations between
sociodemographics and returns therefore indicates that these beliefs capture an im-
portant aspect of parental decision-making that is distinct from standard individual
characteristics and constraints.
When analyzing the effects of parenting values on returns in Panel B of Table 3.2,
some interesting patterns emerge. All three returnmeasures are significantly related
to parents’ beliefs about the malleability of skills, similar to Attanasio, Boneva, and
Rauh (2019) and Boneva and Rauh (2018). In particular, those parents who believe
25. One explanation for these differences is that Boneva and Rauh (2018) and Attanasio, Boneva,
and Rauh (2019) study families in the United Kingdom and only the latter study employs a represen-
tative sample of parents.
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p-value t-test: <.001
p-value KS-test: <.001
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(a) Warmth (Rwarmth,i)
p-value t-test: .291
p-value KS-test: .15
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(b) Control (Rcontrol,i)
p-value t-test: <.001
p-value KS-test: .004
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(c) Neighborhood (Rneighb.,i)
Figure 3.2. Distribution of individual-level perceived returns by parental gender
Notes: These figures present the distributions of individual-level perceived returns based on equa-
tion (3.1) for the dimensions warmth (Rwarmth,i; Figure 3.2a), control (Rcontrol,i; Figure 3.2b) and neigh-
borhood (Rneighb.,i; Figure 3.2c) for mothers (solid, red) and fathers (dashed, blue) separately.
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Table 3.2. Determinants of individual-level perceived returns
(A) only sociodemographics (B) incl. parenting values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rwarmth,i Rcontrol,i Rneighb.,i Rwarmth,i Rcontrol,i Rneighb.,i
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female 0.062∗∗∗ 0.015 0.063∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.014 0.052∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020)
Age -0.000 -0.000 0.003∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
White 0.047∗∗ 0.016 0.004 0.044∗∗ 0.017 0.005
(0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022)
College degree -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020)
Employed -0.021 -0.003 -0.016 -0.022 -0.004 -0.017
(0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023)
log(Household income) 0.019 0.006 -0.003 0.018 0.005 -0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016)
Single parent 0.047∗ -0.005 0.019 0.045∗ -0.001 0.012
(0.025) (0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.020) (0.027)
Number of children 0.009 -0.005 0.002 0.009 -0.005 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Share of female children -0.006 -0.000 0.009 -0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022)
Parenting values
Altruism towards child (std.) 0.018∗∗ -0.005 0.028∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Paternalism towards child (std.) 0.001 0.013∗ 0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Malleability of skills (std.) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Average return .15 -.01 .23 .15 -.01 .23
Individuals 2119 2119 2119 2109 2109 2109
R2 .015 .0017 .011 .023 .0053 .028
Notes: This table presents regressions of individual-level perceived returns to warmth (Rwarmth,i;
columns 1 and 4), control (Rcontrol,i; columns 2 and 5) as well as neighborhood (Rneighb.,i; columns 3 and
6) on sociodemographic characteristics and parenting values according to equation (3.1). Individual-
level perceived returns are estimated based on equation (3.1) for each individual separately. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
that skills are malleable perceive returns to be higher. In other words, those parents
who do not share this belief react less to differences across scenarios. Moreover, re-
turns in the warmth and neighborhood dimensions are related to the parents’ altru-
ism towards their children, whereas returns in the control dimension are associated
with parental paternalism. This supports theoretical results by Doepke and Zilibotti
(2017), who show that sufficiently paternalistic parents adopt parenting styles with
more control, i.e., authoritarian or authoritative parenting styles in which parents
3.5 Relevance of Perceived Returns for Actual Behavior | 135
exert effort to mold their children’s preferences.2⁶ Parents’ altruism and paternalism
are two key parameters in their model, leading to different parenting styles.
In Appendix 3.D, I present a different approach to analyze the determinants of
perceived returns. There, I rely on a measurement error correction based on two dif-
ferent measures of perceived returns: One measure in the monetary domain, as used
throughout the paper, and another one using perceived returns in the life satisfac-
tion domain. I adopt “obviously related instrumental variables” (Gillen, Snowberg,
and Yariv, 2019), as outlined in the next section. In particular, I check whether per-
ceived returns predict specific individual characteristics. The results in Appendix
Table 3.D.3 confirm the previous patterns: Females expect larger returns to warmth
as well as neighborhoods, and parenting values show the same associations as re-
ported above.
3.5 Relevance of Perceived Returns for Actual Behavior
To what extent do perceived returns, as described above, map into actual parental
decision-making? Although establishing causality without shifting parental beliefs
is difficult, I can analyze the association of perceived returns with actual parenting
behavior. Hence, I focus on the predictive power of returns for actual parenting styles.
Remember that perceived returns capture some aspects of parenting that are not
related to sociodemographic characteristics, but at the same time vary systematically
with parenting behavior in the hypothetical scenarios. If perceived returns translated
into actual parental decision-making, their relevance would be even higher in light
of the lacking relationship to sociodemographic characteristics.
In order to examine the relevance of perceived returns, I relate the perceived
returns from the hypothetical scenarios to the parents’ actual parenting style elicited
in the survey by estimating
PSk,i = δ0 + δ1Rk,i + δ2Xi + νk,i, (3.1)
in which PSk,i denotes a standardized measure of the actual parenting style and
Rk,i correspond to the standardized individual-level perceived return estimated ac-
cording to equation (3.1) in the warmth (k = warmth) or control (k = control)
26. Appendix Table 3.D.2 shows that respondents with more children, females, paternalistic par-
ents, and those who believe that skills are malleable are less likely to expect zero returns to parenting.
Accounting for respondents reporting zero returns does not change the results reported in this section.
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dimensions, Xi is the same set of sociodemographic controls as before, and νk,i is an
error term.2⁷,2⁸
In Table 3.1, I examine the relevance of perceived returns for actual parenting
styles based on equation (3.1). Panel (A) focuses on the warmth dimension by re-
lating estimated returns in the earnings (column 1) and life satisfaction domain
(column 2) to warm parenting. The estimates reveal that returns in both domains
are significantly related to parenting behavior. An increase of one standard devia-
tion in perceived returns is associated with a .043 standard deviation increase in the
warmth dimension of parenting styles. Although these individual-level returns are
subject to measurement error, as they are estimated only on eight observations per
respondent, they capture a similar underlying factor. I therefore lever the two dif-
ferent perceived return measures and implement the “obviously related instrumen-
tal variables” (ORIV) estimator proposed by Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2019).2⁹
Applying this measurement error correcting in columns (3) and (4), I find even
larger associations of .084-.088 standard deviations for an increase of one standard
deviation in perceived returns that even hold when simultaneously controlling for
perceived returns in the control dimension.
A similar picture arises when analyzing the role of perceived returns to control
for the control dimension of parenting. While the perceived returns in the monetary
domain are positive but insignificant at conventional levels (p = 0.161), accounting
for measurement error using ORIV reveals significant associations even if controlling
for return to warmth.
Finally, Appendix 3.F presents additional results linking perceived returns to
neighborhoods to actual neighborhood characteristics. The results show that al-
though there is only limited evidence for perceived returns to predict subjective
neighborhoods assessments or economic conditions, perceived returns are strongly
related to living in areas less segregation. In sum, the results from this section sug-
gest that parents do not only adapt their expectations when faced with scenarios of
varying parenting styles, but the corresponding returns are also relevant for their
actual parenting behavior.
27. Appendix Figure 3.E.1 and Appendix Table 3.E.1 show that an exploratory factor analysis
indeed recovers two factors corresponding to warmth and control from the set of survey items used
to elicit a respondent’s parenting style.
28. While the individual-level returns are estimated both for the first-order returns (Rk,i for k =
warmth, control, neighborhood) as well as interactions (Rk,i for k = wc, wn, cn), I restrict attention to
first-order returns as they dominate over interactions effects in size, as shown in Table 3.1.
29. Their estimation procedure involves duplicating each observation and use each measure once
as a regressor and once as an instrument. In order to account for the larger number of observations, I
follow Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2019) and bootstrap standard errors.
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Table 3.1. Relevance of perceived returns for actual parenting styles
(A) Parenting Style – Warmth (B) Parenting Style – Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Expected
earnings
Expected
Life Satis.
ORIV ORIV
Expected
earnings
Expected
Life Satis.
ORIV ORIV
Rwarmth,i 0.043∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ -0.039
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026)
Rcontrol,i -0.021 0.026 0.055∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.032)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2119 2119 4238 4238 2119 2119 4238 4238
Individuals 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119
R2 .046 .046 .044 .044 .036 .04 .045 .045
Notes: This table examines the relevance of perceived returns for actual parenting styles by estimating equation (3.1). Panel (A) presents results for the warmth dimension
using (standardized) perceived returns to warmth, while Panel (B) presents corresponding results in the control dimension. Columns (1) and (5) use returns in the
earnings domain, while columns (2) and (6) employ returns in the life satisfaction domain. Columns (3) and (7) implement ORIV estimators (ORIV, Gillen, Snowberg,
and Yariv, 2019) to correct for measurement error in perceived returns using the two return measures as instruments for each other. Columns (4) and (8) additionally
include (instrumented) perceived returns to control and warmth, respectively. All specifications include controls for sociodemographic characteristics as in Table 3.1.
Robust standard errors in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6); bootstrapped standard errors in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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3.6 Conclusion
While parenting crucially affects the development of children, parenting itself re-
mains a “mystifying subject” (Bornstein, 2002). In order to better understand how
parents decide, I focus on parents’ beliefs constituting an inherent part of their
decision-making process. I conduct a survey that is among the first to investigate
parental beliefs of a representative sample of parents. In the main part of the survey,
I elicit beliefs using a hypothetical scenario approach that varies two factors with
importance for the development of children and, hence, their long-term outcomes:
first, the parenting style defined by the levels of warmth and control parents employ
in raising their children, and, second, the quality of the neighborhood a family is
living in. This allows me to infer parents’ perceived returns to and sheds light on the
perceived substitutability or complementarity of the different dimensions.
My analysis shows that parents expect large returns to high levels of warmth and
beneficial neighborhoods. Parenting styles with high levels of control are only associ-
ated with positive returns if they are paired with warmth suggesting that these two
dimensions are perceived as complements. Moreover, I show that parents expect par-
enting and neighborhoods to interact. In particular, they believe that parenting can
partly compensate for living in deprived neighborhoods. Yet, the perceived return
to authoritative parenting (i.e., high levels of warmth and control) is higher in good
neighborhoods. This latter result indicates one potential explanation for divergent
parenting practices along socio-economic groups: increasing segregation may lead
to divergent parenting practices due to different perceived returns to intensive par-
enting (as also suggested by Doepke, Sorrenti, and Zilibotti, forthcoming), which
may translate into different actual returns.
When studying perceived returns on the individual level, my estimates reveal
some profound gender differences: mothers expect significantly larger returns than
fathers in the warmth and neighborhood dimension, while parental perceptions
are similar for the control dimension. Perhaps surprisingly, other sociodemographic
characteristics of these perceived returns are not related to parental beliefs. The ab-
sence of a socio-economic gradient in perceived returns suggests that they are an un-
likely candidate to explain socioeconomic differences in parenting behavior. Rather,
the interaction between parenting and neighborhoods could provide an explanation
for persistent differences in parenting across sociodemographic groups which might
increase as neighborhoods become more homogeneous over time (Putnam, 2016).
To the extent that some form of “optimal parenting” exists, my results suggest that
the optimal parenting behavior may be environment-specific. Moreover, parenting
values show distinct patterns: while paternalistic parents expect larger returns to
control, altruistic ones perceive larger returns to warmth and neighborhoods. These
findings extend previous research on the determinants of parental beliefs (Attana-
sio, Boneva, and Rauh, 2019; Boneva and Rauh, 2018) and lend empirical support
for assumptions made in Doepke and Zilibotti (2017).
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Importantly, the perceived returns I recover are relevant for actual parenting be-
havior. Hence, they capture an important determinant of parental decision-making,
but cannot be proxied by standard socio-economic variables. This highlights the
value of studying beliefs to understand parental decision-making processes.
The results of this paper open at least two avenues for further research. First,
since the returns to parental investments hinge on the parenting style (Cunha,
2015), it would be interesting to analyze the relationship between the quality mar-
gin of parenting considered in this paper and the quantity margin as in the previous
literature (Attanasio, Boneva, and Rauh, 2019; Bhalotra et al., 2017; Boneva and
Rauh, 2018). Second, as beliefs about returns to parenting hinges on the quality of
neighborhoods, this calls for a deeper understanding of the human capital formation
process and the relationship between parenting and a family’s environment.
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Appendix 3.A Wording of Hypothetical Scenarios
In the following, I present the wording of the main survey instrument containing
the hypothetical scenarios. Both the age (6-16 years) as well as the gender of the
child in question (male/female) are randomized, resulting in male names (John
and Simon) or female names (Sarah and Emily) for the children in the scenarios.
We are interested in your opinion about how important different parenting styles
are for the future of children.
For this purpose, we would like to ask you to imagine two average American
families, the Joneses and the Smiths, who make decisions how to raise their children.
More specifically, we will show you different scenarios, and ask what you think the
likely yearly earnings and life satisfaction of their children at age 30 will be. There are
no clear right or wrong answers, and we know these questions are difficult. Please try
to consider each scenario carefully and tell us what you believe the likely outcome will
be.
Mr and Mrs Jones have one son (daughter), John (Sarah). John (Sarah) is 6
(7-16) years old. The Joneses live in a good neighborhood with little crime (10 violent
crimes per 10,000 inhabitants) and low unemployment (2%). Now let’s think about
the future of John (Sarah). Assuming John (Sarah) is working full-time, what do you
expect his (her) gross yearly earnings (in today’s USD) to be when he (she) is 30 years
old in each of the following scenarios? What do you expect his (her) life satisfaction to
be at age 30 on a scale from 1 (low) to 100 (high)?
Scenario 1: John (Sarah)’s parents show him (her) once per week that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) every other day that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
Scenario 2: John (Sarah)’s parents show him (her) once per week that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) once per week that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
Scenario 3: John (Sarah)’s parents show him (her) every other day that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) every other day that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
Scenario 4: John (Sarah)’s parents show him (her) every other day that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) once per week that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
Now imagine a different family, the Smiths. In many respects, the Smiths are
very similar to the Joneses. For example, Mr and Mrs Smith have one son (daughter),
Simon (Emily), who is also 6 (7-16) years old and as smart as John (Sarah). Mr and
Mrs Smith also have similar levels of income and education as Mr and Mrs Jones and
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spend as much time and money on raising their child. However, there is one difference.
Unlike the Joneses, the Smiths live in a bad neighborhood with much crime (60 violent
crimes per 10,000 inhabitants per year) and high unemployment (10%). Assuming
Simon (Emily) is working full-time, what do you expect his (her) gross yearly earnings
(in today’s USD) to be when he (she) is 30 years old in each of the following scenarios?
What do you expect his (her) life satisfaction to be at age 30 on a scale from 1 (low)
to 100 (high)?
Scenario 5: Simon (Emily)’s parents show him (her) once per week that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) every other day that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
Scenario 6: Simon (Emily)’s parents show him (her) once per week that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) once per week that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
Scenario 7: Simon (Emily)’s parents show him (her) every other day that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) every other day that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
Scenario 8: Simon (Emily)’s parents show him (her) every other day that they like
him (her). At the same time, they tell him (her) once per week that he (she) has to
obey their decisions.
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Appendix 3.B Relationship of Perceived Returns Across
Domains
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Figure 3.B.1. Rank correlation of earnings and life satisfaction expectations
Notes: This figure presents the distribution of individual-level rank correlations of earnings and life
satisfaction expectations. The red line indicates the mean rank correlation across respondents.
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Table 3.B.1. Relationship of perceived returns in earnings and life satisfaction do-
main
RLSwarmth,i R
LS
control,i R
LS
neighb.,i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rwarmth,i 0.652∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036)
Rcontrol,i 0.534∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040)
Rneighb.,i 0.376∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Individuals 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119
R2 .28 .28 .2 .2 .11 .11
Notes: This table presents regressions of individual-level perceived returns in the life satisfaction do-
main (RLSk,i) on perceived returns in the monetary domain (Rk,i) for k = warmth, control, neighbor-
hood. Returns are calculated from estimating equation (3.1) for each individual using either expected
earnings (Rk,i) or expected life satisfaction (RLSk,i) at age 30 as an outcome. Controls include sociodemo-
graphic characteristics as in Table 3.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Table 3.B.2. Parental beliefs about perceived returns in the life satisfaction domain
log. of expected life satisfaction at age 30 (log(lsij))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High warmth 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
High control -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Good neighborhood 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
High warmth
× High control
0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
High warmth
× Good neighborhood
-0.022∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
High control
× Good neighborhood
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
High warmth × High control
× Good neighborhood
0.011
(0.015)
Individual-level controls
Female 0.000 0.000
(0.036) (0.036)
Age 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
White -0.026 -0.026
(0.040) (0.040)
College degree -0.022 -0.022
(0.039) (0.039)
Employed 0.062 0.062
(0.042) (0.042)
log(Household income) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031)
Single parent -0.034 -0.034
(0.050) (0.050)
Number of children -0.009 -0.009
(0.019) (0.019)
Share of female children 0.057 0.057
(0.044) (0.044)
Mean exp. life satis. (0-100) 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Controls for heterogeneity No Controls FE No Controls FE FE
Observations 16952 16952 16952 16952 16952 16952 16952
Individuals 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119
R2 .021 .034 .8 .021 .034 .8 .8
Notes: This table presents least squares regressions of log life satisfaction expectations based on equa-
tion (3.1). Columns (1) through (3) focus on first-order effects, while columns (4) to (6) add inter-
actions. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Appendix 3.C Parenting in National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)
Table 3.C.1. Gender differences in parenting styles (NLSY97)
(A) Mother’s PS (B) Father’s PS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(earnings) HS GPA log(earnings) HS GPA
Warmth 0.104∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040)
Control 0.020 0.121∗∗ 0.076∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.051) (0.048) (0.046) (0.043)
Warmth × Control 0.026 -0.018 -0.021 0.002
(0.060) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055)
Observations 5046 5832 4873 5645
R2 .0037 .017 .0061 .023
Notes: This table uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and regresses the
child’s log earnings in 2013 (i.e., when they are on average 30 years old) on the child’s reports of each
of its parents’ parenting style. Columns (1) and (2) focus on the mother’s warmth and control, while
columns (3) and (4) report analogous regressions for fathers. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Table 3.C.2. Gender differences in parenting styles (NLSY97)
(A) PS Warmth (B) PS Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother 0.057∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean of dependent variable .65 .65 .55 .55
Observations 16968 12310 16968 12310
R2 .0036 .035 .00032 .027
Notes: This table uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and regresses the
child’s report of each of its parents’ parenting style (measured by binary indicators) on an indicator
for mothers. Columns (1) and (2) focus on the warmth dimension, while columns (3) and (4) focus
on control. Control variables include the age and gender of the child, the parent’s education, the log
household income, and an indicator for whether both parents are present at home. Standard errors
clustered on child-level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level.
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Appendix 3.D Further Results on Determinants of
Perceived Returns
To what extent are the associations reported in Section 3.4 driven by zero responses
as shown in Figure 3.1? Table 3.D.1 shows that respondents who perceive no returns
in one dimension are also more likely to also report zero returns in another. This pat-
tern is especially pronounced for both parenting dimensions, suggesting that these
individuals do not expect parenting to matter for long-term outcomes of children.
Panel A of Table 3.D.2 shows that fathers, older respondents, as well as those with
fewer children and who do not believe that skills are malleable are more likely to
report zero responses in the parenting domains. Panel B shows how the results in
Table 3.2 would change once I restrict the sample to respondents perceiving non-
zero returns. The patterns are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the whole
sample.
Table 3.D.1. Correlations of zero perceived returns
Warmth Control Neighb.
Warmth 1.000
Control 0.823∗∗∗ 1.000
Neighb. 0.365∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 1.000
Notes: This table presents correlations of indicators for whether a respondent expects zero returns to
warmth, control, or neighborhoods. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level.
The perceived returns analyzed here are subject to measurement error as they
are inferred from eight observations only. In order to mitigate the role of measure-
ment error, I lever two distinct measures of the same underlying return measure.
More specifically, I lever the perceived return measure constructed from parental be-
liefs in the life satisfaction domain to isolate the common variation in both measures.
I adopt the “obviously related instrumental variables” (ORIV) estimator proposed by
Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2019). This estimator uses two measures of the same
underlying dimension and instruments one measure with the other. Implementing
the estimator requires that the (instrumented) perceived returns is an explanatory
variable rather than the dependent variable as in Table 3.2. Hence, I perform the
following exercise similar to the analysis in Section 3.5, in which I examine the rele-
vance of perceived returns. I duplicate all observations and check whether perceived
returns can predict a specific characteristic conditional on all other characteristics
by estimating
xi = δ0 + δ1Rk,i + δ2Xi,−xi + νi. (3.D.1)
Here, δ0 = (δ0,m, δ0,ls) denote the constants corresponding to the original and dupli-
cated observations, Rk,i denotes the (standardized) perceived return in dimension k
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Table 3.D.2. Perceived returns accounting for zero responses
(A) Zero returns (B) Returns excluding zeros
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parenting Neighb. All Rwarmth,i Rcontrol,i Rneighb.,i
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female -0.037∗ -0.001 -0.015 0.067∗∗∗ 0.020 0.060∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022)
Age 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
White 0.010 0.038∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.022 0.020
(0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025)
College degree -0.028 -0.001 -0.011 -0.010 -0.003 -0.000
(0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)
Employed -0.035 -0.015 -0.016 -0.039 -0.005 -0.029
(0.023) (0.018) (0.015) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025)
log(Household income) 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.025 0.006 -0.008
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Single parent 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.064∗∗ -0.003 0.016
(0.027) (0.022) (0.018) (0.031) (0.025) (0.030)
Number of children -0.029∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.015∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.005 0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Share of female children 0.009 0.022 0.022 -0.008 0.003 0.017
(0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025)
Parenting values
Altruism towards child (std.) -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 0.023∗∗ -0.007 0.033∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Paternalism towards child (std.) -0.024∗∗ -0.007 -0.013∗ -0.004 0.018∗∗ -0.000
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Malleability of skills (std.) -0.020∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.012∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Mean of dependent variable .23 .14 .08 .21 0 .24
Individuals 2109 2109 2109 1626 1626 1821
R2 .019 .0063 .012 .028 .0074 .033
Notes: This table presents regressions of an indicator of zero perceived returns (Panel A) or individual-
level perceived returns excluding those with zero returns (Panel B) on sociodemographic characteris-
tics and parenting values according to equation 3.1. Individual-level perceived returns are estimated
based on equation (3.1) for each individual separately. The dependent variable in column (1) cor-
responds to an indicator equal to one if returns to both warmth and control are perceived to be
zero, while column (2) focuses on zero perceived returns in the neighborhood dimension. Column
(3) checks for all three dimensions simultaneously. Columns (4) to (6) correspond to columns (4) to
(6) of Table 3.2, but exclude individuals that report zero perceived returns according to column (1)
and (2), respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent level.
(k = warmth, control, neighborhood) in the monetary domain for the original ob-
servations (life satisfaction domain for the duplications) that is instrumented with
the return in the life satisfaction domain (monetary domain for duplications), and
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Xi,−xi corresponds to a vector of all characteristics excluding xi.3⁰ In order to account
for the duplications, I follow Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2019) and bootstrap stan-
dard errors using 100 replications.
Table 3.D.3 presents the results of this exercise. Each cell corresponds to a coef-
ficient from a regression of equation (3.D.1): An increase of one standard deviation
in perceived returns in the warmth or neighborhood dimension is associated with a
3.6-4.0 percentage point increase in the probability of being female and parenting
values show similar patterns as before.
30. Note that this is equivalent to estimating seemingly unrelated regressions of these character-
istics on perceived returns in both dimensions separately, for which the coefficient on the perceived
returns is restricted to being equal across specifications.
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Table 3.D.3. Determinants of individual-level perceived returns using ORIVs
Coefficients on perc. returns
(1) (2) (3)
Rwarmth,i Rcontrol,i Rneighb.,i
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female 0.036∗∗∗ 0.022 0.040∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.024)
Age -0.186 -0.193 0.775∗∗
(0.188) (0.254) (0.372)
White 0.040∗∗∗ 0.013 0.004
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021)
College degree -0.014 -0.018 -0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
Employed -0.026 -0.012 -0.025
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
log(Household income) 0.015 0.028 0.026
(0.020) (0.026) (0.028)
Single parent 0.011 -0.002 0.015
(0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Number of children 0.068∗ -0.028 0.040
(0.038) (0.036) (0.055)
Share of female children -0.012 0.001 -0.017
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Parenting values
Altruism towards child (std.) 0.088∗∗∗ -0.027 0.120∗∗
(0.030) (0.037) (0.049)
Paternalism towards child (std.) 0.035 0.128∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.028) (0.038) (0.053)
Malleability of skills (std.) 0.137∗∗∗ 0.043 0.249∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.036) (0.050)
Notes: This table presents regressions of a respondent’s characteristic xi on the instrumented perceived
return and all other individual characteristics based on equation (3.D.1). Each cell reports the coef-
ficient of the perceived returns from a separate regression with the characteristics on the left as the
dependent variable. Column (1) uses perceived returns to warmth, column (2) perceived returns to
control, and column (3) perceived returns to neighborhoods as the regressor of interest. Bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Appendix 3.E Exploratory Factor Analysis
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Figure 3.E.1. Scree plot of parenting style items
Notes: This figure presents a scree plot of the eigenvalues from an exploratory factor analysis using
seven items based on Perris et al. (1980) and Schwarz et al. (1997) to measure parenting styles in the
warmth and control dimensions, respectively.
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Table 3.E.1. Rotated factor loadings of actual parenting styles
Rotated factor loadings
(1) (2)
Warmth Control
Warmth measures (Perris et al., 1980)
(1) I show my son/daughter with words and gestures that I like
him/her
0.72 0.06
(2) I cheer up my son/daughter when he/she is sad 0.74 0.09
(3) I praise my son/daughter 0.75 0.07
Control measures (Schwarz et al., 1997)
(4) I tend to be a strict parent 0.08 0.57
(5) If my son/daughter does something against my will, I punish
him/her
0.06 0.68
(6) I make it clear to my son/daughter that he/she is not to break the
rules or question my decisions
0.12 0.67
(7) I never waive from my rules 0.07 0.51
Notes: This table presents rotated factor loadings from an exploratory factor analysis using seven items
based on Perris et al. (1980) and Schwarz et al. (1997) to measure parenting styles in the warmth
and control dimensions, respectively.
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Appendix 3.F Relevance of Perceived Returns for
Neighborhood Characteristics
In this section, I examine whether estimated returns in the neighborhood dimen-
sion are related to the quality of the neighborhood a family is living in. I use two
approaches to answer this question. First, the survey elicits the parents’ agreement
to three statements: (i) “My neighborhood is a good place to raise children”, (ii) “I
feel safe in my neighborhood”, and (iii) “My child attends a school of good qual-
ity” on a 5-point scale. I extract a factor from these statements as a measure of the
subjective neighborhood quality. Second, linking neighborhood characteristics from
Chetty and Hendren (2018a,b) to respondents in my survey, I perform a second fac-
tor analysis that reveals two factors: a first factor capturing economic conditions in
a neighborhood (NQ 1), and a second factor (NQ 2) related to measures of segrega-
tion and urbanization. Table 3.F.1 presents analogous estimates to Table 3.1 using
both the subjective assessment or objective measures of neighborhood quality as
outcome variables.31
I find that only perceived returns in the monetary domain are significantly as-
sociated with the subjectively assessed quality of a neighborhood. Returns in the
life satisfaction domain or ORIVs do not reveal a significant association. Yet, when
looking at objective measures of the neighborhood quality in columns (4) and (5),
I find that higher perceived returns to neighborhoods are associated positively, but
not significantly with economic conditions of a neighborhood (p = 0.169). They
are, however, negatively related with its segregation. Although parental beliefs do
not predict subjective neighborhood assessments, they are related to objective mea-
sures of the neighborhood quality. This suggests that respondents are not necessarily
aware how their environment shapes their own assessments of the return to neigh-
borhoods. Taken together, parental beliefs are not only systematically related to ac-
tual parenting styles, but also associated with characteristics of the parents’ place of
residence. This supports the conjecture that these parental beliefs are a fundamental
part of parental decision-making processes.
31. One caveat of this approach to keep in mind is that some neighborhood characteristics are
historical data and thus may have changed over time. Yet, Chetty, Friedman, et al. (2018) document
that these characteristics are relatively stable over time and good predictors of today’s conditions.
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Table 3.F.1. Relevance of perceived returns for neighborhood quality
(A) Subjective NQ (B) NQ 1 (C) NQ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected
earnings
Expected
Life Satis.
ORIV ORIV ORIV
Rneighb.,i 0.043∗∗ -0.005 0.058 0.062 -0.161∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.043) (0.045) (0.038)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2104 2104 4208 4164 4164
Individuals 2104 2104 2104 2082 2082
R2 .11 .11 .104 .135 .113
Notes: This table examines associations of perceived returns and measures of the actual neighborhood
quality. Columns (1) to (3) present the results for the respondents’ subjective assessments of the quality
of their neighborhood. The outcome variable is a factor constructed from agreement to the three state-
ments (i) “My neighborhood is a good place to raise children”, (ii) “I feel safe in my neighborhood”,
and (iii) “My child attends a school of good quality”. Columns (1) and (2) use returns in the expected
earnings and expected life satisfaction domains, while column (3) implements the obviously related
instrumental variables estimator (ORIV, Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv, 2019) to correct for measure-
ment error in perceived returns using the two return measures as instruments for each other. Columns
(4) and (5) present corresponding results for objective measures of a neighborhood’s quality based on
respondents’ postcodes using ORIVs. NQ 1 refers to a factor capturing economic conditions in an area,
while NQ 2 is related to measures of segregation and urbanization. All specifications include controls
for sociodemographic characteristics. Robust standard errors in columns (1) and (2) or bootstrapped
standard errors in columns (3) to (5) in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level.
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.Chapter 4
Gender Differences in Wage
Expectations: Sorting, Children, and
Negotiation Styles
Joint with Pia Pinger, Philipp Seegers, and Jan Bergerhoff
4.1 Introduction
The gender gap in labor earnings ranges among the best documented facts in the
empirical economic literature and is subject to regular policy debates1. Overall, the
unconditional gap ranges from 5 to 35% across different OECD countries and in both
absolute and relative terms it tends to be particularly large for individuals with a col-
lege degree or higher (OECD, 2015). Moreover, convergence in male-female wages
remains slow despite sustained efforts towards achieving gender-based equality of
opportunity.
A closely-related gender gap is the gap in ex-ante wage expectations, i.e., male-
female differences in expectations about labor market returns before entering the
labor market (see, e.g., Blau and Ferber (1991) and Brunello, Lucifora, and Winter-
Ebmer (2004) for initial and Reuben, Wiswall, and Zafar (2017) for more recent
evidence). Such male-female gaps in labor market expectations are important as
they potentially determine education and labor market choices, household bargain-
ing, and wage setting. They are also an important component in financial decision-
making, e.g., regarding the optimal choice of retirement and savings plans. More-
over, there may exist important feedback effects whereby expected wages drive ac-
tual wage differences (e.g., through wage negotiations), and actual observable wage
disparities affect expectations, thus providing a rationale for persistent gender wage
gaps.
1. For a recent summary of the literature, see Blau and Kahn (2017) and Kunze (2018).
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The aim of this paper is to provide encompassing and large-scale evidence on
gender wage expectations, as well as investigating how they are affected by a sub-
stantial number of different factors using a single dataset and coherent framework.
For this purpose, we have elicited wage expectations for counterfactual study trajec-
tories amongmore than 15,000 German students from all regions, universities, study
fields and over the entire prospective working life. In addition, the data contain
elicited expectations about future labor force participation, working hours, child-
rearing plans, and wage negotiations, as well as information on perceived and actual
ability, personality, IQ, beliefs and preferences.
We provide two sets of results. In a first instance, we document a range of
stylized facts about male-female wage expectations, including population-wide and
subgroup-specific gaps in expected wages, distributional differences in ranks and lev-
els, and differences in expected life-cycle wage trajectories. We show that the gender
gap in expected wages is significant and large across all subgroups and along the
entire distribution. Moreover, it is similar to the observed actual wage gap among
recent graduates.2 In terms of life-cycle wage developments, females expect flatter
wage trajectories, with an initial gap of 14 percent increasing to 27 percent at the
age of 55. The accumulated life-cycle gap in expected wages hence amounts to eigh-
teen distributional ranks, or more than 500,000 Euros. In terms of magnitude, this
“perceived return to being male” is close to the actual return of obtaining a univer-
sity degree. In the second part, we provide comprehensive evidence on its determi-
nants, both along the expected wage distribution and regarding expected life-cycle
wage trajectories. In line with previous literature on expected and actual wage dif-
ferences (Blau and Kahn, 2017; Bütikofer, Jensen, and Salvanes, 2018; Francesconi
and Parey, 2018), we find that a large portion of the overall gap in expected wages
relates to academic and occupational sorting patterns and a much smaller part to IQ,
perceived or actual ability and personality traits. Contrary to the evidence for actual
wages (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010; Daniel, Lacuesta, and Rodriguez-Planas,
2013; Goldin and Katz, 2016; Kleven, Landais, and Sogaard, forthcoming) but in
line with Kuziemko, Pan, Shen, and Washington (2018), child-related labor force in-
terruptions prove largely unimportant for wage expectations, although a perceived
wage penalty seems to exist for having children before the age of 30. Moreover, we
provide first empirical evidence on the relationship between expected wages, ini-
tial wage claims, reservation wages and a novel measure of expected negotiation
styles. While initial wage claims closely relate to expected wage outcomes, females
envisage substantially less scope for wage negotiations than males. Differences in
anticipated negotiation styles explain 13-14% of the gender gap and thus hold sim-
ilar importance as differences in major choice or occupational sorting. Finally, we
2. Among German college graduates, the gender wage gap is 20% overall and reduces to 5-10%
after accounting for a large number of controls (Destatis, 2014; Destatis, 2017b; Francesconi and
Parey, 2018). It is thus comparatively large.
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provide suggestive evidence that wage expectations are prospective- or preference-
based rather than adaptive, as personal experiences of actual gender gaps in differ-
ent labor markets or student jobs no not translate into relative wage expectations.
Our study thus contributes to a buoyant literature on wage expectations, which,
pioneered by Manski (Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Manski, 2004), has repeatedly
documented the importance of elicited expectations and beliefs for explaining edu-
cation choices and labor market behaviors (e.g., Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang, 2012;
Jensen, 2010; Kaufmann, 2014; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014; Zafar, 2011).
It also relates to a range of prior studies documenting the existence of a gender gap
in ex-ante wage expectations in a number of specialized samples, i.e., containing in-
formation from students enrolled in particular colleges/universities or fields of study.
These studies have separately identified several potential drivers of the gender gap
in wage expectations, including differences in major choice, personality traits, and
economic preferences (Reuben, Wiswall, and Zafar, 2017; Zambre, 2018).
In this paper, we move beyond the existing evidence in at least three respects.
First, we present the first large-scale study on gender wage expectations, both in
terms of sample size and scope, and regarding the range of available measures. The
considerable size and diversity of our sample allows us to make claims about the
overall magnitude of the gender gap in wage expectations, as well as exploring het-
erogeneities across study fields, aspired occupations, regional labor markets, and
numerous background characteristics. Moreover, by asking about expected wages
at three points in the future and for different study scenarios, we construct within-
individual life-cycle wage trajectories to obtain expected differences in growth rates,
relative ranks, and expected lifetime labor earnings. Second, our comprehensive
data allow us to relate gender gaps in expected wages to a vast array of potential de-
terminants in one coherent framework. Potential drivers include sorting into study
fields and occupations, personality traits, perceived and actual ability, economics
preferences, child-rearing plans and labor supply. Third, information about prospec-
tive wage negotiations permits us to document the importance of gender differences
in anticipated wage negotiations and relate wage claims and negotiation strategies
to expected wage outcomes. To the extent that wage negotiations are an important
component of the wage-setting process, our results thus provide an important link
between expected and actual wages, as well as an explanation why the gender gap
in expected wages mirrors the gender gap in actual wages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we dis-
cuss the sample, questionnaire measures and construction of life-cycle wage trajec-
tories. Section 4.3 documents male-female differences in wage expectations both
for starting wages and over the life cycle. This section also shows that differences
in expected wages relate to differences in actual wages. Section 4.4 then presents
evidence on gender differences in a number of dimensions that have been shown to
explain large parts of the variation in actual wage gaps. Most notably, we account for
sorting into study fields and occupations, expectations about child-rearing responsi-
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bilities, and differences in negotiation patterns. Decomposition analyses assess the
relative importance of these factors. Finally, section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data
This section reports on our sample and questionnaire measures. We start out by
describing our sample and questionnaire measures of expected wages, labor supply
and children, initial wage claims and reservation wages, sorting, and background
characteristics. Then, we explain how we construct expected wage trajectories and
measures of negotiation styles.
4.2.1 Sample
Our sample comprises 15,348 students and 1,155 recent graduates (since our fo-
cus is on student expectations, we will henceforth use the word “students”). All
individuals were recruited as part of the German student study “Fachkraft 2030”,
surveyed in the second half of March 2015 (Seegers, Bergerhoff, Hartmann, and
Knappe, 2016). In addition, a subsample of 12,734 students (82.97%) completed
a supplementary psychological questionnaire comprising measures of personality
traits, economic preferences, and IQ.
Students were contacted via the mailing list of a popular nationwide job board.3
Theywere contacted via email and took part in an online questionnaire.⁴ The sample
closely compares to the overall population of German students in terms of region,
university type, study fields, and likelihood to hold a student job (Seegers et al.,
2016).
4.2.2 Measures
Individuals answered a comprehensive questionnaire regarding their own back-
ground and university enrollment, expectations about their course of studies, labor
market expectations, expectations about child-rearing, and wage negotiation plans.
They also provided information about expected future employment and student jobs.
Finally, part of the sample completed a short IQ test, as well as a questionnaire about
personality traits and preferences.
Wage expectations and realized wages. We asked subjects to indicate their ex-
pected yearly labor earnings in current Euros before taxes and at different points
over the life cycle: (i) in their first job after graduation (wsi,st), (ii) at the age of
3. The job board jobmensa.de is operated by Studitemps GmbH and is the largest platform for
student jobs.
4. The questionnaire was filled in by 8% of contacted students. Participation was incentivized
using Amazon vouchers amounting to 5,000 EUR (1 x 1,000 EUR, 4 x 250 EUR, 10 x 100 EUR, 40 x
50 EUR vouchers).
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40 (wsi,40), and (iii) at the age of 55 (w
s
i,55). We chose these time points for several
reasons. First, starting wages are likely to be a natural reference point for many stu-
dents and most related to their expected labor market negotiations. Starting wages
are alsomost often elicited in the literature onwage expectations (Arcidiacono, Hotz,
and Kang, 2012;Webbink and Hartog, 2004). Second, the age of 40 is the timewhen
individuals will have likely completed their prospective family planning, such that
child-related differences in expected wage trajectories should become apparent at
this point. Third, the age of 55 is close to the time where wages peak but before
early retirement sets in (Piopiunik, Kugler, and Wößmann, 2017).
We asked students to state these expected wages under three different scenarios,
regarding their course of studies: (a) if they complete their current (first) studies
(wfi,t), (b) if they change to their second most preferred alternative field of study
(wai,t), and (c) if they dropout and do not complete any further educational degree
(wdi,t). Thus, given three scenarios (a)-(c), denoted by s, and three points over the
life cycle (i)-(iii), denoted by t, we elicit a total of nine expected wages (wsi,t). In
addition, we ask all individuals to state the probability of each of the respective
scenarios materializing (psi,t).
Assuming these scenarios to be mutually exclusive, i.e., that students either fin-
ish, change study fields or drop out, we can use the above information to construct
our measure of overall expected wages as follows:
wi,t = pfi,tw
f
i,t + p
a
i,tw
a
i,t + pdi,twdi,t ∀ t ∈ {st, 40, 55}. (4.1)
We reweight probabilities in cases where the stated probabilities add up to more
than one hundred percent (7 percent). Moreover, we exclude individuals (less than
1%) who indicated implausible large expected wages of more than 1,000,000 EUR
per year.
Our measure of realized wages are actual labor earnings before taxes reported by
the graduates in our sample. All expected and actual labor earnings variables were
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. The mean level of expected starting wages in
our student sample is 35,870 EUR per year (SD=16,093). The mean realized wage
in the graduate sample amounts to 35,961 EUR per year (SD=25,093).
Labor supply and children. Our data contain several measures of expected labor
supply and child-related career breaks. First, expected labor supply is captured by
the expected number of weekly working hours. To match the information about
expected wages, we asked for the expected number of weekly working hours at the
same points in time, i.e., right after graduation (hsi,st), at the age of 40 (h
s
i,40), and at
the age of 55 (hsi,55) for each of the three scenarios s = f , a, d.⁵ Second, we elicited
whether the students in our sample already have children and, if not, at what age
5. We also elicit the subjective probability of involuntary unemployment. However, similar to
what has been found in the literature (e.g., Baker, Bettinger, Jacob, and Marinescu, 2018), we the
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they expect the birth of their first child. Third, we asked howmany children students
expect to have in total and how many months they are planning to stay home with
each child.
Initial wage claims, reservation wages, and discrimination. Respondents were
asked about the initial salary students would demand as they enter a wage negotia-
tion (initial wage claim, wi,I).⁶ We also inquired about the lowest wage rate at which
a student would be willing to accept a job after finishing her studies (reservation
wage,wi,R). Based on initial wage claims and reservation wages, we construct a mea-
sure of negotiation style (see Section 4.2.4). Moreover, respondents stated whether
they would expect to earn the same wage if they were a member of this opposite
sex but with identical skills, characteristics, traits, and qualifications. If the answer
is “no”, we interpret this as an indicator of perceived gender discrimination.
Major and occupational sorting. Students in Germany are required to enroll for
a particular field of studies when they first enter a teaching college or university.
Hence, at the time of the survey, students have already selected study fields in line
with their academic interests and occupational preferences. We elicited the current
study field as a choice out of a list of fifteen majors. In addition, we asked respon-
dents for their career aspirations. They could choose out of 429 pre-defined occupa-
tions or make use of a free text field. All indicated occupations were subsequently
classified in terms of the ISCO-08 occupational classification reflecting job tasks as
well as skills and occupational hierarchies.⁷
Personality traits, economic preferences, beliefs about ability, and IQ. Research
in personality psychology and economics shows that males and females display sub-
stantial differences in personality traits, economic and social preferences, and beliefs
about one’s own ability (Bertrand, 2011; Bian, Leslie, and Cimpian, 2017; Borghans,
Heckman, Golsteyn, and Meijers, 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Schmitt, Realo,
Voracek, and Allik, 2008). Our data allow us to systematically account for these
differences. In order to elicit beliefs about own ability, respondents marked their
reported expected probability of being unemployed is implausibly large in our sample for both males
(25 percent at start and 15 percent at the age of 40) and females (32 percent at start and 19 percent
at the age of 40) compared to employment rates of 93% for recent university graduates in Germany
(Eurostat, 2018). We, therefore, do not use this variable in main part of the paper, acknowledging that
this might lead to conservative estimates of the gender wage gap, as males report a 7 percent lower
probability of involuntary unemployment at employment start and a 4 percent lower probability of
involuntary unemployment at the age of 40.
6. While not all jobs require wage negotiations, Hall and Krueger (2012) show that the incidence
of wage negotiations is much higher for highly-educated individuals with college degrees compared
to the general population. Moreover, it is common in Germany to state an initial wage claim when
applying for a position.
7. For evidence on the importance of tasks for the gender wage gap, see Stinebrickner, Stine-
brickner, and Sullivan (2019).
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relative position in the distribution of students regarding their (a) perceived aca-
demic ability and (b) perceived work-related ability on a scale from 0 to 100. Four
fifth of the sample additionally participated in a survey on personality, economic
preferences, and IQ. First, we measured IQ based on ten items from a Raven-type
Matrices IQ test (Raven and Court, 1998). Second, a student’s Big Five personality
traits (agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion and open-
ness) were assessed using the 50 item IPIP test (Goldberg, Johnson, Eber, Hogan,
Ashton, et al., 2006). Finally, to elicit altruism, impatience, positive and negative
reciprocity, risk aversion and trust, we employed an experimentally-validated sur-
vey module (Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde, 2018). In the following,
we use the term “Perceived/actual ability & personality” to refer to the set of these
measures.
4.2.3 Wage Trajectories and Life-time Labor Earnings
We use elicited wage expectations to approximate lifetime wage trajectories as well
as total lifetime labor earnings. For this purpose, we assume a standard Mincer-type
earnings function where log-normally distributed wages are a quadratic function of
potential experience:
lnwi,t = αi + βiexpi,t + γiexp2i,t. (4.2)
Using the elicited information about wage expectations at three different points in
time (wi,st, wi,40 and wi,55), we can use equation (4.2) to determine the parameters
α, β and γ for each individual separately. We then use the above relationship to
calculate individual-specific expected wages for each year (ŵi,t ∀t /∈ {st, 40, 55}).⁸
Based on these expected wage calculations for each year of an individual’s work-
ing life, lifetime earnings can be calculated as the sum of expected yearly earnings,
i.e.,
ŵi,life =
65∑
st
ŵi,t, (4.3)
where all expected wages are given in current Euros and we assume an average
retirement age of 65 years.
4.2.4 Distributional Differences and Negotiation Styles
Apart from analyzing gender differences at the mean, we investigate the gender
gap in terms of levels and ranks along the entire expected wage distribution. While
8. Note that the expected starting year (t = st) differs across individuals. Since we know each
individual’s expected year of graduation as well as their age, we calculate ŵi,t for all years t > st. This
implies that our sample changes during the initial prospective working period, i.e., up to the point
where all students in our sample expect to have graduated (see also footnote 15).
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level differences are commonly analyzed (e.g., Francesconi and Parey, 2018), to the
best of our knowledge gender gaps expressed in ranks have not been analyzed so far.
Intuitively, a respective female takes up a different position (and rank) in the female
expectedwage distribution than in the distribution of male expected wages, whereby
we compare the difference between these two rank measures. Accordingly, for each
quantile qF,E of the female (log) expected wage distribution FF,E, we compute the
rank qMF,E in the male distribution FM,E that corresponds to the same (log) wage level.
The rank gap for a given quantile is then given by Gq(rank) = qF,E − qMF,E and the
corresponding level gap byGq(level) = F−1M (q)− F−1F (q) (see also Bayer and Charles,
2018, for details on this methodology). We thus express male and female wages on
the same underlying scale, namely in terms of the expected wage distribution of
males. Panel (a) of Figure 4.1 illustrates both measures of the gender gap.
Expanding on this idea, we construct a measure of negotiation styles that is well
defined and comparable across genders. Such comparisons across different distribu-
tions are not trivial as they require some form of anchoring. To provide such an an-
chor, we express initial wage claims and reservation wages of both genders in terms
of ranks of the male wage distribution (see panel (b) of Figure 4.1). Thus, given that
the initial wage claim (reservation wage) of a given female in our sample lies on a
certain quantile qF,I (qF,R), we calculate the corresponding quantile in the male ex-
pected wage distribution FM. Using this, we then determine the corresponding rank
of initial wage claims and reservation wages with respect to the male wage distribu-
tion (qMF,I and qMF,R). Next, we proceed analogously with the initial wage claims and
reservation wages of males. In a second step, we then define the negotiation style of
individual i as the difference between her transformed rank of initial wage claims
and reservation wages, i.e., NSi(rank) = qMi,g,I − qMi,g,R with g = F,M for females and
males, respectively. Our measure of negotiation styles thus captures “boldness” in
wage negotiations, namely how much more a respective individual is willing to ask
for, when compared to her minimum acceptable wage. Note that despite being based
on initial wage claims, this measure likely captures a general willingness to ask for
a relatively higher wage, both initially and in later wage negotiations.
4.3 Gender Differences in Wage Expectations
This section first documents the gender gap in wage expectations across scenarios
(current major, alternative major, dropout) and over the life cycle (starting, age
40, age 55). We also present the overall gap (weighted by scenario probabilities),
distribution-wide differences, and differences in individual life-cycle wage trajecto-
ries. Finally, we provide evidence that wage expectations tend to be accurate on
average, suggesting that the wage gap in expectations maps into actual wage differ-
ences.
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Figure 4.1. Calculation of ranks in expected wages, initial wage claims, and reser-
vation wages
Notes: Figure 4.1a illustrates the decomposition of the gender gap in terms of ranks and levels. For
a given quantile in the female expected wage distribution FF (red, solid), the rank gap is defined
as the difference between a given quantile and the quantile position that a respective female would
assume in the male distribution FM,E (blue, dashed): Gq(rank) = qF,E − qMF,E. Similarly, the level gap is
defined as the expected wage difference between a male and a female both evaluated at the same
quantile (Gq(level) = F−1M (q)− F−1F (q)). Fgure 4.1b illustrates how ranks of initial wage claims (dark
red, solid) and reservation wages (light red, solid) of females are calculated using the male (log)
expected wage distribution FM,E (blue, dashed). Our measure of negotiation styles for individual i is
given by the difference in ranks between her initial wage claim (qMi,g,I) and reservation wage (q
M
i,g,R):
NSi(rank) = qMi,g,I − qMi,g,R with g = F,M depending on individual i’s gender.
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4.3.1 The Male-Female Gap in Wage Expectations
Panel A of Table 4.1 presents mean expected wages for each of the different scenarios
(graduating in one’s major, graduating with an alternative major, or dropping out)
and at three points over the prospective working life. It shows that regardless of
the scenario or age, all male-female differences in expected wages are statistically
different from zero and substantial in size. Thus for example, while male students
expect to earn on average 40,582 EUR after graduating from their current major,
females expect a mere 85% of this amount (34,331 EUR). Moreover, the wage gap
increases at higher prospective ages and is more pronounced for the current major
choice, where the lifetime gap in expectedwages cumulates to almost 600,000 Euros.
Besides, for both males and females, expected wages conditional on finishing the
current major are higher compared to the starting wages of the alternative major or
for dropping out of university.⁹
To simplify the analysis, we henceforth focus on overall expected wages, i.e., by
taking into account the notion that with a certain probability students changemajors
or drop out as shown in equation (4.1). The resulting overall expected wage rates are
presented in panel B of Table 4.1 and their respective distributions in Figures 4.1a to
4.1c. Again, the male-female gap in overall expected wages is statistically significant
and large. At the beginning of their careers, male students expect to earn on average
39,076 EUR, while female students expect 33,434 EUR (86%). The difference in
expectations increases until the age of 40, when most children will be born, and
rises further until the age of 55, when wage trajectories tend to peak. Male students
expect to earn 58,301 EUR at the age of 40 and 70,518 EUR at the age of 55, whereas
females report wage expectations of 45,765 EUR (78%) and 51,291 EUR (73%).
Over the life cycle, this gap in expectations cumulates to an average of more than
half a million Euros. To put this number into perspective, the 525,969 EUR lifetime
“expected return to being male” is close to the average lifetime return to obtaining
a university degree (Piopiunik, Kugler, and Wößmann, 2017).1⁰
When looking at gender gaps in expectations bymajor, a similar pattern emerges.
While substantial heterogeneity exists in terms of levels – humanities majors on aver-
age expect the lowest starting wages, while law students expect the highest – female
students always expect to earn substantially less than their male counterparts and
the gap in expected wages increases over the life cycle. However, the expected wage
9. This finding is consistent with recent evidence that students select into majors according to
their perceived comparative advantage (Kirkeboen, Leuven, and Mogstad, 2016).
10. Lifetime returns in Piopiunik, Kugler, and Wößmann (2017) are discounted using a net dis-
count rate of 1.5%. We thus approximate gross returns as 3568 EUR x 12 months x 37 years - 1891
EUR x 12 months x 45 years = 563,052 EUR using the numbers reported in Table 1 of their paper.
Alternatively, we can apply the same discount rate of 1.5% to yearly expected incomes in our sample.
Doing so results in a discounted expected lifetime earnings of 366,464 EUR compared to 387,431 EUR
for the return to obtaining a university degree.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of expected and actual gross annual wages in cur-
rent Euros
Summary statistics
Males Females Diff. Ratio N
A. By scenario (expected wages)
Current major
Starting 40,582 34,331 6,252 0.85 15,348
Age 40 61,475 47,514 13,961 0.77 15,348
Age 55 74,698 53,361 21,337 0.71 15,348
Lifetime 2,482,233 1,895,315 586,919 0.76 12,734
Probability to finish major 81 84 -3 1.04 15,348
Alternative major
Starting 38,156 33,685 4,471 0.88 15,348
Age 40 53,225 43,665 9,559 0.82 15,348
Age 55 64,048 48,434 15,614 0.76 15,348
Lifetime 2,165,761 1,744,971 420,790 0.81 12,828
Probability to major change 9 7 1 0.86 15,348
Dropout
Starting 27,017 24,326 2,690 0.90 15,348
Age 40 34,296 27,980 6,316 0.82 15,348
Age 55 38,892 30,276 8,616 0.78 15,348
Lifetime 1,369,630 1,132,489 237,141 0.83 12,828
Probability of college dropout 11 9 2 0.82 15,348
B. Overall (expected wages)
Starting 39,076 33,434 5,642 0.86 15,348
Age 40 58,301 45,765 12,536 0.78 15,348
Age 55 70,518 51,291 19,227 0.73 15,348
Lifetime 2,356,291 1,830,322 525,969 0.78 12,734
C. Actual wages (graduates)
Starting 38,728 33,945 4,783 0.88 1,155
Lifetime 2,621,885 1,904,946 716,939 0.73 825
Notes: Ratio refers to the ratio of female to male expected wages/probabilities. Lifetime wages are
constructed based on equations (4.2) and (4.3). Lifetime wages of graduates are based on actual
starting wages and wage expectations at the age of 40 and 55. All wages are winsorized at the 1%
and 99% level.
gap tends to be smaller in majors with a larger share of females (e.g., medical/health
sciences, humanities) relative to majors mostly chosen by males (e.g., STEM, eco-
nomics/business; see section 4.C for details). Consistent with Goldin (2014), we
also observe smaller gender differences for occupations that are characterized by
a linear hours-earnings relationship (e.g., teachers) compared to occupations with
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Figure 4.1. Expected yearly gross wages
Notes: Figure 4.1a–4.1c present kernel densities of expected overall wages upon graduation (4.1a),
at the age of 40 (4.1b), and at the age of 55 (4.1c) of female (red, solid) and male (blue, dashed)
students in our sample. All expected wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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nonlinear/convex hours-earnings profiles (e.g., lawyers), see section 4.B and Ta-
ble 4.B.2 for results.
4.3.2 Gender Gaps along the Expected Wage Distribution in Levels
and Ranks
In the previous section, we described the gender gap at the mean. However, there
might also be important distributional heterogeneities if, e.g., most of the gap was
driven by differences at the very top or bottom of the distribution. Regarding ac-
tual wages, distributional differences are indeed heterogeneous. In Germany, the
actual gender gap varies across the wage distribution, and decreases for university
graduates with rising wage levels (Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, and Sommerfeld, 2010;
Francesconi and Parey, 2018).11 In the following, we characterize the gap in wage
expectations at different points of the expected wage distribution using quantile re-
gressions in terms of both log levels and ranks.12. The analyses of levels and ranks
correspond to two different thought experiments. First, level differences are infor-
mative about the absolute (percentage) gain in wages that a female at a certain
quantile could expect to receive if she were male. Second, rank differences reveal
how much lower a respective female ranks on the male wage distribution given her
respective expected wage. In other terms, if the labor market was a competition with
wages as a prize, then rank differences inform us about how much worse a female
would expect to perform in that competition due to her gender.
Table 4.2 describes the gender gap at five points along the expected wage distri-
bution, namely the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. The estimates in the
first row of panel A show that the gender gap in levels for lower quantiles is larger
than for higher quantiles, decreasing from about 24 to 11 percentage points. The
gap in expectations thus mirrors the actual distributional wage gap among students
Francesconi and Parey (see Figure 4 in 2018). Panel B characterizes the gap using
ranks as introduced in Section 4.2.4, revealing a somewhat larger, hump-shaped dif-
ference.13 While the difference between males and females is on average five ranks
at the 10th percentile, it increases to 21 ranks at the median and decreases again to
nine ranks at the 90th percentile. However, the smaller rank difference at the lower
end of the wage distribution reflects a lack of mass in lower tail of the male wage
distribution. We thus conclude that both level and rank differences indicate a some-
what smaller gap at the top end of the distribution compared to the rest. Apart from
11. These findings for Germany contrast evidence from Sweden and the United States, where
gender gaps are more pronounced at the upper part of the wage distribution, and thus overall larger
among college graduates (Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman, 2003; Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010).
12. Again, we use ranks of wages as measured in the male log wage distribution, following the
approach introduced by Bayer and Charles (2018).
13. This is in line with findings from Bayer and Charles (2018), who find that black-white gaps
in earnings are more pronounced when analyzing them in terms of ranks rather than levels.
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Table 4.2. Level and rank gaps
Quantiles
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
A. Level gap
Female -0.236 -0.221 -0.238 -0.138 -0.108
(0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011)
Including controls
+ Majors -0.178 -0.148 -0.129 -0.137 -0.121
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
+ IQ and personality -0.156 -0.114 -0.103 -0.091 -0.071
(0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
+ Perceived ability -0.154 -0.108 -0.098 -0.082 -0.077
(0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
B. Rank gap
Female -5.2 -12.6 -20.6 -19.1 -8.5
(0.3) (0.5) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8)
Including controls
+ Majors -4.0 -8.1 -12.4 -13.7 -7.0
(0.4) (0.6) (0.7) (0.9) (1.0)
+ IQ and personality -3.9 -6.3 -10.3 -10.3 -5.3
(0.5) (0.7) (0.9) (1.1) (1.3)
+ Perceived ability -3.9 -6.4 -9.8 -9.5 -5.1
(0.6) (0.7) (0.9) (1.0) (1.3)
Notes: Each cell of this table reports the female coefficient that characterizes the gender differences
for different quantiles. Panel A uses log expected wages as an outcome and thus reports level gaps,
while panel B uses percentile ranks of expected wages measured in the expected wage distribution
of males and therefore reports rank gaps as outlined in Section 4.2.4. Ability measures comprise IQ
and personality traits and perceived ability comprises the subjective position in the distribution of
academic and job-related skills, respectively. Log gross annual wages are winsorized at the 1% and
99% level.
heterogeneities in sorting, this finding might suggest that women at the middle and
lower end of the distribution are less confident regarding their perceived or actual
abilities. Indeed, after major choice as well perceived and actual ability (IQ, pref-
erences, and personality) are accounted for, the gender gap in wage expectations
becomes much more similar across quantiles.1⁴ The remaining gap is thus seems to
accrue to male-female differences that exist along the entire distribution. Examples
of such differences are child-rearing demands and negotiation preferences. Later in
this paper, we will determine the relative importance of these factors.
14. See Table 4.A.1 for major-specific heterogeneities.
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4.3.3 Life-cycle Trajectories in Expected Wages
The evidence presented in section 4.3.1 indicates that the gender gap in wage ex-
pectations increases with potential experience. To investigate the magnitude and
relative importance of rising expected wage gaps over time, we use the three
wage expectations (after graduation, at the age of 40, and at the age of 55) to
fit individual-specific Mincerian wage trajectories as described in section 4.2.3. Fig-
ure 4.2a presents how male and female graduates expect earning trajectories to
evolve over their respective lifetimes.1⁵ The figure reveals that the gender gap in-
creases over time and this increase accelerates in the early-thirties when individuals
start a family. Moreover, it increases until the age of 50 and stabilizes at 72% (i.e.,
females expect to earn 72% of the male wage at the age of 50). Expressed in terms
of labor market experience, females need about nine years of prospective experience
(from the age of 25 to 34) to reach the wage level that males expect to receive upon
graduation (approx. 40,000 EUR). Males in turn expect to earn on average 49,000
EUR after nine years of experience, which is almost as high as the highest average
wage level that females expect to earn throughout their entire careers (51,000 EUR
at the age of 50).
Figure 4.2b illustrates the distribution of annual wage growth by growth cate-
gory (<2%, 2-4%, 4-6%, 6-8%, 8-10%, ≥10%). It shows that the vast majority of
students expect annual wage growth rates of less than 4%. However, male students
are more likely than females to expect larger growth rates. Thus, almost half of all
female students expect their yearly wages to grow by less than 2%, compared to
35% of males. Moreover, students who expected high starting wages expect lower
growth rates, and this pattern is more pronounced for females. Taken together, these
patterns imply that expected wage trajectories of male and female students diverge
over the life cycle. Nonetheless, while overall the gap in expected wages widens over
the prospective life cycle at all parts of the expected starting wage distribution (see
Figure 4.3a), rank differences persist or increase only slightly (Figure 4.3b).1⁶
4.3.4 Comparing Expected Wages to Actual Wages
The above-described gender gap in wage expectations might translate into male-
female differences in career decisions or family planning. Nonetheless, in terms of
distributional concerns, fairness, and policy-making, its empirical relevance also de-
15. Note that Figure 4.2a expresses all expected wages in terms of a respondent’s age while
Table 4.1 presents expected starting wages irrespective of age. As there are students who graduate in
their late-twenties or early-thirties, the sample used for this figure thus changes at initial ages. At the
age of 25, approximately 39% of all students expect to have graduated from university. At the age of
28, 72%, at 30 this share amounts to 85% and at the age of 32 to 92%. Approximately 98% of all
students expect to have graduated from university by the age of 35.
16. Figure 4.A.1 in the Appendix also confirms that the ranks in the starting wage distribution
are highly correlated with ranks at the age of 40 and 55.
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Figure 4.2. Life-cycle wage trajectories and wage growth
Notes: Figure 4.2a shows the evolution of wages over the life cycle (females: red, solid; males: blue,
dashed), including the female-male ratio (black, long-dashed). Figure 4.2b presents the expected an-
nual wage growth until the age of 40 (bars measured on the left axis) and average expected starting
wages (lines measured on the right axis) in each wage growth category separately for female (red,
left bars) and male (blue, right bars) students in our sample. All wages are winsorized at the 1% and
99% level.
pends on the extent to which these expectations translate into actual gender wage
differences.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that this is indeed the case. First, follow-up
surveys on graduates who were initially surveyed about their wage expectations
4.3 Gender Differences in Wage Expectations | 175
-.
35
-.
3
-.
25
-.
2
-.
15
-.
1
-.
05
0
Le
ve
l g
ap
 (
in
 lo
g 
po
in
ts
) 
by
 q
ua
nt
ile
26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
Age
(a) Level gap
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
R
an
k 
ga
p 
by
 q
ua
nt
ile
26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
Age
(b) Rank gap
Figure 4.3. Rank and level gaps over the life-cycle for different initial quantiles
Notes: This figure presents the evolution of the wage gap measured in levels ranks for females starting
at the 10th (very light, solid), 25th (light, long-dashed), 50th (medium, dashed), 75th (dark, short-
dashed), and 90th (very dark, dotted) percentile of their wage distribution over the life cycle. Gaps
are estimated using quantile regressions at each age, similar to Table 4.2.
during college show a close relation between the expectations and later realiza-
tions (Webbink and Hartog, 2004; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018a).1⁷ Second, the wage
17. See also Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014), Filippin and Ichino (2005), and Schweri and Har-
tog (2017) for evidence that expectations predict subsequent real-life outcomes.
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gap in expectations that we observe mimics the actual (conditional and uncondi-
tional) wage gap in Germany, as well as the fact that women experience much flat-
ter life-cycle wage profiles (Destatis, 2017b; Francesconi and Parey, 2018). Thus,
for example Francesconi and Parey (2018) report an overall actual gap among re-
cent university graduates in Germany of 19.1%, while we find one of 15.5% in
expectations. Besides, they report an actual gap of 10.5% among economics majors,
whereas the gap in expectations among economics majors in our sample amounts
to 10.45%. Third, the gender gap in starting wage expectations and the gender gap
among recent graduates in our data are almost identical, and the same holds true
for respective wage levels. Male recent graduates earn 38,728 EUR on average, and
students in our sample expect to earn 39,076 EUR upon entry into the labor market
(see Table 4.1). The corresponding values for female graduates and students are
33,945 EUR and 33,434 EUR, respectively. Finally, we find that the respective dis-
tributions overlap (see Figure 4.4), aside from slightly more mass at the lower end
of the distribution among recent graduates. By comparing log (expected) wages of
graduates and students in a regression framework (see Appendix Table 4.C.1), we
can show that any of the observed differences stem from non-standard employment
relationships (e.g., internships, part-time work). After controlling for gender, field
of study, and working hours, there are no differences between expected and actual
wages.
The empirical similarity of wage expectations and actual wages thus suggests
that expectations reflect the expected outcome of (future) wage setting (Table 4.A.2
shows compelling evidence that this is indeed the case) and that women tend to an-
ticipate lower wages mostly due to factors related to their gender. In the following,
we will investigate this claim by shedding particular light on the relative importance
of preference-based occupational sorting, child-related career breaks, and wage ne-
gotiation styles.
4.4 Explaining the Gender Gap in Wage Expectations
In this section, we examine the relative importance of several potential drivers of the
gender gap in wage expectations. Alongside differential sorting into majors and oc-
cupations as well as differences in perceived/actual ability and personality traits or
economic preferences, we focus in particular on the respective roles of anticipated
child-rearing responsibilities and expected negotiation styles. For these factors to
drive the gender gap in wage expectations documented in Section 4.3.1, two con-
ditions need to be met: first, they need to differ across genders, and second, they
need to matter for wage expectations. Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 thus proceed by
documenting male-female differences in child-rearing plans and wage negotiation
patterns, respectively. Finally, section 4.4.3 presents regression and decomposition
analyses to explore the relative importance of these and other potential divers for
the gap in wage expectations.
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Figure 4.4. Comparison of expected and actual wages
Notes: These figures present kernel densities of expected overall wages of female (red, solid; Fig-
ure 4.4a) and male (blue, solid; Figure 4.4b) students in our sample as well as the same distributions
for actual wages of graduates (darker colors, dashed). All wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
level.
4.4.1 Expected Child-rearing Responsibilities
Biological and social differences in child-bearing and -rearing responsibilities are an
important factor in explaining male-female differences in labor market outcomes
(Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010; Daniel, Lacuesta, and Rodriguez-Planas, 2013;
Goldin and Katz, 2016; Kleven, Landais, and Sogaard, forthcoming). First, women
178 | 4 Gender Differences in Wage Expectations
who intend to have children may select into occupations with flatter earnings pro-
files or linear pay structures, i.e., in anticipation of child-related wage penalties
(Blau and Ferber, 1991; Goldin and Katz, 2016). Moreover, different fertility prefer-
ences, for example if women wanted more children or children at an earlier point
in time, may affect a woman’s household bargaining position regarding her child-
rearing responsibilities and prospective labor market attachment. Second, career
breaks in the form of parental leave may lead to a reduction in human capital, work-
related networks, and experience, inducing females with children to earn lower rel-
ative (expected) wages afterwards (Albrecht, Edin, Sundström, and Vroman, 1999).
Third, reduced working hours among women with children may exert an additional
penalty in (expected) female wages, especially if long hours relate to promotions or
increasing marginal returns (Angelov, Johansson, and Lindahl, 2016; Goldin, 2014).
Table 4.1. Summary statistics on family planning
Males Females Diff. N
A. All respondents
Wants to have children 0.88 0.87 0.02 15,348
Already has at least one child 0.03 0.02 0.01 15,256
Exp. working hours per week (age 40) 41.04 39.20 1.85 15,348
B. Conditional on wanting at least one child
Age at birth of first child 30.59 29.38 1.21 13,370
Early parent (before age 30) 0.54 0.71 -0.16 13,427
Exp. number of children 2.27 2.20 0.07 13,427
Expected months at home per child 4.87 9.65 -4.78 11,666
Exp. working hours per week (age 40) 41.04 39.01 2.03 13,427
Notes: Panel A presents information on family planning and labor supply for all students in the sample,
while panel B conditions on those respondents who want to have at least one child.
Table 4.1 summarizes male-female differences in fertility preferences, expected
child-related career breaks, and expected weekly working hours. Regarding fertility
preferences, the differences across genders are minor. 87% of females and 88% of
males want to have children and conditional on parenthood, whereby both genders
prefer to have on average around 2.2 children. However, women expect to have chil-
dren about one year earlier than men and a much larger fraction (71% versus 54%)
would like to have children before turning 30 years old. This age difference matches
reality to the extent that males tend to be at least one year older in three quar-
ters of all couples (German microcensus, 2010). Larger differences emerge when
it comes to child-related career breaks. Males expect to stay home for around 5
months per child as opposed to females, who estimate that they will stay home for
around 10 months with each child (see also Figure 4.1b). Expected differences in
working hours at the age of 40 are again minor. The average expected number of
working hours at the age of 40 among all individuals (panel A of Table 4.1) is almost
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identical to that for individuals who expect to have children (panel B of Table 4.1
and Figure 4.1b) and there is no significant difference if we restrict the sample to
individuals with and without (expectant) children. Arguably, the age of 40 might be
too late to capture a reduction in working times among individuals who expect to
have children in their late-twenties. However, even among individuals who plan to
have children in their late-thirties we do not find significant differences.
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Figure 4.1. CDFs of expected time at home with kids and working hours
Notes: This figure presents cumulative distribution functions of (a) time spent at home with children
(career break) and (b) hours worked per week at the age of 40 conditional on expecting at least one
child for both female (red, solid) and male (blue, dashed) students in our sample.
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Figure 4.2 reveals that both males and females who expect to have children
early, i.e., before the age of 30, expect longer career breaks and are also planning
to work fewer hours. Young prospective parents thus seem to (rationally) anticipate
less time-consuming careers. Nonetheless, as can be seen in panel (c) of Figure 4.2,
females expect a wage penalty of 1,514 EUR for early parenthood (p-value < 0.01),
while for males there is no difference (premium of 324 EUR, p-value = 0.42).
Some of the above expectations regarding fertility and time with children di-
verge from what we observe for current cohorts. Thus, for example, while only 13%
of the women in our sample expect to remain childless, we see in current cohorts that
28% of women with an academic degree have no children at the age of 45 (Destatis,
2013). Moreover, women plan to interrupt their careers on average for 9.7 months
for each child, but most expect to work full-time again at the age of 40. Among cur-
rent cohorts, we observe that women with academic degrees interrupt their careers
on average for 19 months (4 months for males) and only 32% of college-educated
women with children under the age of 18 years work full time (Destatis, 2017a;
Fabian, Rehn, Brandt, and Briedis, 2013). By contrast, males expect and realize al-
most no child-related interruptions or working-time reductions. In this sense, our
findings are much in line with recent evidence presented in Kuziemko et al. (2018)
showing that women underestimate the impact of motherhood on their future labor
supply. Nonetheless, given that the students in our sample represent future cohorts
of parents, it is somewhat difficult to distinguish false expectations from fundamen-
tal changes in child-rearing choices.
4.4.2 Negotiation Patterns
Wage negotiation strategies as well as initial wage claims and reservation wages
may explain why a strong link exists between expected and actual wages (see sec-
tion 4.3.4). For example, male-female differences in expected and actual wages may
emerge if males are bolder in their initial wage claims or if females are more easily
negotiated down towards their reservation wages.1⁸
Table 4.2 presents initial wage claims, expected wages, and reservation wages of
males and females first in Euros (panel A) and then in terms of ranks in the expected
wage distribution of males (panel B). Expected wages on average lie between the
initial wage claim and the reservation wage, indicating that most individuals expect
to start a wage negotiation by claiming salaries above what they expect to receive.
Similarly, they expect to settle on expected wages that lie above their respective
18. University graduates are usually asked to state their initial wage claim when applying for a
position, such that there is little room for women to shy away from initiating a negotiation (Babcock
and Laschever, 2009; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman, 2007).
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Figure 4.2. Expected time at home with children, expected working hours, and
expected wages for younger and older parents
Notes: This figure presents bar graphs of (a) time spent at home with children (career break) and of
(b) hours worked per week at the age of 40 and (c) expected wages of younger and older parents
conditional on expecting at least one child for both female (red) and male (blue, dark lines) students
in our sample including 95% confidence intervals. Lighter colors indicate that females or males expect
their first child after the age of 30, darker colors before the age of 30.
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics on negotiation patterns
Negotiation patterns
Males Females Diff. N
A. Expressed in levels/Euro
Initial wage claim 41,789 33,714 8,075 15,348
Expected wage 39,076 33,434 5,642 15,348
Reservation wage 34,355 28,002 6,352 15,348
B. Expressed in ranks
Initial wage claim 58 40 18 15,348
Expected wage 50 37 14 15,346
Reservation wage 42 28 14 15,348
Negotiation style 16 13 3 15,348
Notes: Panel A reports mean initial wage claims, expected and reservation wages in Euro for bothmales
and females. Panel B expresses these in ranks measured on the male expected wage distribution. See
Section 4.2.4 for a description of how to calculate these ranks.
reservation wages.1⁹ Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.3a, this is true for both males
and females and along the entire expected wage distribution.2⁰
Males consistently expect to enter wage negotiations with a higher wage claim
and reservation wage than females. The difference is substantial and the distribution
of male reservation wages matches the distribution of female initial wage claims
(compare Figure 4.3a).When expressingwage claims and reservationwages relative
to an individual’s expected wage, we also uncover that men tend to be bolder in their
wage claims. As Figure 4.3b illustrates, males intend to claim a larger initial wage
for every expected wage and they also expect to settle on a wage that exceeds their
reservation wage more than females.
When expressing initial wage claims, expected wages and reservation wages
in terms of ranks on the expected wage distribution of males, we observe that the
previous finding persists: gender differences in initial wage claims are larger than
differences in expected and reservation wages. The difference in ranks between
initial wage claims and reservationwages is thus higher formales (16 ranks) than for
females (13 ranks) (see panel B of Table 4.2). Figure 4.4a presents the distribution
of negotiation patterns. About one third of female students in our sample leave very
19. For recent evidence on the importance of male-female differences in reservation wages for
the gender gap, see Caliendo, Lee, and Mahlstedt (2017).
20. The close association between initial wage claims, reservation wages and expected wages
is further confirmed by the results displayed in Table 4.A.2. It indicates that the difference between
expected wages and initial wage claims remains constant along the expected wage distribution (coeffi-
cient close to 1). Nonetheless, the difference between reservation and expected wages increases along
the distribution (coefficient < 1). This implies that at the top individuals expect a negotiation result
that exceeds their reservation wage relatively more (this can also be seen graphically in Figure 4.3b).
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Figure 4.3. Initial wage claims, expected and reservation wages
Notes: Figure 4.3a presents reservation wages (wR, light), expected wages (wexp, medium) and initial
wage claims (wI, dark) ordered according to their percentile rank in the expected wage distribution
of female (red, solid) and male (blue, dashed) students in our sample. Figure 4.3b presents the same
distributions net of expected wages. All wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
little scope for negotiations, as there are only five ranks or fewer between their initial
wage claims and their respective reservation wages. By contrast, males tend to enter
negotiations with much bolder wage claims, with the majority planning to claim a
wage that lies fifteen ranks or more above their reservation wage.
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Figure 4.4. Negotiation styles by gender
Notes: Figure 4.4a presents the negotiation styles NSi defined by the difference in ranks measured on
the male (log) expected wage distribution between the initial wage claims and reservation wages for
both female (red, left bars) andmale (blue, right bars) students in our sample. Figure 4.4b presents the
association between these negotiation styles NSi and expected starting wages,wi,st, from regressions of
the type wi,st = β0 + β1NSi + β2NS2i + β3NS3i + β4NS4i + i estimated separately for male and female
students including 95% confidence intervals. All wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
These differences in negotiation styles prompt the question whether bolder ne-
gotiation styles pay off. While our data do not permit establishing causality, they
allow us to investigate the relationship between negotiation styles and expected
wages. Figure 4.4b uncovers a striking pattern: while males expected wages are
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nearly unaffected by their negotiation patterns, negotiations have large perceived
returns for female students. A larger scope for negotiations with a higher initial
wage claim increases the wage females expect to earn after graduation. Increasing
boldness in negotiation styles by one standard deviation (approx. 12 ranks) for a
female at the mean is associated with an 3,453 EUR increase in her expected wage,
while a corresponding increase for males only amounts to an increase of 171 EUR.
The results in this section provide a novel view on negotiation styles as a driver of
gender differences in labor market outcomes. While previous research suggests that
females are less likely to initiate negotiations (Babcock and Laschever, 2009; Bowles,
Babcock, and Lai, 2007; Leibbrandt and List, 2015), we provide field evidence sug-
gesting that females ask for less in wage negotiations, thereby complementing evi-
dence from laboratory experiments (Rigdon, 2012). In addition, we show that nego-
tiating pays off for female students, who expect large returns for higher initial wage
claims. This finding might be consistent with the notion that women “know when
to ask” (Exley, Niederle, and Vesterlund, forthcoming). By contrast, there is no such
effect for males.
4.4.3 Decomposing the Gender Gap in Wage Expectations
Previous sections have documented the extent to which males and females differ
in their prospective child-rearing and negotiation patterns. In this section, we use
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions to approximate the extent to which these and other
factors contribute to the gender gap in wage expectations. Thus, for example, sort-
ing into specific academic majors has been shown to hold particular importance for
expected and actual wage gaps (Francesconi and Parey, 2018; Zafar, 2013), as is
sorting into different occupations and industries (Goldin, 2014; Wiswall and Zafar,
2018b). Nonetheless, sorting into occupations and industries might not only reflect
preferences, but might also be driven by individual perceptions about discrimination
or class ceilings (Blau and Kahn, 2017), ability, perceived relative ability, personal-
ity or economic preferences (Cortes and Pan, 2018; Fouarge, Kriechel, and Dohmen,
2014), all of which may also have a direct effect on expected wages. We thus sub-
sume all potential drivers of the gender wage gap by forming three groups: (A)
sorting into majors, occupations, industries as well as perceived/actual ability and
personality, (B) labor supply and family planning, and (C) negotiation styles.
To obtain relative shares of these factors, we compute the share of the gap that is
attributable to sorting (comprised of sorting into majors, occupations, and industries
as well as perceived relative ability, personality and economic preferences), family
planning, and negotiation styles based on a twofold Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
using regression coefficients from a pooled regression model.21 The results of this
21. We use pooled coefficients to obtain an estimate about the importance of differences in char-
acteristics rather than their (perceived) prices. Differences in coefficients enter the unexplained differ-
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model suggest that each of the above factors matter for expected wages and that the
estimated relationshipmimics results of models with actual wages as dependent vari-
able (see Tables 4.A.3 and 4.A.4). Thus, for example, majors in medical sciences, law,
economics/business, and STEM each yield a large and significant premium over a
major in humanities. Similarly, conscientiousness and extraversion yield a wage pre-
mium, while agreeableness is associated with lower wages (for a comparison using
actual wages, see Heineck and Anger, 2010). Finally, working hours are positively
associated with expected wages as is boldness in wage negotiations.
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.5a present the results from an Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position of the gender gap in wage expectations for both starting wages as well
as expected wages earned over the life cycle (see Figure 4.5b). Consistent with
previous research (Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang, 2012; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015;
Zafar, 2013), we find that a sizable share of the gender gap in wage expectations
relates to differential sorting into majors, occupations, and industries, with occu-
pations as the finest category being most important. By contrast, our vast battery
of perceived/actual ability, personality and economic preference measures explains
only 3% of the male-female difference in expected starting wages.22 However, this
share rises to 10% once we decompose expected lifetime wages. We interpret this
as suggestive evidence of anticipated employer learning (see, e.g., Altonji and Pier-
ret, 2001), i.e., the idea that employers are unable to fully price a graduate’s non-
cognitive characteristics at the beginning of the career, but only with increasing
experience. The notion that majors explain a smaller share of the gap in lifetime
wages relatively to starting wages is also consistent with this idea.
Compared to sorting, labor supply and family planning together make up for a
somewhat smaller share of around 12%, where most of the variance is explained
by anticipated working hours rather than child-related career breaks. In fact, we
observe hardly any expected child penalty after we control for occupations and
industries, indicating that women may opt for somewhat more family-friendly oc-
cupations (with flatter wage trajectories as described in Section 4.3.3), but then
do not experience a relative decline in expected wages due to family planning and
child-related career breaks (see Kuziemko et al., 2018, for related evidence). Finally,
negotiation styles explain 14% of the gender gap and this is true on average even
within occupation categories and after controlling for measures of perceived and
actual ability. Moreover, the importance of negotiation styles remains similar at 9%
ence, usually attributed to discrimination. Note that this yields a lower bound of the estimated effect
of wage negotiations, given our estimates displayed in Figure 4.4b. There are no differences in the
pricing of child-related labor force interruptions.
22. Overconfidence, measured by perceived and actual ability, thus proves much less important
in our data than suggested by some of the previous evidence on elite students (see, e.g., Reuben,
Wiswall, and Zafar, 2017).
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over the life cycle, indicating that negotiation strategies set individuals on different
initial wage trajectories with important ramification throughout their entire career.
Table 4.3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender gap in wage expectations
log(Expected starting wage) log(Expected lifetime wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
with occ. sorting without occ. sorting with occ. sorting without occ. sorting
Unadjusted difference 0.181 100.000 0.181 100.000 0.230 100.000 0.230 100.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Explained difference 0.129 71.104 0.101 55.752 0.142 61.812 0.119 51.740
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Composition effects attributable to
A. Sorting
Major 0.024 13.143 0.044 24.535 0.024 10.504 0.046 19.944
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Occupation 0.029 16.165 0.041 17.653
(0.006) (0.006)
Industry 0.023 12.708 0.017 7.195
(0.004) (0.004)
Perc./actual ability
& personality
0.004 2.432 0.005 2.899 0.024 10.443 0.027 11.786
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
B. Labor supply/family planning
Hours worked 0.018 9.783 0.018 9.714 0.017 7.299 0.019 8.234
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Children 0.005 2.969 0.007 4.065 -0.002 -0.723 0.003 1.388
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
C. Negotiation styles
Boldness 0.025 13.904 0.026 14.539 0.022 9.440 0.024 10.388
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 10788 10788 9146 9146
Notes: This table decomposes the differences in log expected starting or lifetime wages into compo-
nents attributable to (A) sorting into majors, occupations, and industries as well as perceived ability,
personality and economic preferences (perceived ability on the job and in university, IQ, Big Five per-
sonality traits, altruism, impatience, positive and negative reciprocity, risk aversion and trust), (B)
labor supply and family planning (expected hours per week, expected number of children, months at
home with children, indicator for early parenthood), and (C) negotiation styles (as defined in Sec-
tion 4.2.4) using Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. For each decomposition, we also present the share
of the difference that is attributable to the respective component and present results with and without
controls for sorting into occupation and industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Log gross
annual wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
We conduct several additional analyses and robustness checks. First, we notice
that the above Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition explains a substantial portion, but
not all of the difference in male-female expected starting (lifetime) wages. Given
the breadth of available measures on individual characteristics in our data, unmea-
sured differences in personal characteristics are unlikely to account for the remain-
ing difference. Instead, differences in regional contexts may prove important (see,
e.g., Kuchler and Zafar, forthcoming; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011;Malmendier and
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Figure 4.5. Decomposition of expected wages
Notes: Figure 4.5a illustrates the decomposition of expected starting and lifetime wages presented
in Table 4.3. Figure 4.5b presents this decomposition for all ages over the life cycle. Categories are
aggregated such that labor supply/children corresponds to the sum of hours worked and children,
negotiation style/personality corresponds to negotiation style, perceived ability/discrimination as well
as personality.
Nagel, 2015), since individuals stem from very different regional labor markets with
very different actual gender wage gaps (see Figure 4.A.2). Nonetheless, our findings
displayed in Tables 4.A.5 and Figure 4.A.3 indicate that regional differences in gen-
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der wage gaps are largely unrelated to actual expected wages. Second, along the
same lines, we investigate the importance of having experienced different degrees
of female wage discrimination in previous student jobs. Here, again we find that
the wage earned in previous student jobs does not explain the wage differences as
shown in Table 4.A.6. Third, we replicate Table 4.3 for students who do not aim to
enter the public sector as for them negotiation styles might be more important than
for prospective civil servants. As Table 4.A.7 documents, we do not find substantial
differences when focusing on this subsample. Finally, in Appendix Table 4.A.8 and
4.A.9, we also present unconditional quantile decompositions corresponding to the
decompositions in Table 4.3 at different points along the distribution. The results
of these decompositions are similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions at the
mean, with one exception: the importance of negotiation styles decreases along the
distribution, while personality traits become more important in explaining the gap.
4.5 Conclusion
This study provides first large-scale evidence on the gender gap inwage expectations.
Already prior to labor market entry, women expect much lower wages than men
and this gender gap in expected wages is significant and large across all subgroups.
Moreover, it prevails along the entire distribution, and increases over the prospective
life cycle. In terms of relative magnitudes, females would need to work on average
around four hours more per week in the same occupation and industry, or major for
instance in medical sciences rather than humanities to catch up with the starting
wages of their male peers. Similarly, in expectation, it would take them about nine
years more of accumulated work experience to make up for the gender penalty.
The overall pattern of results confirms previous findings on the importance of
sorting into certain majors, industries or occupations, and a female preference for
jobs with flatter wage schedules (Blau and Ferber, 1991; Blau and Kahn, 2017;
Brunello, Lucifora, and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Zafar, 2013). Yet, except for a wage
penalty of having children early, women seem to underestimate the extent and im-
portance of child-related career breaks. We also document a striking relationship be-
tween expected wages, initial wage claims and reservation wages, and use this infor-
mation to construct a measure of negotiation styles, which reveals that women plan
to enter wage negotiations with more modest wage claims relative to their reserva-
tion wage. A decomposition of starting and lifetime wages into components related
to sorting, perceived/actual ability as well as personality, child-rearing responsibili-
ties and negotiation styles unveils that after sorting is accounted for, working hours
matter but child-related career breaks are largely unimportant. What does matter,
however, is boldness in initial wage negotiations, with important consequences for
expected starting and lifetime wages.
The above findings have implications for our understanding of wage-setting
processes, expectation formation, and economic modeling. In particular, the docu-
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mented systematic and accurate gender differences in wage expectations and their
strong relation with wage claims and reservation wages suggest that expected wages
drive actual wage differences and persistent gender wage gaps. At the same time,
the expectation formation process for wages is non-adaptive, given that relative
wage expectations are not affected by contextual labor market variables. Instead,
expected wages seem a prospective, preference-related component in wage setting,
which might thus be more easily malleable than, e.g., expectations about aggre-
gate economic relationships that are indeed shaped by experiences (Fuster, Laibson,
and Mendel, 2010; Kuchler and Zafar, forthcoming; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011,
2015). Given their accuracy and forward-looking nature, relative expected wage dis-
parities likely matter for financial decision-making, household bargaining, as well
as education and labor market choices. In this respect, our results also inform the
economic modeling of such decisions and associated learning processes (see, e.g.,
Breen and Garcia-Penalosa, 2002; Reuben, Wiswall, and Zafar, 2017; Wiswall and
Zafar, 2018b; Xia, 2016).
The findings presented in this paper also provide an explanation for several em-
pirical patterns. First, our results suggest that women are aware of the career cost
of having children early, which may explain the observational tendency to delay
child birth among highly-educated women (Bratti, 2015). However, aside from con-
siderations of timing, women underestimate the child-related dampening in their
wage trajectories, with potential implications for household bargaining and the dis-
tribution of child-rearing tasks. Thus, women may stay home at a higher rate not
only because they expect lower labor market returns than their spouses, but also be-
cause they underestimate the wage loss associated with raising children (Kuziemko
et al., 2018). Second, it seems as if reluctant negotiation behavior leads to lower
reference points and lower subsequent wage expectations. While we cannot make
strong causal statements given the nature of our data, our evidence strongly sup-
ports the idea that initial negotiation styles matter for starting wages and differences
in starting wages lead to different wage trajectories. Hence, these findings may ex-
plain why wage gaps are larger among university students entering labor markets
in which unionized wage setting is rare and where employer-employee negotiations
hold particular importance in the wage-setting process (Blau and Kahn, 2017).
Our results also deliver insights regarding the effective implementation of poli-
cies aimed at leveling the playing field between genders. First, our findings suggest
that negotiation trainings – rather than encouraging more negotiations per se (Exley,
Niederle, and Vesterlund, forthcoming) – might be an effective measure to improve
female labor market outcomes and reduce the gender wage gap (Ashraf, Bau, Low,
and McGinn, 2018). In fact, such measures seem to be more effective than poli-
cies that encourage women to enter male-dominated fields, for which the gender
gap in expectations tends to be somewhat higher. They may also be more effective
than exposure to low actual gender gaps (e.g., by enforcing equal pay in student
jobs), which we find to be unrelated to differences in wage expectations. Second, the
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above evidence suggests that information treatments on child-related wage penal-
ties might help women to gain a more realistic view of the career costs of raising a
family and they might also lead women to bargain for a more equal distribution of
child-rearing responsibilities within households. In future research, it would thus be
informative to ascertain how our measure of negotiation styles elicited before labor
market entry translates into realized wages, and whether randomly-assigned infor-
mation treatments about negotiation styles or child-related labor market penalties
can reduce actual wage gaps to the same extent as suggested in this paper.
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Figure 4.A.1. Marginal effects of increases in starting wage ranks on later earnings
Notes: This figure presents the associations between the an individual’s rank in the starting wage
distribution (Rst) and the rank in the distribution of ranks later in life (Ra, a = 40, 55) including 95%
confidence intervals. Marginal effects are from regressions of the type Ra,i = β0 + β1Rst,i + β2R2st,i +
β3R3st,i + β4R4st,i + i (a = 40, 55) estimated separately for female (red, solid) and male (blue, dashed)
students.
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Figure 4.A.2. Regional differences in actual gender wage gaps
Notes: This figure displays percentage differences in actual wages for the year 2012 across regions
(Kreise) in Germany using data from the German statistical office.
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Figure 4.A.3. Regional differences in gender wage gaps
Notes: These figures display the relationship between the expected and actual gender gap by region
(Kreise) in Germany using either the region of origin (Figure 4.A.3a; slope of -0.035, standard error:
0.037) or the current region (Figure 4.A.3b; slope of -0.062, standard error: 0.152).
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Table 4.A.1. Level and rank gaps by major
Quantiles
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
A. Level gap
Baseline -0.236 -0.221 -0.238 -0.138 -0.108
(0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011)
Control for majors -0.178 -0.148 -0.129 -0.137 -0.121
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
Separately by major
Med./Health Sciences -0.135 -0.149 -0.071 -0.183 -0.179
(0.058) (0.036) (0.031) (0.025) (0.028)
STEM -0.219 -0.232 -0.134 -0.145 -0.114
(0.019) (0.022) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015)
Law -0.116 -0.131 -0.187 -0.220 -0.140
(0.085) (0.049) (0.036) (0.057) (0.081)
Econ./Business -0.128 -0.115 -0.109 -0.108 -0.092
(0.028) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.020)
Hum./Soc. Sciences -0.165 -0.124 -0.131 -0.078 -0.106
(0.032) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.036)
B. Rank gap
Baseline -5.2 -12.6 -20.6 -19.1 -8.5
(0.3) (0.5) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8)
Control for majors -4.0 -8.1 -12.4 -13.7 -7.0
(0.4) (0.6) (0.7) (0.9) (1.0)
Separately by major
Med./Health Sciences -3.0 -5.9 -9.5 -20.2 -10.1
(1.2) (1.8) (3.1) (3.3) (2.5)
STEM -7.9 -15.2 -17.7 -14.3 -6.3
(1.0) (1.2) (1.3) (1.2) (1.0)
Law -2.7 -12.4 -21.0 -14.0 -1.7
(2.4) (3.9) (4.8) (3.6) (1.1)
Econ./Business -7.3 -10.7 -12.7 -11.7 -7.5
(1.1) (1.2) (1.2) (1.4) (1.3)
Hum./Soc. Sciences -1.3 -2.6 -7.1 -11.0 -10.6
(0.3) (0.5) (1.0) (1.9) (3.7)
Notes: Each cell of this table reports the female coefficient, which characterizes the gender differences
for different quantiles and sample specification. Panel A uses log expected wages as an outcome and
thus reports level gaps, while panel B uses percentile ranks of expected wages measured in the ex-
pected wage distribution of males and therefore reports rank gaps as outlined in section 4.2.4. Log
gross annual wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Table 4.A.2. Comparison of initial wage claims, reservation and expected wages
log(Initial claim) log(Reserv. wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Complete sample
Log average expected wage (starting) 0.954∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023)
Gender, major, occupation, industry, labor supply No Yes No Yes
R2 (adj.) .44 .44 .41 .42
Observations 15346 15346 15346 15346
p-value: Coefficient=1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60
log(Initial claim) log(Reserv. wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Females Males Females Males
B. Subsamples by gender
Log average expected wage (starting) 0.884∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032)
Gender, major, occupation, industry, labor supply Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (adj.) .4 .49 .39 .45
Observations 8720 6626 8720 6626
p-value: Coefficient=1 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.65
Notes: This table presents the relation of expected starting wages to initial wage claims and reservation
wages. In panel (a), we present results for the whole sample, while we replicate columns (2) and (4)
of panel (a) for each gender separately. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Log gross annual wages
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level.
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Table 4.A.3. Determinants of the gender gap in starting wage expectations
log(expected starting wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.184∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
A. Sorting
Medical/health sciences 0.117∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033)
STEM 0.126∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Law 0.189∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.084∗ 0.079
(0.044) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050)
Economics/business 0.174∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Civil servant -0.040∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.018 -0.020
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Agreeableness -0.009 -0.007 -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Conscientiousness 0.021∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Emotional Stability -0.001 0.000 -0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Extraversion 0.028∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Openness 0.003 -0.002 -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
B. Labor supply/family planning
Exp. working hours per week 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Exp. number of chidren 0.013∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Exp. months at home -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Exp. children before age 30 -0.006 -0.008
(0.010) (0.010)
C. Negotiation Style
Boldness 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000)
Occupation and industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subjective ability/perc. discrimination No No Yes Yes Yes
IQ and economic preferences No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 (adj.) .025 .087 .11 .16 .18
Observations 15346 15346 10788 10788 10788
Notes: This table presents regressions of log expected starting wages on varying sets of controls: vari-
ables that relate to (A) sorting based on majors (with humanities as the omitted baseline major cat-
egory), occupations, industries and standardized measures of personality, (B) labor supply and fam-
ily planning, and (C) negotiation styles. Column (5) corresponds to the specification underlying the
decomposition in Table 4.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Log gross annual wages are win-
sorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Table 4.A.4. Determinants of the gender gap in lifetime wage expectations
log(expected lifetime wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.239∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
A. Sorting
Medical/health sciences 0.163∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
STEM 0.137∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Law 0.221∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.051) (0.051)
Economics/business 0.207∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Civil servant -0.083∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Agreeableness -0.021∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Conscientiousness 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Emotional Stability 0.003 0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Extraversion 0.034∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Openness 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
B. Labor supply/family planning
Exp. working hours per week 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Exp. number of chidren 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Exp. months at home -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Exp. children before age 30 0.038∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
C. Negotiation Style
Boldness 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000)
Occupation and industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subjective ability/perc. discrimination No No Yes Yes Yes
IQ and economic preferences No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 (adj.) .052 .19 .23 .26 .28
Observations 12734 12734 9146 9146 9146
Notes: This table presents regressions of log expected starting wages on varying sets of controls: vari-
ables that relate to (A) sorting based on majors (with humanities as the omitted baseline major cat-
egory), occupations, industries and standardized measures of personality, (B) labor supply and fam-
ily planning, and (C) negotiation styles. Column (5) corresponds to the specification underlying the
decomposition in Table 4.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Log gross annual wages are win-
sorized at the 1% and 99% level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Table 4.A.5. Association of actual gender gaps with expected gender gaps
log(expected starting wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.190∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Avg. wage in county of origin (in 1,000 EUR) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Avg. wage in current county (in 1,000 EUR) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
State fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Major, occupation, industry, labor supply No No No No No Yes
R2 (adj.) .027 .029 .029 .03 .033 .16
Observations 11759 11759 11759 11759 11759 11759
Notes: This table presents regressions of log expected starting wages on a female indicator and measures of actual regional wage levels for a respondent’s own gender.
The sample is restricted to those with valid information on their county of origin (i.e., where students received their high school diploma) and current county (i.e.,
where they are currently living). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Log gross annual wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Table 4.A.6. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender gap in wage expectations
including past wages in student jobs
log(Expected starting wage) log(Expected lifetime wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
with occ. sorting without occ. sorting with occ. sorting without occ. sorting
Unadjusted difference 0.181 100.000 0.181 100.000 0.230 100.000 0.230 100.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Explained difference 0.129 71.295 0.102 56.106 0.142 61.832 0.119 51.784
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Composition effects attributable to
A. Sorting
Major 0.024 13.507 0.045 24.921 0.024 10.535 0.046 19.989
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Occupation 0.029 16.052 0.041 17.646
(0.006) (0.006)
Industry 0.023 12.673 0.017 7.192
(0.004) (0.004)
Perc./actual ability
& personality
0.004 2.227 0.005 2.659 0.024 10.421 0.027 11.751
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
B. Labor supply/family planning
Hours worked 0.018 9.764 0.018 9.709 0.017 7.302 0.019 8.239
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Children 0.005 2.694 0.007 3.766 -0.002 -0.747 0.003 1.354
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
C. Negotiation styles
Boldness 0.025 13.838 0.026 14.477 0.022 9.433 0.024 10.379
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D. Student jobs
Wage in student jobs 0.001 0.538 0.001 0.574 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.072
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 10788 10788 9146 9146
Notes: This table decomposes the differences in log expected starting or lifetime wages into compo-
nents attributable to (A) sorting into majors, occupations, and industries as well as perceived ability,
personality and economic preferences (perceived ability on the job and in university, IQ, Big Five per-
sonality traits, altruism, impatience, positive and negative reciprocity, risk aversion and trust), (B)
labor supply and family planning (expected hours per week, expected number of children, months
at home with children, indicator for early parenthood), (C) negotiation styles (as defined in sec-
tion 4.2.4), and (D) past wages in student jobs using Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. For each de-
composition, we also present the share of the difference that is attributable to the respective compo-
nent and present results with and without controls for sorting into occupation and industries. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Log gross annual wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Table 4.A.7. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender gap in wage expectations
for students who want to enter the private sector
log(Expected starting wage) log(Expected lifetime wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
with occ. sorting without occ. sorting with occ. sorting without occ. sorting
Unadjusted difference 0.186 100.000 0.186 100.000 0.252 100.000 0.252 100.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Explained difference 0.143 77.001 0.114 61.436 0.158 62.583 0.130 51.349
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Composition effects attributable to
A. Sorting
Major 0.026 14.139 0.051 27.425 0.022 8.816 0.048 19.212
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Occupation 0.034 18.483 0.046 18.169
(0.007) (0.007)
Industry 0.023 12.096 0.020 7.966
(0.005) (0.005)
Perc./actual ability
& personality
0.009 5.082 0.011 5.663 0.029 11.639 0.034 13.414
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
B. Labor supply/family planning
Hours worked 0.019 10.271 0.019 10.042 0.016 6.508 0.018 7.312
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Children 0.008 4.515 0.010 5.206 0.003 1.071 0.005 2.123
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
C. Negotiation styles
Boldness 0.023 12.416 0.024 13.099 0.021 8.414 0.023 9.289
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 8340 8340 7079 7079
Notes: This table decomposes the differences in log expected starting or lifetime wages into compo-
nents attributable to (A) sorting into majors, occupations, and industries as well as perceived ability,
personality and economic preferences (perceived ability on the job and in university, IQ, Big Five per-
sonality traits, altruism, impatience, positive and negative reciprocity, risk aversion and trust), (B)
labor supply and family planning (expected hours per week, expected number of children, months
at home with children, indicator for early parenthood), and (C) negotiation styles (as defined in sec-
tion 4.2.4) for individuals who want to enter the public sector (i.e., excluding those who aim for
the public sector) using Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. For each decomposition, we also present the
share of the difference that is attributable to the respective component and present results with and
without controls for sorting into occupation and industries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Log
gross annual wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Table 4.A.8. Quantile decomposition
Quantiles OB
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Mean
Unadjusted difference 0.225 100.000 0.208 100.000 0.225 100.000 0.122 100.000 0.086 100.000 0.181 100.000
(0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010)
Difference explained 0.183 81.465 0.124 59.396 0.119 52.743 0.085 69.452 0.058 67.731 0.129 71.104
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
Composition effects attributable to
A. Sorting
Major 0.023 10.302 0.021 10.208 0.026 11.564 0.017 13.810 0.011 12.933 0.024 13.143
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Occupation 0.046 20.285 0.028 13.556 0.028 12.279 0.018 14.513 0.017 19.616 0.029 16.165
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Industry 0.032 14.308 0.026 12.611 0.024 10.833 0.022 17.894 0.012 13.607 0.023 12.708
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Perc./actual ability & personality 0.004 1.951 0.007 3.357 0.013 5.617 0.016 13.492 0.029 33.793 0.004 2.432
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
B. Labor supply/family planning
Hours worked 0.014 6.307 0.008 3.824 0.006 2.639 0.005 4.291 0.007 8.044 0.018 9.783
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Children 0.009 4.209 -0.001 -0.675 0.002 0.987 0.006 4.975 0.005 5.563 0.005 2.969
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
C. Negotiation styles
Boldness 0.054 24.102 0.034 16.517 0.020 8.824 0.001 0.477 -0.022 -25.825 0.025 13.904
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Notes: Quantile decomposition (using unconditional quantile regressions based on Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 2009) of the gender gap in expected starting wages using
the same variables as in Table 4.3. The final column presents results from an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean for reference. Log gross annual wages are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Table 4.A.9. Quantile decomposition without sorting
Quantiles OB
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th Mean
Unadjusted difference 0.225 100.000 0.208 100.000 0.225 100.000 0.122 100.000 0.086 100.000 0.181 100.000
(0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010)
Difference explained 0.147 65.167 0.098 47.336 0.091 40.473 0.065 53.260 0.045 52.244 0.101 55.752
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Composition effects attributable to
A. Sorting
Major 0.060 26.634 0.047 22.460 0.046 20.542 0.031 25.838 0.020 23.207 0.044 24.535
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Perc./actual ability & personality 0.005 2.433 0.008 4.034 0.014 6.259 0.017 14.147 0.030 34.730 0.005 2.899
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
B. Labor supply/family planning
Hours worked 0.014 6.238 0.008 3.817 0.006 2.688 0.006 4.748 0.008 9.024 0.018 9.714
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Children 0.011 5.091 0.000 0.006 0.004 1.758 0.009 7.072 0.008 8.969 0.007 4.065
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
C. Negotiation styles
Boldness 0.056 24.770 0.035 17.020 0.021 9.226 0.002 1.455 -0.020 -23.685 0.026 14.539
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Notes: Quantile decomposition (using unconditional quantile regressions based on Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 2009) of the gender gap in expected starting wages using
the same variables as in Table 4.3 without controls for sorting into occupations and industries. The last column presents results from an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
at the mean for reference. Log gross annual wages are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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Appendix 4.B Expected Wage Gaps by Major and
Occupation
The gender gap in wage expectations prevails within majors. To determine the re-
spective gaps, we aggregate all majors into five categories (Medicine and health sci-
ences, STEM, Law, Economics and business studies, humanities and social sciences)
and present expected overall wages in Table 4.B.1. While there exists substantial
heterogeneity in levels across majors female students expect to earn less than their
male counterparts within each of the respective study fields. This holds both for
starting wages and over the life cycle. However, the gender gap is slightly lower
in fields that are traditionally chosen by females than in male-dominated subjects.
Thus females on average expect to earn only 84% of the average male starting wage
in legal studies, as compared to 93% in humanities. At the age of 55, the respective
shares decrease to 72–80%.
Table 4.B.1. Descriptive statistics of gross annual expected wages by major
Med./Health Sci. STEM
Males Females Ratio N Males Females Ratio N
Starting 38860 34282 0.88 1313 40620 35472 0.87 5234
Age 40 59589 49800 0.84 1313 58214 47314 0.81 5234
Age 55 70977 56474 0.80 1313 69692 52657 0.76 5234
Law Econ./Business
Males Females Ratio N Males Females Ratio N
Starting 48511 40670 0.84 676 40352 36345 0.90 3427
Age 40 76524 60519 0.79 676 66612 52688 0.79 3427
Age 55 96180 69487 0.72 676 82717 60698 0.73 3427
Human./Soc. Sci. All subjects
Males Females Ratio N Males Females Ratio N
Starting 31808 29480 0.93 4698 39076 33434 0.86 15348
Age 40 44822 38009 0.85 4698 58301 45765 0.78 15348
Age 55 53151 41489 0.78 4698 70518 51291 0.73 15348
Notes: This table shows average expected starting wages as well as expected wages at the age of 40
and 55 for males and females for majors aggregated into five categories. All wages are winsorized at
the 1% and 99% level.
Additionally, Table 4.B.2 presents the gender gap in wage expectations for dif-
ferent occupations. Goldin (2014) suggests that occupations for which earnings are
a nonlinear/convex in working hours have larger gender gaps than those with fairly
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flat/linear relationships. Indeed, we observe the gender gap inwage expectations for
occupations with nonlinear hours-earnings profiles (e.g. lawyers) to be larger than
for, e.g., teachers, who tend to have very flat hours-earnings profiles.23 Along these
same lines the gap tends to be smallest for authors and journalists, who might even
have decreasing hours/earnings profiles due to decreasing marginal productivity.
Students thus correctly anticipate that flatter hours-earnings profiles are associated
with lower earning gaps.
Table 4.B.2. Gender gap in wage expectations by occupations
Gender gap by occupation
Journalists
Teachers
Engineering Medical
Lawyers
& authors professionals doctors
Gap in EUR -1423 -1792 -3578 -6630 -9824
Gap in log-points -0.071 -0.130 -0.123 -0.122 -0.225
Gap in ranks -5.6 -9.7 -12.6 -13.0 -14.1
Observations 729 1141 1470 464 433
Notes: This table presents the gender gap in wage expectations measured in Euro, log-points and ranks
for different occupations. Each coefficient corresponds stems from a regression of expected wages, log
expected wages or ranks in the male expected wage distribution on an indicator for females. All wages
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
23. The table does not include results for pharmacists, as we cannot distinguish individuals plan-
ning to work in pharmacies from those planning to work in the pharmaceutical industry.
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Appendix 4.C A Regression-based Comparison of
Expected and Actual Wages
We formally compare expected and actual wages by pooling them in a single regres-
sion on an indicator for being an actual graduate. Table 4.C.1 reveals that in terms of
raw wages, graduates earn 11.2 percentage points lower wages when compared to
the expected wages of students.2⁴ Nonetheless, once we control for gender, sorting
patterns and hours worked the difference vanishes. In fact, this difference is entirely
driven by differences in hours worked as some graduates start working part-time af-
ter finishing their studies and thus earn lower wages than graduates in full-time jobs.
Similar to what has been found in the literature (e.g., Webbink and Hartog, 2004;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2018a), the wage expectations of students elicited in our survey
thus tracks the distribution of realized earnings very well once we account for hours
worked. This suggests that the gender gap in expected wages likely translates into
differences in realized wages.
Table 4.C.1. Comparison of expected and actual log wages
log wages (pooled)
(1) (2)
Actual graduate -0.112 0.016
(0.022) (0.025)
Gender, major, occupation, industry, labor supply No Yes
R2 (adj.) .0022 .13
Observations 16501 16400
Notes:Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample pools over log gross annual wages of both current
students using expected wages and actual graduates with realized wages. All wages are winsorized at
the 1% and 99% level.
24. Note that we do not observe a difference in mean actual and expected wages but in log wages,
given that taking the logarithm gives more weight on the lower end of the wage distribution. As can
be seen from Figure 4.4, this is where the differences between actual and expected wages are more
pronounced.
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